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PREFACE 
or many years, the countries of the Black Sea belonged to two 
totally opposing political and military blocs. With the end of the 
Cold War, the countries of the region jointly decided to revive the 
cooperative spirit by setting up the Organisation of the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC), despite the fact that the Black Sea area is 
one of the most diverse regions in the world. The eleven member states of 
the BSEC (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, 
Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine) have 
concluded that their common interests should prevail and that they can 
better promote them through cooperation. 
BSEC’s diversity makes it also very convenient to play the role of a 
bridge between Europe, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. The BSEC 
member states together constitute a vast Euro-Asian space of almost 20 
million square kilometres, populated by 340 million people. It possesses 
huge deposits of natural, particularly energy, resources. It is also very 
important for the transportation of the energy resources of the Caspian 
Sea and Central Asia to the rest of the world. Its geo-strategic importance 
is substantial since it includes Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the countries 
of the Caucasus among its members. 
Especially after the 11th of September 2001, BSEC could become an 
excellent example of how countries so different from each other cannot 
only co-exist but also cooperate closely in many fields. The success of a 
formation like BSEC may be also instrumental not only in promoting 
economic growth and stability in the region but in facilitating its 
integration with the wider European structures too. 
The accession of the candidate countries from South East Europe into the 
European Union (EU) will create a de facto new relationship between the 
latter and the Black Sea region. The enlarged EU would greatly benefit 
from enhanced cooperation with the non-EU countries in the Black Sea 
region and will not be able to fully exploit its growth potential if the 
BSEC area continues to stagnate and lag behind its new members. 
The BSEC has developed a rather sophisticated organisational structure 
which, in addition to its intergovernmental bodies, includes also the 
Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, the BSEC Parliamentary 
Assembly, the BSEC Business Council and the International Center for 
Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), its think tank. 
F 
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In charting the future road of BSEC, its member states miss no 
opportunity to reiterate their readiness to establish a close collaboration 
with the European Union and jointly forge the Black Sea dimension with 
it. To this end the ICBSS and other members of the BSEC family are 
trying to contribute to a better understanding between the EU and the 
BSEC and to a recognition by all parties of the mutual benefits to be 
derived from an institutionalised BSEC-EU relationship. 
This is especially so as the parallel processes of globalisation and its 
counterpart regionalisation affect the relationship between the EU and its 
new neighbouring regions and make necessary the search for new bonds 
of collaboration in various fields.  
In order to facilitate a better exchange of ideas and understanding about 
the future of the wider Europe and to promote the dialogue between the 
BSEC and the EU, the International Center for Black Sea Studies 
identified the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels as 
an ideal partner. With its tremendous experience and credibility, CEPS is 
very well suited for the task of developing together with the ICBSS 
common projects of mutual interest on the interface between the EU and 
the BSEC in such important fields as energy, the environment and the 
overall relationship between the two. 
The present publication is the result of this cooperation and we hope that 
it will bring the EU and BSEC closer. Such a development would lead 
not only to a stronger Europe, but more prosperity, security and stability 
to the wider region stretching from northwest Russia to the Black Sea, the 
Caucasus, the Caspian, Central Asia and the easte rn Mediterranean. 
We are grateful to CEPS and its staff for the quality of our cooperation so 
far and look forward to a long-lasting, mutually satisfactory and 
rewarding relationship.  
 
 
Yannis Papanikolaou 
Director-General, ICBSS 
Athens 
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EUROPE AND THE BLACK SEA -  
MODEL REGIONALISM, PRÊT-À-PORTER 
MICHAEL EMERSON AND MARIUS VAHL 
1.  Introduction1 
The house of the Organisation for Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC) is now a fine piece of regional architecture, symbolised by its 
elegant mansion on the shore of the Bosphorus, but reflected more 
significantly of course in its comprehensive institutional structure 
(ministerial councils, working groups, permanent secretariat, 
parliamentary assembly, business council, development bank, think tank, 
etc.). 
There is a general concern that the operational performance of BSEC is 
still thin, however, and that the considerable political and institutional 
investments are under-exploited. What is BSEC really meant to do? Or, 
more broadly, how should Black Sea cooperation best be organised to fit 
into the new European architecture? How should BSEC relate to the 
important cooperative activities in the Black Sea region that essentially 
take place outside the BSEC framework (for example in the fields of the 
environment, transport and energy)? How should BSEC and the EU relate 
to each other, given that half the Black Sea coastline is now accounted for 
by member states that are also candidates for accession to the EU, and 
that BSEC has invited the EU to become an observer and later possibly a 
full member?  
This paper argues that BSEC should focus more strongly right now on a 
set of core functions that have an intrinsically important regional aspect, 
rather than aspire to be a general purpose international organisation 
covering almost all desirable policy objectives of the member states. To 
achieve this stronger focus, BSEC would need to do three things. First, it 
would have to strengthen its technical staff expertise to prepare projects 
and actions in priority sectors. Secondly, it would need to reach a basic 
agreement with the European Union over how to deal with the several EU 
policy competences that are now going to increasingly overlap in EU 
                                                                 
1 The authors are grateful for helpful conversations with Valeri Chechelashvili 
and his colleagues at the BSEC Permanent Secretariat, Yannis Papanicolaou of 
the ICBSS and several EU officials, none of whom of course are in any way 
responsible for opinions expressed in the paper. 
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member states, its accession candidates and other European states. Third, 
it would also be necessary to bring closer to BSEC, if not fully inside its 
institutional structure, a number of core regional activities (such as in the 
interrelated fields of energy, environment and transport) which presently 
are largely pursued outside BSEC.  
Whether to capitalise on the considerable investments already made in 
BSEC is now a matter for policy-makers to decide both within existing 
BSEC member states and the EU. From the EU point of view, BSEC is 
seeking to do all the things that EU policy is typically looking for in 
regional cooperative structures in the area of its borderlands. In other 
regions the EU has deplored the lack of will or capacity of regional 
leaders to develop seriously cooperative structures and has itself had to 
take the lead (e.g. in South East Europe and the Mediterranean), even if it 
is virtually impossible to succeed where the region itself is unwilling. In 
the Black Sea case, regional leaders have themselves put together in 
BSEC a prêt-à-porter (‘ready-to-wear’ or ‘off-the-rack’) set of 
institutional structures. It would seem to be a remarkable opportunity 
offered to the EU now to join this endeavour and help achieve possible 
high returns with the aid of a marginal investment of diplomatic, expert 
and financial resources on its part. The EU should surely not adopt a ‘not 
invented in Brussels’ reason for keeping at a distance from BSEC.  
2.  Multilateral Cooperation in the Black Sea Region 
BSEC is not alone among the institutions of post-Cold War Europe which 
now, after around a decade of experience, are reflecting on how to 
proceed in the years ahead. A common challenge for these institutions is 
how to face the issues of deepening and/or widening. A related theme is 
whether to embrace flexibility (or variable geometry) in order to 
reconcile the deepening and/or widening challenge.  
Europe as a whole has seen basically two types of institutional 
development in the post-Cold War era: 
· Progressive widening of membership of the global and European 
organisations, which has gone ahead quickly for the OSCE, IMF, 
IBRD, and Council of Europe, but more slowly for the WTO, and 
even slower for NATO and the EU. 
· Creation of new regional organisations or cooperative arrangements 
overlapping the former frontiers of the Cold War blocs, and the new 
primary categories of EU members, EU candidates, and non-EU 
candidate states. This has become in fact now a general pattern for all 
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the enlarging EU’s border regions: with Baltic and Barents Sea 
organisations now grouped under the Northern Dimension initiative, 
the Barcelona Process for the Mediterranean, the Stability Pact for 
South East Europe. BSEC completes this picture, and is the only one 
of these home-grown regional organisations whose region has not 
been the target of an EU regional initiative.  
The EU is now invited by BSEC to become more deeply involved in the 
Black Sea region, as an observer or full member. In principle this could 
help deepen the value of BSEC cooperation, since the EU could 
contribute skills and financial resources which are lacking, and because 
the EU enlargement process is in any case going to extend the reach of 
EU policies into the Black Sea region.  
2.1  BSEC institutions  
Although BSEC is primarily an intergovernmental organisation, it also 
has established parliamentary, local government, business, academic and 
financial institutions, and these all constitute important elements of an 
emerging network of cooperation in the wider Black Sea region.  
Since the creation of BSEC in June 1992, most of the efforts have 
focused on the progressive establishment and development of these 
institutions. In 1993 the Parliamentary Assembly of BSEC (PABSEC) 
was established, and has since 1997 (when Bulgaria joined the Assembly) 
included parliamentarians from all 11 BSEC parliaments. Agreement on 
the creation of a Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) was 
reached in 1994, although the Bank was not established until 1998 and 
become operational as recently as June 1999. 1994 also saw the 
establishment of a Permanent Secretariat (PERMIS) in Istanbul. 
Academic cooperation was initiated in 1996-98 with the establishment of 
the Black Sea Universities Network, the BSEC Standing Academic 
Committee and the International Center for Black Sea Studies in Athens. 
In April 1999, BSEC was established as a regional economic organisation 
under international law, with the entry into force of the 1998 Charter of 
the Organisation of BSEC. 
It is possible that the institutions of BSEC could be given a stronger 
regional identity. For example, Russian parliamentarians in PABSEC are 
from the Black Sea region. Is this also the case for parliamentarians of 
PABSEC from Ukraine and Turkey? While there is an association of 
Black Sea Capitals, BSEC might consider one of the features of the 
Baltic and Barents Sea initiatives, which are councils of regional 
government representatives. 
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Box 1. BSEC institutions 
Intergovernmental institutions 
Summit meetings of the Heads of State and Government of BSEC determine 
its strategic direction, such as its establishment in 1992 and its 
transformation into a formal regional organisation decided in 1998. Five 
summits of BSEC have taken place (1992, 1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999). 
The principal regular decision-making organ of BSEC is the Council of 
Ministers, which consists of the 11 Foreign Ministers of the BSEC states. 
The Council meets twice a year, each time chaired by the Foreign Minister 
of the country assuming the six-month Chairmanship of BSEC. The 
Chairman-in Office is supported by a Committee of Senior Officials, a 
number of sectoral Working Groups (at present 13). In addition to the 
regular meetings of the Council of Ministers, there are also meetings of 
other BSEC ministers, although this is on an ad hoc non-institutional basis. 
A ‘Troika’-mechanism of consultation, including the past, the current and 
the future chairmen, was introduced in 1995 in order to ensure continuity, 
but does not play a prominent role.  
A Permanent Secretariat (PERMIS) has been established in Istanbul to co-
ordinate BSEC activities. PERMIS has its own budget to which all member 
states contribute according to an agreed-upon formula, and currently has a 
staff of 16 people, nine of whom are professionals. PERMIS lacks the legal 
status to be a contracting partner on behalf of BSEC. In order to strengthen 
continuity of BSEC activities, the current (April-November 2001) Turkish 
Chairmanship intends to encourage the BSEC member states to accredit 
permanent delegations to BSEC, which, eventually, could lead to the 
establishment of a Council of Permanent Representatives based in Istanbul.  
Interparliamentary cooperation 
The Parliamentary Assembly of BSEC (PABSEC) is a related body of 
BSEC consisting of national parliamentarians, aimed at the harmonisation 
of legislation required to implement BSEC projects. The Assembly meets 
twice a year, and works in three committees (Economic/environment, 
Legal/political and Education/social). A Secretariat has been established in 
Istanbul. In contrast to the Council of Ministers, the PABSEC agenda is not 
limited to economic cooperation. Although there has been only limited 
progress towards legal harmonisation, PABSEC has taken several useful 
initiatives, such as its initiatives to promote sub-national cooperation. 
Financing 
The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank  (BSTDB), the autonomous 
financial institution of BSEC, became operational in June 1999, with an 
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initial capital of $300 million expected to rise to $1.5 billion. Greece, 
Russia and Turkey have 16.5% of the shares each, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Ukraine 13.5% each, while the remaining five BSEC governments have 2% 
each. With BSEC now consolidated as an international organisation, the 
core of BSEC activity will be the implementation of concrete joint projects. 
The BSTDB is expected to play a key role in the future of BSEC. 
Sub-national cooperation 
In comparison with similar regional organisations in Europe (such as CBSS 
and BEAC), the sub-national level of cooperation is less developed within 
BSEC. Some institutions like the International Black Sea Club (IBSC) and 
the Association of Black Sea Capitals (BSCA) have been established, the 
latter following an initiative by PABSEC. However, the IBSC has 
participants only from 6 of the 11 BSEC countries, while BSCA is, as its 
name implies, limited to the capital cities.  
Private sector involvement  
The BSEC Business Council (BSEC BC) consists of representatives of the 
business communities in the 11 BSEC countries, and has observer status in 
BSEC. A Secretariat has been established for BSEC BC, located with 
PERMIS in Istanbul.  
Academic cooperation 
Following the establishment of the BSEC Standing Academic Committee in 
1996, the International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) was set up in 
Athens to carry out policy-oriented and practical research. The ICBSS staff 
currently consists of only six persons, so its capacity to conduct extensive 
research is limited. 
2.2  Other Black Sea regional arrangements  
Although BSEC is the only multi-purpose arena for regional cooperation 
in the Black Sea region, there are several multilateral projects and 
programmes in the region that take place outside the BSEC framework. 
Cooperation in the fields of environment, transport, energy, soft security 
and, in the near future, fisheries are particularly important in the context 
of EU-Black Sea relations. 
Environment. The 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Black Sea 
against Pollution (The Bucharest Convention) was ratified by the 
parliaments of the six littoral states in early 1994. Implementation is 
managed by a Commission with a small secretariat in Istanbul (the 
current staff of two persons will eventually grow to six), the 
establishment of which was delayed until autumn 2000. In the meantime, 
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a Black Sea Environmental Programme (BSEP) supported by the UN’s 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the EU, was launched in 1993. 
Since 1993, the GEF has committed approximately $11 million to the 
programme. The BSEP, through its secretariat in Istanbul (which shares 
premises with the Commission secretariat), has conducted a 
comprehensive analysis of transboundary environmental problems in the 
region and developed a strategic action plan for the rehabilitation and 
protection of the Black Sea, which was signed by the six governments in 
1996. Regional activity centres have been established in all six countries, 
although they are not operational because of a lack of funding for 
projects, which is the responsibility of the host governments. 
Infrastructure. The European Commission has developed several large 
multilateral infrastructure programmes for the wider Black Sea region. 
The Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) programme 
was launched in 1993 by the five Central Asian and three South Caucasus 
countries together with the European Union. This consists of EU-funded 
technical assistance and catalytic investment support (so far 
approximately €100 million) to develop a transport corridor on a East-
West axis from Europe, across the Black Sea, through the Caucasus and 
the Caspian Sea to central Asia. Four sectoral working groups in 
operation from 1995 to 1999 developed the programme plan. The 
technical assistance provided through the TRACECA programme has 
helped to attract large investments by the international financial 
institutions, in particular the EBRD, which by itself has committed 
approximately €300 million to TRACECA projects. The TRACECA 
process led to the signing of the Basic Multilateral Agreement on 
International Transport for the Development of TRACECA in 1998 by 12 
countries from Eastern Europe to Central Asia, among them all BSEC 
member states except Albania, Greece and Russia. 
At the third European Conference of Ministers of Transport in 1997 
dedicated to pan-European transport infrastructure, the Black Sea was 
designated as one of four Pan-European Transport Areas (PETrAs), the 
maritime complement to the Pan-European Transport Corridors. A 
Steering Group composed of representatives of the eight participating 
states (the six Black Sea littoral countries, Greece and Moldova) and the 
EU Commission was established in 1999. Four sectoral working groups 
and an annually revised Action Programme have been developed. A 
decision has been made by the Steering Group to establish a technical 
secretariat of the Black Sea PETrA in Odessa, Ukraine, although the 
BSEC Permanent Secretariat offered to house it in Istanbul on its 
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premises. Agreement on the final map is expected towards the end of 
2001, and will be followed by an action plan for the Black Sea PETrA. 
The Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) is an EU-
funded regional programme of technical assistance and modest 
investment support for oil and gas infrastructure in the wider Black Sea 
region, launched in 1995. At the first INOGATE summit in July 1999, 
the INOGATE Umbrella Agreement, a treaty setting out an institutional 
system aimed at facilitating the development of oil and gas transportation 
networks, was signed. The treaty, which entered into force in February 
2001, opened up for the participation in INOGATE of countries not 
covered by the Commission’s TACIS programme. As of today, the 
Umbrella Agreement has been signed by 21 countries, including all 
BSEC member states except Russia. A secretariat for INOGATE was 
inaugurated in Kyiv in November 2000. 
Security. First proposed in 1998, the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task 
Group (BlackSeaFor) agreement was signed by the six Black Sea littoral 
states in April 2001, and will enter into force following parliamentary 
ratification. The group was activated in September 2001. The purpose of 
BlackSeaFor is to cooperate in search and rescue operations, mine-
clearing operations, environmental cooperation and organising goodwill 
visits among the Black Sea navies. No permanent headquarters will be 
established for BlackSeaFor, but will follow the rotating presidency of 
the group. At least one joint manoeuvre is planned each year. 
Fisheries. A fisheries convention for the Black Sea is likely to be signed 
in the near future, with two options currently under consideration. The 
first option entails a BSEC agreement, the second a convention outside 
BSEC with only the six littoral states participating. In the latter case, a 
Commission and a secretariat would be established, while in the former 
these functions would be handled by a working group on fisheries and 
PERMIS. 
2.3  What kind of international organisation is BSEC to be? 
The new Europe has an abundance of multilateral organisations and 
cooperative arrangements. The growth and evolution of these initiatives 
is a Darwinian process. Some institutions prove their vitality for decades. 
New circumstances, such as the end of the Cold War division of Europe, 
see new institutions created, some old institutions adapt, while others 
become marginalised or wither away. Some are complementary, whereas 
some are competitors. Differences of membership in some of these 
institutions by BSEC member states are illustrated in Table 1. This makes 
EMERSON &  VAHL 
8 
it quite evident that the Darwinian processes have not yet run their course 
in this field. It is not possible for all of these institutions and BSEC to 
have significant roles in overlapping sectors of policy all at the same 
time.  
BSEC cooperation is founded on three mutually supporting motivations, 
as clearly explained in the work programme of the Turkish Presidency in 
2001:  
1. Cooperation rather than conflict. Common ground among BSEC 
member states is that the organisation should serve to create a 
presumption of cooperation in a region that has much potential for 
tension and conflict, as can be seen between several of the pairs of 
member states. It is already to be recognised as a success that BSEC has 
gone a long way in establishing this presumption of cooperation, even 
while some serious conflicts and tensions in the region – in the Caucasus 
in particular – have remained unresolved. 
2. Regionalism as well as globalisation. There is also a sufficiently 
widespread growth of regionalism in all continents, in a world of 
globalisation, to say with confidence that the two phenomena – 
regionalisation and globalisation – are complementary. 
Table 1. Participation by BSEC member states in selected European 
organisations 
 EU NATO GUUAM CIS Tashkent Treaty 
Greece X X    
Turkey (x) X    
Bulgaria  (x) (x)    
Romania (x) (x)    
Albania   (x)    
Georgia    X X  
Moldova   X X  
Azerbaijan   X X  
Ukraine   X X  
Armenia    X X 
Russia     X X 
X = Member state; (x) = Candidate state for EU accession. 
3. Avoiding new divisions in Europe. Within Europe as a whole there is 
also the specific issue of how to bring together as harmoniously as 
possible the enlarging European Union and the rest of Europe, with many 
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sensitive issues arising over the rela tions between the EU members, its 
candidate states and the non-candidate states. 
These principles are all well and good. They are sufficient to justify in 
principle the substantial investments made in the BSEC process. 
However there is next the question how to select the domains for 
substantive work. BSEC has chosen to throw the net exceedingly wide. 
This is seen in the long list of sectoral policy working groups that have 
been established (Box 2) and in the recent ‘BSEC Economic Agenda for 
the Future’ document of April 2001 adopted at the Moscow Ministerial 
Meeting (whose numerous headings are listed in Box 3). As the next 
section reviews in more detail, the many headings range from those 
which relate to very concrete Black Sea matters, through to important 
policy objectives which are general for the national policies of member 
states, with no real Black Sea regional aspect.  
Box 2. BSEC Working Groups 
1. Economic and trade development 
2. Tourism cooperation 
3. Communication 
4. Environmental protection 
5. Agriculture and agricultural industry 
6. Energy 
7. Electronic communication network 
8. Scientific and technological cooperation 
9. Statistical information and data exchange 
10. Health care and pharmaceuticals 
11. Transport 
12. Emergency assistance 
13. Combating crime 
The unease over the under-performance of BSEC seems related to this 
primary distinction between the regional and the general issues. More 
precisely the problem is that several of the most important regional issues 
such as in the energy, environment and environment fields, where BSEC 
should in principle have a comparative advantage, are in fact being 
handled wholly or to a large degree outside the BSEC framework. On the 
other hand, BSEC aims to discuss many general policy issues, for which 
it does not have a comparative advantage, for example macroeconomic 
and governance issues, where the huge financial and/or analytical 
resources of the IMF, World Bank and OECD are deployed. 
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The European Union factor is now also of real significance to the future 
of BSEC. At one time a few years ago it seemed that several BSEC 
member states felt that BSEC could actually serve the purpose of being 
an alternative to the EU as their privileged regional framework. For 
example, it has suggested that this was at some point the case for Turkey 
[Valinakis, 1999], and for Romania [Hartwig, 2001]. Now the 
perspectives are completely different, however. The EU candidacies of 
Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are deepening stories, and the external 
impact of EU policies beyond the forthcoming enlargements becomes a 
major topic for the future neighbours. In fact the EU is very active in 
areas of prime concern to the Black Sea region – energy, environment 
and transport.  
The EU is not currently using BSEC, however, as an operational agency 
in these policy domains. If this does not change, the chances are that 
BSEC will continue to play a rather secondary role. The EU might take 
up a more visionary view of the new euro-regionalism, in which it 
already invests extensively (Northern Dimension, Stability Pact for 
South-East Europe, Barcelona Process), and where the Black Sea region 
remains the missing piece. According to such a view, the enlarging EU 
would establish deeply cooperative relations with all its eastern border 
regions, so to avoid perceptions of new Berlin Walls. This would mean a 
change of policy by the EU towards BSEC, and require first and foremost 
a clear signal by BSEC member states of their willingness to build up the 
role of the organisation.  
2.4 What is the core business of Black Sea regionalism? 
The recent BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future document does not 
really clarify what BSEC’s core business is to be. A project-based 
approach is announced in general. However the list of sectoral policy 
headings remains extremely long (Box 3 lists all the headings of this 
document). The commentary on these headings often does not distinguish 
between desirable general objectives of national policies and specifically 
regional projects where BSEC as an organisation could have a 
comparative advantage. The Work Programme of the Turkish 
Chairmanship for the period May to October 2001 is more selective and 
perhaps reflects more realistically the present orientation of the 
organisation. As a contribution to discussing BSEC priorities, a tentative 
regrouping of the headings of the Economic Agenda document is offered, 
as follows.  
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Category A: Domains where regional cooperation is an essential aspect 
of efficient policy-making, and where the Black Sea region itself has an 
objective vocation. 
· Energy: gas and oil projects. Key investment decisions over pipeline 
and transportation routes are intensely competitive processes, with 
the final responsibilities lying mostly with the major international 
energy corporations and unilateral or bilateral negotiations. Therefore 
BSEC has not been involved in negotiations or decision-making. 
That fact, however, should not exclude discussion of many vital 
issues at BSEC level, such as sharing full information about the 
options for strategic investments, policy framework conditions and 
secondary coordination activity. In particular the two big new trunk 
lines for exporting Caspian oil are now either built (CPC to 
Novorossisk) or committed (Baku-Ceyhan). As argued elsewhere in 
this book in the paper by Terry Adams, this new situation may make 
it easier now to discuss in a BSEC forum the alternative options for a 
Bosphorus bypass investment with independent experts. 
· Energy: electricity network interconnections. The Black Sea 
electricity ring concept is established and is more the responsibility of 
state enterprises and ministries. Establishment of the ring, and then 
work on a regional electricity market are therefore highly plausible 
BSEC tasks. This project calls for technical assistance for its 
specification and later investment. 
· Transport. BSEC transport ministers have drawn up an action plan, 
and the Turkish Chairmanship currently gives priority to the Black 
Sea Ring Corridor concept. There are two other major EU-led 
initiatives that are advancing outside BSEC, the Black Sea Pan-
European Transport Area (Black Sea Petra), and the TRACECA 
project for linking Central Asia and the Caucasus to Europe. There is 
therefore a large issue of coordination with the EU here. In addition 
the Bosphorus poses very sharp issues of transport policy, which are 
inadequately covered by the outdated Montreaux Convention of 
1936, especially its environmental aspects. As also argued in the 
paper by T. Adams, the Bosphorus issues deserve now to be the 
subject of constructive dialogue.  
· Environmental protection. This is already the most advanced 
example of Black Sea policy-making, given the work under the aegis 
of the Bucharest Convention and the Black Sea Environmental 
Programme. The six littoral states adopted a Strategic Action Plan for 
the Rehabilitation and Protection of the Black Sea in 1996, and have 
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received substantial support from the Global Environment Facility of 
the UN and from the EU for its implementation. This significant 
activity grew up outside the BSEC institutional framework, however, 
although its offices are also located in Istanbul. While the six littoral 
states have special responsibilities for the Black Sea, the 
fundamentals of its pollution or protection lie in its watersheds, first 
in importance being the Danube basin, followed by the Dniester and 
Don. The crucial importance of the entire Danube basin for the Black 
Sea is now reflected in the forthcoming publication by the EU 
Commission of a policy communication on ‘Environment in the 
Danube and Black Sea Region’. (Germany, Austria and most of 
Central and South East Europe are thus involved.) This is also a 
domain where the EU’s enlargement has a direct impact on the Black 
Sea, given the legally binding water standards that EU law imposes 
on member states. If BSEC is to be the lead organisation for Black 
Sea cooperation, some way would need to be found institutionally to 
bring it closer to the Black Sea Environmental Programme. (See 
paper by Laurence David Mee elsewhere in this book.) 
Box 3. The BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future 
I.    Acceleration of effective multilateral economic cooperation and  
       attainment of sustainable development 
- Concerted actions for economic expansion of the BSEC member 
states  
Project-based approach 
       Project elaboration and promotion 
- Intra-regional trade and investment 
- Banking and finance 
Defining priorities for cooperation in specific sectors of the  economy 
- Energy: oil and gas projects, interconnection of electricity networks  
- Transport 
- Telecommunications 
- Environmental protection  
- Science and technology 
- Information and communication technology 
- Investment in education and training 
- Regional strategy for agricultural development and food security 
- Tourism 
- Strengthening of the BSEC business dimension – SMEs 
- Exchange and harmonisation of statistical data and economic 
information and adoption of common accounting principles  
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II.   Cooperation in the field of institutional renewal and governance  
- Legality and legitimacy 
- Effective partnerships 
- Policy integration 
- Investing in government capacity 
- Black Sea cities exchange 
- Anticipating crisis management 
- Building key networks 
III. Soft security measures in the framework of multilateral economic 
       cooperation 
- Cooperation in combating organised crime, illegal trafficking of drugs 
and arms, terrorism, corruption, money laundering in the wider 
European context 
- Cooperation in emergency situations 
IV. BSEC: Towards the mature partnership, common endeavour and 
       shared values 
- Broadening the basis for multilateral cooperation among 
governmental and parliamentary structures, NGOs, businessmen and 
academic communities 
- The role of PABSEC and national parliaments of the BSEC member 
states 
- Further development and improvement of the BSEC implementation 
and co-ordination mechanisms 
- The role of the BSEC PERMIS 
V.   External relations of the BSEC organisation 
- The BSEC role in the new European architecture 
- The BSEC-EU Platform of Cooperation 
- BSEC and the world – cooperation with other international 
organisations 
Source: BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future: Towards a more consolidated, 
effective and viable BSEC partnership, document adopted by BSEC in 
March 2001, BS/SOM/R(01)2, Annex III. The main headings of this 
document are reproduced above. 
· Fisheries. This is a surprising omission from the BSEC Economic 
Agenda document, especially since a multilateral convention has 
been under negotiation for some time. This is the purest example of a 
policy domain for the six littoral states to share. With Bulgaria and 
Romania now negotiating various policies related to their accession 
to the EU, including fisheries, there are some sharp issues also arising 
from the EU side (see paper by L. Mee).  
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· Tourism. The tourism sector has great potential, but is today limited 
by a series of problems (unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus, visa 
restrictions, dilapidated investments, limited ferry boat and air 
transport services, etc.). Redevelopment will call for much detailed 
coordination and new investment by local government and business 
interests.  
All of the above domains will have important requirements for financing 
of investments and prior feasibility studies. The aim of BSEC to focus on 
a project approach in such areas seems fully justified, and the Black Sea 
Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) is well suited to support this. 
The need for grant-financed feasibility studies and for leveraging the 
capital resources of the BSTDB is acute, and here the EU, EBRD and 
EIB could all be useful partners.  
Category B: Domains where there might be a useful Black Sea 
dimension, although the policy domains are essentially domestic and 
national in character. 
· Telecommunications 
· Science and technology 
· Education and training 
· Agricultural development and food security 
· Business cooperation and SMEs 
These are all policy domains where there is a secondary case for Black 
Sea regional cooperation, and the Turkish Chairmanship’s work 
programme has several examples of the project approach, such as 
developing in the educational field the Black Sea University Network, 
and in the field of agriculture cooperating to prevent the spread of foot 
and mouth disease. 
· Cooperation in emergency situations 
· Anticipating crisis management 
· Soft security: crime, trafficking, terrorism 
These are new fields for BSEC, with specific initiatives on a Police 
Liaison Centre discussed, and a Task Force on money laundering. These 
three headings together are indicative of BSEC’s interest in entering the 
soft security domain. Cooperation with the EU in these areas is also 
conceivable.  
Category C: Domains where the policy is essentially national or 
supranational at a more global level, and where the regional dimension 
has little or no operational meaning.  
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· Concerted actions for economic expansion. This concerns 
general economic policy-making, for which the IMF, World 
Bank and OECD are the lead international organisations, and 
which have deployed their priorities considerably in favour of 
transition economics in the last decade. BSEC has no 
comparative advantage, especially noting the strength of 
professional analytical skills of the lead organisations. At best it 
can be said that Greece and Turkey have some special insights 
because of their recent or incomplete transitions. 
· Main features of trade policy. BSEC continues to refer to a 
BSEC Free Trade Area as an objective, even if a long-term one. 
It has to be remarked that regional free trade is legally impossible 
for individual BSEC member states that are either partners in a 
customs union with the EU (Turkey) or EU members (Greece 
today, others tomorrow). Free trade for BSEC only makes sense 
as an objective under one of two conditions. Either the whole of 
Europe becomes one pan-European free trade area, which is 
certainly an interesting idea for the future but one whose 
achievement would not be through the agency of BSEC, or BSEC 
undertakes policies with a variable geometry that excludes EU 
members and candidate states. In the latter case, however, it 
reverts to becoming a variant of either the CIS, the EurAsian 
Economic Community or GUUAM free trade. More plausibly, 
BSEC can pursue more modest objectives for trade facilitation, 
and the Turkish Chairmanship’s work programme includes the 
example of facilitating the transport of goods on the model that 
the Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI) has 
developed for South East Europe.  
Category C would also include most of the headings aiming at improved 
institutions and governance, namely: 
· Legality and legitimacy 
· Effective partnership 
· Policy integration 
· Responsible budgeting 
· Investing in government capacity 
Category C would seem to include sectoral policy domains such as: 
· Information and communication technology 
· Statistics and common accounting standards 
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In general these category C topics seem too extensive for BSEC to 
become significantly engaged in them. It is indicative they do not feature 
much or in some cases at all in the Turkish Presidency’s work 
programme.  
Category D: Post-conflict rehabilitation of conflict zones. The BSEC area 
still suffers from several sub-regional conflicts, either live conflicts or 
those frozen but unresolved (Transdniester, Abkhazia, Nagorno-
Karabakh, South Ossetia, Chechnya). Resolution of these conflicts is 
surely not for the BSEC agenda, given the involvement of the specialised 
services of OSCE and UN, as well as intense negotiations between the 
parties directly concerned. However these conflict zones are areas of 
extremely depressed living conditions. As and when the directly 
interested parties succeed in making political settlements, there will be 
important needs and opportunities for re-opening these blockaded 
economies, reconstructing housing and economic infrastructures, and re-
establishing normal flows of trade and personal movements. At some 
stage BSEC might be mandated to sponsor regional rehabilitation 
programmes for such regions.  
2.5  Issues of deepening, widening and variable geometry 
A sharper regional focus on the BSEC agenda seems indispensable in 
order to deepen BSEC’s operational impact. This seems to be the way 
BSEC priorities are developing in practice.  
In support of this deepening there would have to be a strengthening of the 
staff capacity to prepare technical proposals, since existing BSEC staff 
are mainly diplomats on secondment. There is a problem here of 
financing. BSEC’s budget was in initial years entirely funded by Turkey, 
including costs of setting up. The present budget is only about $1 million, 
but apparently stretches the possibilities of some member states. If 
BSEC’s own budget cannot be increased substantially, there are two 
conceivable approaches, both involving the EU and its member states.  
· First, at the most pragmatic level, cooperative arrangements could be 
developed where other agencies have set up technical offices in 
BSEC core areas of interest. For example the Black Sea 
Environmental Programme exists also in Istanbul, but even reciprocal 
observer status is not yet fully activated. For the transport sector, the 
PETrA steering committee has an office being established in Odessa, 
which could have been located in Istanbul and even housed in 
BSEC’s building. The servicing of BSEC policy analytical needs by 
EUROPE AND THE BLACK SEA – MODEL REGIONALISM 
17  
the Internationa l Center for Black Sea Studies can be further 
developed. 
· Secondly, if the EU established an institutional link through an 
advanced observer or membership status, it could make available 
staff or experts or fund technical support units, as also could EU 
member states, to work as part of the BSEC in-house team.  
As in the EU, there may be questions in BSEC whether the six-month 
rotating chairmanship of all member states in a predetermined order is 
optimal for continuity and depth of leadership. An alternative is the 
OSCE model of successive presidencies decided by common agreement, 
possible for a whole year, without a set list. The EU has positive 
experiences in some of its committees of senior officials or chairpersons 
being elected on a personal basis for several years, when someone of 
outstanding ability and commitment is identified.  
There are plans for permanent representatives to BSEC, becoming later 
something presumably modelled on the Committee of Permanent 
representatives (COREPER) of the EU. With the scarcity of expert staff 
capable of preparing projects and policy proposals, it is not clear whether 
the first call on resources should be for permanent representatives, 
especially since the existing senior staff are all or mostly seconded 
diplomats from national capitals. 
There are pressures also for widening BSEC, with applications for full 
membership from F.R. Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Iran and Uzbekistan. 
This would represent a substantial extension of membership both in 
numbers and range of interests of candidates. No decision on BSEC 
enlargement has yet been made. It may be commented that, for an 
organisation that is still only beginning to address the first priority of 
deepening, new decisions to enlarge membership at this stage would 
seem rather perilous. A reasonable approach might be not to reject the 
requests, but to hold them in abeyance for a period, during which BSEC 
would be consolidating its role in well-identified core functions.  
There are also variable geometry options to be considered, for BSEC to 
undertake some tasks in a more restricted group of member states such as 
the six littoral states, and other tasks with a more extensive participation. 
Both variants merit consideration, and the first one already is provided 
for in the BSEC Charter. For example, in 1996, a Memorandum on 
cooperation in the electric power industry was signed by only eight 
member states, with Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey (maybe not 
coincidentally the 3 EU candidate states) abstaining. Nevertheless, BSEC 
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officials are understandably very cautious about opening BSEC to the 
risks of fragmentation. The CIS may be seen as an illustration of the 
menu approach to participation, in which CIS member states can choose 
which activities they wish to join. The result was a lack of cohesion and 
gradual erosion of the organisation itself, such that it is now largely 
overtaken by entities like the EurAsian Economic Community or 
GUUAM for just a sub-set of CIS states.  
The EU also has been very cautious about opening up variable geometry, 
but in recent years it has developed a set of rules that permit ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ among a restricted number of member states. These rules 
were defined in the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties (a majority of states 
must participate, the interests of other states must not be affected, etc.). 
Important examples exist in the EU in the case of the Schengen regime 
and monetary union. Institutional arrangements include the example of 
the euro-group of finance ministers, who meet generally immediately 
before plenary meetings of EU finance ministers. The Schengen regime 
gradually re-integrates into the EU domain legally and institutionally. 
For the Black Sea region one could also envisage a controlled regime for 
variable geometry. Such cases might be agreed where there were 
objective needs for specific groupings, rather than an open opting-out 
provision, which indeed would be very damaging to the existing cohesion 
of the organisation.  
There are several domains where the six littoral states could have well 
identified reasons to act together, as in the examples of some aspects of 
environment policy, fisheries and maritime emergencies. A strict 
exclusion of possibilities for ‘enhanced cooperation’ (using EU language) 
may in the Black Sea case have the undesirable effect of forcing some of 
its potential core business outside the organisation, which runs against the 
deepening objective.  
On the other hand, there are important cases where the existing BSEC 
member states need to be able to work with a wider circle of states in 
order to arrive at sound policies. Again there are examples in BSEC’s 
potential areas of core business. In the environment field the main source 
of Black Sea pollution is in the Danube watershed leading all the way 
back to Germany. In the field of oil and gas supplies, Iran is a crucial 
actor in the Caspian-Black Sea context, in addition to the existing BSEC 
member states.  
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3.  EU Participation in Black Sea Cooperation 
3.1   EU interests in the Black Sea  
The question of the EU’s involvement in Black Sea cooperation, and an 
institutional link to BSEC in particular, is now reviewed systematically 
under its several aspects: 
· The nature of the EU’s strategic interests; 
· Contractual and financial relationships between the EU and BSEC 
member states; 
· Existing models of EU sponsored regional initiatives in the wider 
Europe; and 
· Legal precedents for EU participation in international organisations. 
EU interests. The EU’s present official position is that its cooperation 
with BSEC should proceed on an ad hoc basis, without institutional links. 
This was the reply of Commissioner Patten to the invitation by BSEC to 
the EU in early 2001 to establish Observer status, leading later to more 
developed institutional links. The reasons for this cautious reply may 
have to do with the complexity of the EU’s existing set of bilateral links 
with BSEC member states, as set out in Table 2. These different types of 
status for the EU mean different operating policies and programmes, legal 
bases and financial instruments. To cut across these different types raises 
considerable administrative and legal complications. Also individual 
BSEC member states are carefully guarding any acquired relative 
advantages. For example the pre-accession policies for EU candidate 
states are much more generous financially than for other categories of 
non-member states. 
The negotiating accession candidates, Romania and Bulgaria, receive 
economic and technical assistance from the EU through the PHARE, 
SAPARD and ISPA programmes aimed at preparing them for EU 
membership. Turkey has a special financial protocol with the EU, which 
has only recently been activated after years of suspension. The non-
candidates states of South Eastern Europe, including Albania, are 
beneficiaries of the CARDS programme of financial and technical 
assistance. The CIS states are beneficiaries of the TACIS programme. 
The distinctions between these programmes are very marked.  
First, the amounts allocated to the different categories of countries vary 
enormously. In the EU’s financial perspective 2000-06, enlargement 
candidates will receive almost €1200/capita, Western Balkan countries in 
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excess of €200/capita, while the former Soviet republics will receive 
€13/capita on average. This allocation of economic assistance, while 
slowly reducing the economic disparities between the enlargement 
candidates and the EU, hardly reduces the growing socio-economic gap 
between the countries of enlargement candidates and the former Soviet 
republics. 
Secondly, different EU aid programmes provide different types of 
assistance. While assistance to the candidate countries includes 
significant amounts of investment support, aid to the CIS countries is 
primarily in the form of technical assistance. In addition to the grants 
from the European Community, EU accession candidates also receive 
funds from the European Investment Bank, which has so far been unable 
to operate in the CIS. 
Thirdly, the division of non-EU countries into different groups eligible 
for assistance from different programmes means differences in technical 
regulations and programming cycles as well as different administrative 
departments. Thus, a considerable, if not in some cases insurmountable 
burden of coordination would be required in order to support common 
projects of interest to a politically heterogeneous region such as the Black 
Sea. On issues that require multilateral cooperation among countries with 
different relationships with the EU therefore, the EU’s approach poses 
problems for such regional cooperation. 
Table 2. EU bilateral agreements with BSEC member states 
 Member 
State 
Europe 
Agreement 
(Negotiating 
candidate) 
Association 
agreement 
(Non-neg. 
candidate) 
Stability and 
Association 
Agreement 
(under neg.) 
Partnership 
and 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
Greece X     
Bulgaria  X    
Romania  X    
Turkey   X   
Albania    X  
Armenia     X 
Azerbaijan     X 
Georgia     X 
Moldova     X 
Russia     X 
Ukraine     X 
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Solutions to such problems can hardly go as far as unifying all these 
different programmes. Nevertheless, it is possible to create separate 
budget lines to service specific needs, when the political priority to do so 
is judged to be sufficient. The potential for developing such ‘Black Sea 
synergies’ was the main reason why the 1997 Commission 
Communication on regional cooperation in the Black Sea area [European 
Commission, 1997a] proposed that the Commission should become an 
observer in BSEC. 
How then might one assess the EU’s strategic interest in strengthening 
the effectiveness of Black Sea cooperation? In fact, it seems that there are 
no less than eight arguments of importance: 
1. With the prospect of Bulgarian, Romanian and Turkish accession, the 
EU is set to become a major Black Sea actor, whose future member states 
account for half of its coastline. It is not a question of whether, but when 
the EU enters the Black Sea, with much EU legislation and policy due to 
be adopted by the accession candidate states even before accession. As 
these states become EU members, their interests become axiomatically 
EU interests.  
2. The EU’s is concerned that the exclusion of some neighbouring states 
from the EU accession process should not cause a negative ‘exclusion 
effect’, undermining their progress in the political and economic 
transition towards modern European standards and values. This is the 
general EU interest in the new European regionalism overlapping its 
future frontiers. 
3. There is the interest for the EU’s security of energy supply. In 
particular, the Caspian basin offers a useful diversification away from 
excessive dependence on Middle East supplies and/or a replacement for 
declining North Sea production, which calls for cooperation and political 
stability surrounding the transport routes for oil and gas.  
4. The EU is going to be investing very heavily in environmental policies 
in its new member states, and the Danube water basin is the one of the 
most important frameworks for this. Such investments would be 
substantially wasted if they did not fit into a coherent Black Sea 
environmental programme, involving also the Dniepr and Don River 
basins too.  
5. The EU is interested in the resolution of the several conflicts in the 
Caucasus region, and the progressive shift of this region into modern 
modes of cooperative behaviour between nations and ethnic communities. 
BSEC is a framework that can facilitate this shift, and already maintains 
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multilateral collaboration between some nations of the region that do not 
at present have cooperative bilateral relations (e.g. Armenia -Azerbaijan 
and Armenia-Turkey). 
6. With respect to Turkey, where the question of EU accession cannot 
progress very quickly, the EU is highly interested in finding ways of 
adding value together through the pursuit of common interests in advance 
of accession negotiations. The enrichment of Black Sea cooperation is an 
important opportunity for doing this.  
7. Vis-à-vis Russia, the EU is interested in extending as widely as 
possible the mode of cooperative relations, and the Black Sea region can 
usefully complement the progress made already in the Northern 
Dimension in establishing regional cooperation across the frontiers of the 
enlarging EU where these reach or approach Russia, whether to the North 
or South. Given Russia’s historical and political sensitivities, it is 
particularly important that the EU’s entry into the Black Sea come to be 
appreciated in Russia as part of a long-term mutually beneficial positive 
sum game, not a zero sum game of competing for ‘possession’ of land 
and water space and control over transportation routes. 
8. Vis-à-vis Ukraine, the EU is interested in deepening cooperative 
arrangements that are not in any way divisive for this country or Europe 
as a whole.  
3.2   Models of regional cooperation sponsored by the EU 
In spite of a tendency to prefer organising its relationships with states of 
the wider Europe on a bilateral basis, the EU has sponsored or supported 
several multilateral regional initiatives since the end of the Cold War. 
The main initiatives are the so-called Barcelona Process in the 
Mediterranean, the Northern Dimension in North West Europe and the 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.2  
All three initiatives address a well defined geographical and historical 
region, but one comprising states in three different political categories: 
EU member states, EU accession candidates and other states. The 
regional initiatives are seeking to support natural opportunities for 
regional cooperation if not integration, despite the political divisions.  
 
                                                                 
2 See, inter alia, Christiansen et al. [2000]; EastWest Institute and European 
Stability Initiative [2001]; Emerson [2001] and Vahl [2001]. 
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Box 4. Main EU regional initiatives in the wider Europe 
The Barcelona Process 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the so-called Barcelona Process, also 
known as the Southern Dimension) is a framework for bilateral and 
multilateral relations between the EU and its 12 Mediterranean partners 
(three of whom – Cyprus, Malta and Turkey – are accession candidates) 
initiated by the 1995 Barcelona Conference.  
Aims, agenda and performance. The aims of the Barcelona Process are 
broad, and include creating a common area of peace and stability and the 
establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area. The Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership is constructed around three groups of issues: 
economic, political and socio-cultural. There has so far been little progress 
towards the principle objectives, primarily because of the continuing 
conflict in the Middle East. 
Institutions and dialogue. Six conferences of foreign ministers have taken 
place since 1995, and a Euro-Mediterranean Committee consisting of 
representatives of the EU and the 12 partner countries has been established.  
Financing. The MEDA programme established for the Barcelona process is 
the second biggest EU external relations programme worth approximately 
€1 billion per year.  
The Northern Dimension 
The idea of an EU Northern Dimension initiative embracing all 11 countries 
in Northern Europe – four EU states (France, Sweden, Denmark, and 
Germany), four EU accession candidates (Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and 
Latvia) and three others (Norway, Russia and Iceland) – was launched by 
Finland in 1997.  
Aims, agenda and performance. The Northern Dimension agenda is broad 
and includes in principle all issues, except the hard security domain. An 
extensive Action Plan for the Northern Dimension was adopted by the Feira 
European Council in June 2000. At Feira, the EU decided that Kaliningrad, 
the fight against organised crime and the environment, including nuclear 
issues, would be the three priorities for the Northern Dimension. The 
second ministerial conference in April 2001 initiated a Northern Dimension 
Environmental Partnership.  
Institutions and dialogue. Two ministerial conferences have taken place (in 
1999 and 2001) under the Finnish (1999) and Swedish (2001) EU 
Presidencies that have played a crucial role in promoting the Northern 
Dimension. At the second ministerial conference it was decided that annual 
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Northern Dimension meetings will take place, alternating between foreign 
minister and senior official level. 
Financing. Although in principle no new financing was initially envisaged 
for the Northern Dimension, the Commission will contribute €100 million 
of additional funding for environmental projects in Russia. The European 
Investment Bank (EIB) will also participate in these projects, following the 
decision by the Stockholm European Council to allow the EIB for the first 
time to operate in the CIS.  
The Stability Pact for South East Europe  
A Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was launched in 1999 in the wake 
of the Kosovo war. The Stability Pact differs from the other main regional 
initiatives in that it includes countries beyond the wider Europe, such as 
Japan, the US, Canada and Russia, as well as the international financial 
institutions as full participants. 
Aims, agenda and performance. The Stability Pact aims to create a stable 
regional order following the Balkan wars, and as an intermediary stage 
pending progressive integration of the whole of the region into the EU. 
Very large numbers of expert meetings have proved difficult for states of 
the region to service properly. A process of rationalisation of priorities is 
under way. 
Institutions and dialogue. The Stability Pact has a more developed 
institutional structure than the Barcelona Process and the Northern 
Dimension, with a Regional Table (a forum for high-level officials), three 
sectoral Working Tables (security, economics and the ‘human dimension’), 
and numerous specialised task forces and expert groups. A Stability Pact 
secretariat has been established in Brussels. 
Financing. Its possesses resources of its own, but participates in the 
organisation of donor conferences together with the European Commission 
and the World Bank.  
 
From a financing point of view, each of these three initiatives has its 
strong points, although quite different ones. The Barcelona Process has a 
substantial budget line of its own (MEDA) from the EU budget, as well 
as loan funds from the EIB. The Northern Dimension and its related 
Baltic and Barents Sea Councils, have the advantage of rich patrons in the 
four Nordic countries, with EU funds also supporting EU frontier regions, 
and the accession candidate states. In addition the EU recently opened up 
additional EIB loan and Commission grant funds for Northern Dimension 
environmental projects. The Stability Pact region benefits from 
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substantial EU programmes for accession candidates, and the new 
CARDS programme (Community Assistance for Association, 
Democratisation and Stabilisation) for the other states of the Balkans, as 
well as substantial support from bilateral donors and the international 
financial agencies.  
In terms of fields of their competence, the Stability Pact for South East 
Europe is the widest, covering the economic, political and security fields. 
The Northern Dimension excludes hard security as does Barcelona.  
Any progress of Barcelona has been blocked by the continuing Middle 
East conflict. The Stability Pact was basically established as a post-war 
mechanism. The Northern Dimension proceeds in a region free of 
conflic t. By comparison, BSEC is closest to the Northern Dimension in 
aiming at economic and political but not hard security relations, although 
it is notable for progressing without fatal damage from the unresolved 
conflicts of the BSEC region, from the Balkans to the Caucasus.  
These three regional programmes are not ‘organisations’ but rather 
‘dimensions’ to diplomatic and cooperative activity. The key difference is 
whether the activity has a legal basis or not, as well as staff and a budget, 
etc. The ‘dimension’ mode of activity is of course far more fluid in its 
nature, and allows for different sectors of policy to come and go on the 
agenda of foreign ministers. For the EU the ‘dimension’ mode is however 
the heaviest in that all member states, as well as the Commission and 
Council Presidency participate. 
3.3  Forms of EU or EC participation in international organisations  
EU involvement in BSEC is currently limited to national governments, 
with Greece as a BSEC member and four other EU states (Austria, 
France, Germany and Italy) as observers. In the ‘EU-BSEC platform’ 
document, the EU is invited ‘to consider the possibility of obtaining an 
observer status or full membership.’ The possibility of the Commission 
obtaining observer status in BSEC on behalf of the European Community 
was suggested as early as 1997 by the Commission. 
There are many examples of the EU or EC participating formally and 
legally in official organisations.3 Participation normally falls within one 
                                                                 
3 The distinction between the European Union (EU) and the European 
Community (EC) may seem an excessively technical matter, but it is of some 
practical importance in the present context. The EC is the juridical entity of the 
EU that has specific legal competences, financial resources and executive 
capacities (in the Commission). The EC is mainly responsible for economic 
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of two broad categories: full membership or observer status. The rights 
and conditions of members and observers differ according to the 
international organisation in question. As a rule, however, member status 
allows participation of the fullest kind, such as the right to vote and to 
propose motions, as well as requiring contributions to the budget. Full 
membership in international organisations is usually restricted to nation 
states and the status usually available to international organisations is that 
of observer, but the EU or EC enjoys a status in international relations 
and law that is higher than that accorded ‘international organisations’ and 
in some cases approximates that of sovereign states. The EC’s 
membership in international organisations is much less common, 
however, than its participation as an observer [Macleod et al., 1996]. 
According to its Charter, BSEC consists of members and observers (Arts. 
5-7). In addition BSEC promotes relations with third parties, under the 
three headings ‘dialogue partnership’, ‘sectoral dialogue partnership’ and 
‘invitation of guests’ (Art. 9). European Community participation in 
BSEC has so far been as an ‘invited guest’, with the European 
Commission participating as an observer on an ad hoc basis.  
From the perspective of the EU, there are a number of precedents that 
show that there are significant graduations in the broad categories of 
member and observer, as illustrated in Table 3. In some organisations the 
Commission is only an observer, while full membership is reserved for 
EU member states (most of the UN family). In others, the Commission 
participates as a member on a par with other member states (FAO, 
EBRD). In still other organisations, the Commission can be a member 
alongside some but not all member states (Baltic and Barents Sea 
Councils), and this model is conceivable for BSEC with just Greece as 
full member today. In the gradations between full member and observer, 
there are variables, e.g. being able to assume the chairmanship, paying 
into the budget, and eligibility for nominees in the staff structures. 
                                                                                                                                                  
matters. The EC is often the legal entity that establishes institutional links with 
other legally constituted organisations. The EU embraces all three pillars – 
economic, security and justice and home affairs. The EU is therefore the main 
actor in the field of foreign and security policy.  
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Table 3. The European Community in international organisations 
Status Examples Community role 
Member 
FAO, WTO, commodity 
agreements, EBRD, fisheries 
organisations 
Member on par with member 
states. Shareholder in EBRD, 
alongside EIB and member 
states. 
Council of Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS), Barents Euro Arctic 
Council (BEAC) 
No formal link, but signatory 
of key documents and de facto 
member. Participates 
alongside member states, but 
the EC cannot assume 
chairmanship and related 
secretarial functions. 
OECD EC participation defined by 
additional protocol of OECD 
Convention. Commission 
participates on almost equal 
basis with member states (for 
example no participation in 
the budgetary committee, and 
no vote). 
UN General Assembly, ECOSOC, 
UNCTAD, WHO, OSCE, OAS. 
Formal observer (right to 
speak, but not to vote) 
Council of Europe  No formal status, but close 
institutional links. 
ASEAN, Council of Arab 
Economic Unity 
No formal status, but 
institutional links. 
Observer 
(or approx-
imating 
observer 
status) 
BSEC No formal status, but the 
Commission is invited to 
participate in relevant 
meetings on an ad hoc basis.  
3.4  Elements for possible EU or EC participation in BSEC 
This section sets out a menu of possible institutional links between the 
EU or EC and BSEC, assuming of course that at some stage there was a 
political decision to consider more positively BSEC’s explicit invitation 
to the EC/EU to join either as an observer or a full member.  
Observer status. This would require little complicated negotiation. As an 
observer, the Commission would have the right to speak and present 
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proposals and draft documents, but not to vote. Nor would it contribute to 
the budget. In practice formal observer status would presumably mean 
participation in the numerous BSEC Working Groups. The Commission 
has the expertise required, both in the departments of DG External 
Relations dealing with the bilateral relations with BSEC countries, and in 
the external relations departments in other relevant DGs, such as Energy 
and Transport, Environment, Regional Affairs, Enlargement, etc. Staff 
resources are very tight, however, and if the Commission became a 
systematic observer, this would no doubt accentuate the issue of 
duplication with other Black Sea meetings on the same topics. The issue 
already raised above, of rationalising the handling of Black Sea agenda 
topics both inside and outside BSEC, would come to a head.  
Membership . As a member of BSEC, the European Commission 
(representing the Community) would of course be entitled to vote, which 
would be a significant matter in cases where BSEC initiatives overlapped 
and perhaps were incompatible with EU policy and law. The Commission 
would also contribute to the BSEC budget, which today is very small 
(approximately $1 million annua lly). Perhaps the Commission’s 
accession would be the occasion to boost the budget. It could also be the 
occasion to offer special operational support for BSEC programmes and 
projects, preferably through a separate budget line because of the 
complications already referred to in putting together elements from 
different existing EU aid programmes. To begin with, even a small 
budget line for project feasibility studies, such as in the BISTRO facility 
used in some TACIS programmes, would be of great value to BSEC and 
the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (see below).  
As member, the European Commission would also provide officials and 
experts for the BSEC Secretariat and other BSEC centres.  
High-level dialogue, restricted format. In addition to EC membership or 
observer status in BSEC, the Platform for Cooperation between the EU 
and the BSEC includes a proposal to establish a political dialogue 
between BSEC and the EU. The document envisages high-level meetings 
between the BSEC Chairman-in-Office and the EU Presidency, 
preferably at ministerial level. Different formats could be suggested. One 
option could be meetings between the Troikas of both organisations. 
Another alternative would be to choose the ‘summit’ formula used in the 
EU-Russian dialogue, whereby the EU is represented by the President of 
the Commission. This political dialogue need not be limited to foreign 
ministers, but could be conducted between other ministers (transport, 
energy, environment, etc.), depending on what issues are being discussed.  
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High-level dialogue, wide format. An alternative would be to organise a 
broader forum of high-level dialogue. This has now been institutionalised 
in the Northern Dimension, where annual conferences with participation 
from all 15 EU member states and the partner countries take place, 
alternating between foreign minister and senior officials level. 
Transferred to BSEC, this model would entail an annual EU-BSEC 
ministerial conference bringing together 25 foreign ministers (EU-15 plus 
10 non-EU BSEC states), the European Commission and the BSEC 
Secretariat (PERMIS). 
Dialogue among senior officials and experts. Regardless of the exact 
format chosen, the high-level dialogue could be supplemented by more 
frequent meetings at senior official level. This could either between the 
BSEC Committee of Senior Officials or its (as and when designated) 
Permanent Representatives and a formation (specialised working group) 
of the EU’s Political and Security Committee.  
Parliamentary dialogue. The European Parliament could consider giving 
the Parliamentary Assembly of BSEC (PABSEC) observer status in the 
European Parliament. The European Parliament has a standing invitation 
to participate in PABSEC meetings as an observer. A MEP attended a 
PABSEC session for the first time only last year. The most practical 
arrangement would be for the two parliamentary bodies to establish 
reasonably compact ‘delegations’ for the dialogue.  
Black Sea Trade and Development Bank. Because of the growing 
emphasis on BSEC as a project-oriented organisation, the BSTDB is 
likely to play an increasingly important role within BSEC. Although the 
BSTDB is a related body of BSEC and has the same members as BSEC 
proper, membership in the BSTDB is possible for ‘multilateral banks and 
financial institutions’ in addition to the ‘BSEC participating states’. This 
provides the EU with the option of playing a more active role in BSEC 
without membership in BSEC, through the European Investment Bank 
(EIB). Alternatively, or in addition, the EU could propose that the 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), within 
which the EU-15 have a majority of the votes, could become a member of 
the BSTDB. The BSTDB could also benefit from grant funds for 
feasibility studies. 
International Center for Black Sea Studies. The ICBSS, currently 
financed by Greece because of the limited financial resources of BSEC, is 
seeking to mobilise the under-utilised scientific resources of the BSEC 
member countries. This could entail significant synergies with existing 
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EU research programmes for the region, for example the INTAS 
programme.  
4.  Conclusions  
The new European architecture now takes shape after a decade of post-
Cold War experience with three main features:  
· The thin pan-European organisations such as OSCE and Council of 
Europe which have easily expanded in geographical coverage, but 
have not really been able to deepen their operational roles;  
· The leading European or Euro-Atlantic institutions, namely the EU 
and NATO, which are attractive for accession candidates to the East, 
but which only admit new members progressively, so as not to 
undermine their core capacities, leaving some not too happy outside; 
and  
· The new European regional structures, which find their roles in the 
shortcomings of the first two categories, namely the contrasting 
priorities they have given to widening and deepening respectively. 
All regions of the wider Europe that have historical and natural 
geographical and historical identities, but which overlap today’s main 
remaining political and economic divides, are the subject of this new type 
of European regionalism – as seen in the Northern Dimension 
encompassing Baltic and Barents Sea initiatives, the Barcelona Process 
for the Mediterranean, the Stability Pact for South East Europe, and 
finally the Black Sea. 
The purpose of the new European regionalism seems thus to have a 
double rationale, reactive and active. The reactive aspect is to compensate 
for the thinness of the pan-European organisations and the exclusiveness 
of the leading institutions. The active aspects are to develop networks of 
cooperative activities, which gain functionally from their regional 
specificity and politically because they bridge the remaining political 
divides of the wider Europe. This rationale seems solidly founded, but it 
is not a static matter, since the enlargement of the leading institutions is 
gradually taking in increasing parts of the regions in question. For 
example the Baltic region will soon be all EU territory except for Russia, 
whereas the whole of the South East Europe is officially recognised as 
prospective EU members. As the EU membership process advances, there 
is increasing overlap between EU regional and other policies and the new 
European regionalism. There is a NATO version of this same story.  
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The Black Sea region has some common features with the other regions, 
but it is unique in that although it has a regional organisation – BSEC – 
which is the product of the states of the region, it has not been the target 
of an EU regional initiative. Indeed, it was seen by some for a while as an 
alternative to the EU. However times have changed, and now half of the 
Black Sea coast line is accounted for by EU accession candidate states. 
Thus, the EU enters the scene as a major Black Sea power in any 
mainstream scenario. For BSEC to have been a home-grown organisation 
is an important quality in terms of its political legitimacy, as is also its 
political achievement in introducing a cooperative structure in a region 
beset by serious conflicts or tensions.  
The disadvantage, however, is the shortage of budgetary resources that 
most of the member states can make available. Turkey bore the main 
costs of setting up BSEC, but its operating budget now is tiny, and the 
result is a serious weakness in the technical capacity of the permanent 
secretariat. BSEC has continued to develop its institutions, such that it 
has now the most complete structure of the new European regionalism 
(ministerial councils, permanent secretariat, parliamentary assembly, 
business council, development bank, think tank, etc.). This is the prêt-à-
porter organisation, waiting for the owner or owners to really take it on 
and use it. The organisational problem is made more serious by the fact 
that several of the core functions for Black Sea cooperation are being 
handled by ad hoc arrangements outside BSEC, such as is the case for the 
environment (Black Sea Environment Programme) and transport (Black 
Sea PETrA, TRACECA) and energy issues. The EU is supporting several 
of these initiatives outside BSEC. Comparing the scarcity of resources 
available to BSEC at present with the scale of resources that the EU is 
putting into the region in one way or another outside BSEC, it seems 
evident that if there is to be a solid future for BSEC there will have to be 
a conscious and joint determination by both BSEC and the EU to do so. 
The potential for developing such ‘Black Sea synergies’ was emphasised 
in the 1997 Commission communication on regional cooperation in the 
Black Sea area. Therefore it is understandable that BSEC has recently 
invited the EU to become an observer or full member, as mentioned as an 
option in the 1997 Commission paper. However, the EU has been 
cautious in its response. This may in part be because it is also not so clear 
what the underlying priorities of existing BSEC member states are, 
notably over how far they are willing to give BSEC room for initiative. 
BSEC has already experimented with an exceedingly long agenda of 
activities, with many items having no essential regional content, and with 
several domains that do have essential regional substance being left 
EMERSON &  VAHL 
32 
outside the house of BSEC except in a token manner. This is a formula 
for continuing disappointment over the organisation. More recently the 
BSEC has placed the accent on a project-oriented approach, which should 
indeed mean dealing with concrete regional realities.  
The question of whether and how to build up the operational 
effectiveness of BSEC as the lead organisation in the region remains 
therefore an open one.  
From an objective public policy standpoint, the case for a multi-purpose 
organisation, rather than a set of ad hoc clubs for single purposes, relies 
on the possibilities for achieving synergies between the component 
actions and/or on linked bargaining in a consensus-ruled setting (country 
A may agree to policy X demanded by country B, as long as it can get 
sufficient satisfaction under policy Y). In the Black Sea case there are 
evident practical linkages between such domains as transport, energy and 
environment. More broadly one might hope that the habit of joint actions 
in uncontroversial domains may help ease various political tensions and 
indirectly facilitate conflict resolution among the parties.  
At the geo-political level, Black Sea regionalism is in one important 
respect uniquely significant compared to the wider Europe’s other 
regional dimensions. It involves three very large European actors (Russia, 
Ukraine and Turkey) with the EU as the possible fourth, in a quite 
balanced and non-hegemonic setting. Moreover, the first three all share 
varying degrees of unease over exclusion from one or other or both of the 
two leading European structures.  
It is primarily for BSEC’s present member states to decide how to 
proceed. With the prospect of substantial EU enlargement into the area, 
however, it becomes also a matter for policy-makers in the EU to reflect 
on, both as a pragmatic matter of efficiently organising policies such as 
energy, environment and transport, and as a matter of strategy for the 
wider European architecture. On the EU side, in the various regional 
dimensions of ‘borderland Europe’ that it has initiated so far, there has 
invariably been a political sponsor in a member state for whom it was a 
priority, and which chose the occasion of its EU presidency to promote it. 
At present there is only one common member state of both BSEC and the 
EU, which is Greece (slated to next hold the EU presidency in the first 
half of 2003).  
If the EU were to decide to complete its set of borderland regional 
cooperation projects with a Black Sea dimension, the structure for giving 
it effect is ready, prêt-à-porter. 
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CASPIAN OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 
AND THE BLACK SEA REGION: 
AN OVERVIEW 
TERRY D. ADAMS  
1.  Introduction1 
Since its origins in 1875, oil and gas development in the Caspian has had 
a long and chequered history. Likewise oil export to the Black Sea has 
always been strategically important. Historically Baku oil has not always 
lived up to investor expectations. Nevertheless the early development of 
oil at Baku with its first international oil terminal at Batumi on the Black 
Sea laid down the technical and commercial foundations of our modern 
global oil industry. In 1900, Baku led the world in oil production. 
Through the inventiveness of the Nobel brothers Baku oilmen were 
amongst the first to demonstrate the competitive advantage of applied 
technology. The commissioning of the Baku-Batumi pipeline in 1905 saw 
the construction of the world’s first long-distance transnational pipeline 
for oil exports to international markets. From pioneering investments at 
Batumi, the Rothchild family set new parameters for the risk financing in 
international oil and gas. From its earliest days Baku oil was sensitive to 
global oil prices, firstly from international price wars between oil 
producers in Europe and the United States. Today OPEC tends to drive 
the process. Shell as a modern multinational oil company owes its origins 
to Baku oil and the Rothchilds at Batumi. They were the first company to 
exploit new tanker technology through the Suez Canal to deliver cheap 
Russian oil to emerging markets in East Asia. By 1910, the complexity of 
risk management at Baku, where blood oil and politics had become an 
inexorable mix, was such that it drove Shell and others towards a process 
of global mergers and acquisitions; a trend not too different from what we 
see in our oil industry today. For global oil, size has always mattered, and 
                                                                 
1 This paper is based on a presentation made in September 2001 at the Halki 
Seminar on ‘Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea and the Caucasus’ arranged 
by the Hellenic Foundation. Information on Caspian oil transportation tariffs was 
primarily sourced from unpublished conference manuscripts by Ted Fergueson, 
President of AMBO. Laurent Rusekas of CERA is gratefully acknowledged for 
the help he gave in the preparation of this manuscript, and for the illustrations 
used in the final paper. 
TERRY D. ADAMS 
 40 
for Baku, access to the Black Sea for international oil export to global 
markets was commercially critical. 
Baku oil became a military target for Germany and Turkey in the First 
World War (to be repeated by Hitler in the Second). In 1919 it was also a 
military target for the Bolsheviks who desperately needed Baku oil to fuel 
their ongoing Russian Revolution. The British and their Western Allies 
returned to Baku and the Caucasus in 1918, and for a brief period 
promoted the creation of three newly Independent Democratic Republics 
(Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan). In support of this political initiative, 
the badly damaged oil facilities in Baku were substantially refurbished by 
the British military. But despite renewed investment in Baku oil, the 
economic cost of maintaining regional security in the Caucasus against a 
Bolshevik takeover was not seen to be in the commercial or political 
interests of either Britain or the United States. In 1919 the region and its 
new Republics were abandoned to their fate. This is a message as fresh 
today perhaps as it was then. In 1921 these states became an integral part 
of the Soviet Union. Foreign investments in Baku oil were nationalised 
by the Soviets, and for the next 70 years external energy investments in 
the Caspian were closed to the West. 
But with the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the Caspian 
and the Caucasus once more open to Western energy investment. By then 
Soviet experts had already built up a substantial database on Caspian oil 
and gas that had confirmed the presence of many new giant oil and gas 
fields. But constraints imposed by the inadequacies of Soviet offshore oil 
technology, and with the redirection of Soviet energy investment from the 
Caspian to Siberia in the 1970s, both meant that by 1992 there were 
several undeveloped giant oil and gas fields in the Caspian available for 
foreign licensing. There were two in Kazakhstan and one in Azerbaijan. 
These undeveloped fields became the focus of intense and extended 
negotiation. It was equally believed that there were many untested low-
risk giant oil prospects in the shallow waters off Kazakhstan and in the 
deeper waters of offshore Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran. It was 
access to low technical risk and high-volume oil reserves that drove 
Western energy investment back into the Caspian. For these new 
multinational energy investors, access to Black Sea oil terminals once 
more became a critical priority. But the Caspian track record that has 
resulted from new energy investment has been uneven. There have been 
excessive bouts of optimism followed by equally dramatic periods of 
great pessimism. It is a repetitive story that reflects more than 100 years 
of Caspian oil and gas development. So what are the realities, what are 
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the current challenges, and how does the future export of Caspian oil 
impact on the Black Sea and global oil markets?  
2. Caspian Oil 
Over the past nine years, renewed Western energy investment in the 
Caspian has progressed through three distinct phases: 
1. The period 1992 to 1996 was a time of difficult access and general 
pessimism. There was much hostility and misunderstanding. The 
Western investor faced an opaque Soviet business culture that 
displayed both resentment and suspicion to outside interference. The 
Western media were consistently highlighting the problems; in 
particular that the geographical isolation of the Caspian would 
present insurmountable difficulties for regional export and support 
logistics. In addition there were serious concerns over regional 
security arising from active ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus. 
Business risk was high. But access through new production-sharing 
and joint venture contracts to the undeveloped giants fields of 
Tengiz and Karachagenak in Kazakhstan, and Azeri-Chirag-
Guneshli in Azerbaijan, drove the process forward (see Figure 1; all 
figures have been grouped together at the end of this paper). These 
three fields still dominate Caspian energy development today. 
2. By contrast, the period 1996 to 1998 was a time of unbridled 
optimism. The Caspian became a global exploration ‘hot spot’. 
Major projects were working, Caspian oil was getting to market, and 
excessive hyperbole raised investor and national expectations to 
unreal levels. But the collapse in 1998 of global oil prices, 
extinguished this euphoria, and the latest Caspian oil boom withered 
on the vine. 
3. Since 1999 a greater sense of business reality has set in. Hard-nosed 
economic screening now places Caspian oil and gas investment into 
a more realistic context. Existing mega-projects are developing but 
at a slower pace than was predicted. Two new giant discoveries have 
been made (Kashegan in Kazakhstan, and Shah Deniz in 
Azerbaijan), but there have also been a significant number of failed 
Caspian exploration wells. 
Nine years of investor experience has also shown that Caspian 
exploration and development is a high-cost exercise. To remain 
commercially competitive the Caspian requires a global oil price that is 
consistently above $18 to $20 a barrel (bl) real. Caspian exploration 
failure costs are high ($300-$500 million per project), but in the success 
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case with the discovery of giant fields and large reserves, finding costs 
are low (30-50¢/bl). With both deficient infrastructure and geographical 
isolation, Caspian development costs are high, but there is a realistic 
expectation that applied technology will drive these costs down. Simila rly 
with the successful development of existing Caspian export systems and 
with two new regional pipelines (one pending), a fall in oil transportation 
cost is confidently predicted. Today a fully built-up cost for Caspian oil is 
roughly $12 to $15/bl. This compares to the high-cost end in the North 
Sea, and is some two to three times more expensive than an equivalent 
OPEC barrel in the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless with new technology and 
lower transportation tariffs, Caspian built-up costs will fall. In future an 
$8 to $10/bl-cost band should keep Caspian oil globally competitive. 
Nevertheless, upstream oil and gas investment in the Caspian is not for 
the faint at heart. It only suits those multinational energy companies that 
have large and diversified global risk portfolios, with the critical ability to 
self-finance large-scale Caspian investment off strong company balance 
sheets.  
Caspian energy development has suffered from both media hype and 
politicisation of the investment process by the United States and Turkey. 
In 1995 CIA energy analysts helped fuel expectations for Middle East 
reserve equivalents in the Caspian, with predictions of 200 billion barrels 
(bnbls) Yet to Find (ytf). This would have placed the Caspian oil 
potential on a par with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
combined. Some even saw for the Caspian the possible emergence of a 
new Saudi Arabia! What was being ignored was that this huge reserve 
prediction had sat at the extreme end of a CIA risk projection curve. It 
was therefore never realistically expected to occur. For their most likely 
case the CIA had proposed a more modest ytf of 50 to 70 bnbls that 
matched much of what the industry perceives today. However recent 
exploration drilling failures suggests that there is now an even stronger 
bias towards the lower end (50 bnbls ytf). The Caspian’s potential is 
therefore more comparable to a new North Sea. It is not a Middle East. 
This message carries strong strategic overtones, particularly for Europe 
and the Black Sea. 
This more conservative view of Caspian oil has been confirmed by 
substantial exploration drilling in both the oil basins of the North and 
South Caspian (see Figure 1). These two basins have very different 
hydrocarbon systems. In the North Caspian play types are dominated by 
super-giant Palaeozoic reef traps, as seen at Tengiz and now at Kashegan. 
Subordinate Mesozoic sandstone reservoirs contain more modest oil 
volumes onshore. Lukoil has also found a new Mesozoic sandstone oil 
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play straddling the offshore boundary between Russia and Kazakhstan. 
Conventional estimates place Kazakh proven remaining oil reserves at 8 
to 10 bnbls recoverable. Speculative ytf recoverable oil is seen to fall 
within a 30 to 50 bnbls range that is entirely dependent on the discovery 
of new super giant fields comparable to Tengiz and Kashegan. But the 
commercial viability of the deeply buried carbonate reservoirs at 
Kashegan is still under appraisal. Sustainable high-volume well 
productivity from Kashegan has yet to be confirmed, and the costs of 
deep drilling in what is a technically complex drilling environment are 
very high. Application of novel technologies may be needed to monetise 
the project. The commercial disposal of high volumes of associated gas 
cap gas that is required for simultaneous oil production has also not been 
resolved. Oil field development in what are the most environmentally 
sensitive shallow waters of the Caspian that are the main breeding 
grounds for Caspian sturgeon and caviar production, and that are ice 
bound in the winter, all increase Kashegan oil development costs to very 
significant levels. There are in fact many technical challenges to be 
resolved before substantial oil reserves in Kazakhstan can be developed 
with confidence. Therefore current offshore ytf reserve forecasts are 
based on a limited number of appraisal wells and may be subject to 
dramatic change in either direction. 
In the South Caspian Basin failed exploration drilling has significantly 
reduced estimates of future oil potential. Again the industry consensus 
placed Azerbaijan-West Turkmen proven remaining recoverable oil 
reserves at 6 to 8 bnbls, with a projected recoverable of 20 bnbls ytf. The 
latter figure must now being seriously challenged, however. Until 
recently the South Caspian Basin was thought to possess a significant 
number of large untested and prospective deepwater traps. The bulk of oil 
discoveries in the South Caspian Basin are all confined to the sandstone 
reservoirs of three Plio-Pleistocene palaeo-delta systems within the 
Azeri-Turkmen offshore areas. There are some smaller but coeval 
untested paleo-deltas in the Iranian offshore, but these are generally 
considered to be relatively non-prospective. Recent drilling has 
effectively confirmed that only the clean sandstone reservoirs of the 
north-central paleo-Volga delta south of the Apsheron Ridge (which 
geologically connects Baku to Turkmenbashi in the east) can support 
high well productivities that are both sustainable and commercially 
viable. Equivalent deeply buried reservoir sandstone in the Kura palaeo-
delta to the west and the Uzboi palaeo-delta to the east is of poor quality. 
The presence of clay minerals and volcanic detritus disrupts reservoir 
performance, and well productivities are generally low and unsustainable. 
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Recent dry holes drilled in offshore Azerbaijan have also more precisely 
defined the limits of the main South Caspian oil and gas fairway. This is 
narrower than was originally perceived. Specialist sedimentological 
studies in the South Caspian by CASP (Cambridge) have conf irmed the 
high-performance nature of the sandstone reservoirs of the palaeo-Volga 
south of the Apsheron Ridge. Their new geological model suggests that 
good reservoir development is unlikely to extend to the large untested 
deepwater prospects of the South Caspian that makes them a high-risk 
play. These prospects had previously accounted for the bulk of South 
Caspian ytf (15 to 17 bnbls recoverable). Together with high-risk 
development costs in very deep water, and with an increased risk of 
finding non-commercial gas rather than oil, means that the expectation 
for substantial new oil potential in the South Caspian has been materially 
downgraded. 
From this resource analysis one can predict with some confidence that if 
there are no serious dislocations in the development process, by 2010 the 
Caspian should be producing around 3 million barrels a day (mmbd) or 
150 million tonnes a year (mty). Two-thirds of this oil production will be 
from the North Caspian Basin with one-third from the South Caspian 
Basin. But to achieve these production levels it will require a substantial 
investment of incremental capital that depends on three essential factors: 
a sustainable global oil price that remains above $18 to $20/barrel real, 
the absence of regional political conflict, and that urgent attention is paid 
to serious deficiencies in Caspian infrastructure and the business 
environment. Caspian production could eventually peak by 2020 at 5 
mmbd (50 mty), primarily from the North Caspian. But even at this level 
the Caspian would only contribute some 3% to future global oil supply. 
The Caspian will therefore never be a strategic supply alternative to the 
OPEC oil producers in the Gulf. But it is strategically important to 
Europe. 
There is now an eight-year track record for project management in the 
Caspian. Space constraints prevent a comprehensive overview but the 
basic messages are simple. Caspian Soviet hydrocarbon infrastructure is 
seriously deficient through under investment and long-term neglect. Also 
much of it is not where it is most needed. There are Caspian construction 
facilities but all are in considerable need of new investment and 
expansion. Critical path items such as offshore drilling rigs, heavy lift 
equipment, marine fleets, and pipe laying barges are available, but more 
are needed. Those that already exist need substantial upgrade and capital 
injection to bring them up to Western insurable operating standards. The 
unpredictability of costs involved in upgrading Caspian Soviet 
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infrastructure is a serious commercial risk, which has been the common 
experience of Caspian operators so far. Skilled manpower and local 
management cadres are both in short supply, especially in the North 
Caspian. Contractual obligations in Caspian energy contracts that impose 
high levels of front-end local content for both materials and manpower 
exacerbate the problem. None of this can be resolved within a shortened 
time frame, and the idea that multiple Caspian mega-projects can proceed 
simultaneously without inherent delays is certainly flawed. Caspian oil 
and gas development will almost certainly proceed more slowly in the 
future than many currently predict, and this will impact directly on levels 
of future Caspian oil movement across the Black Sea. 
But of equal concern to Caspian energy investors is their ability to 
finance long-term energy investment from conventional sources of 
international project financing. It is important to note that of the $13 
billion foreign capital invested in Caspian energy projects so far, only 
$400 million was obtained through conventional third-party financing. 
The rest was all self-financed off company balance sheets. Can or will 
investors continue to do this in the future? Caspian energy investment 
must compete for capital in a global market. Therefore for most investors 
capital rationing in the Caspian seems inevitable. It will be difficult to 
access some $15 to $30 billion of new long-term Caspian borrowing over 
the next 10 to 15 years. It would require private-sector banks to have 
considerably greater confidence in the Caspian track record than they 
currently hold. Even then these banks would still expect the multinational 
lending agencies (MLAs) to cover political-risk financing, as well as 
requiring up to 60% or more equity financing from the energy investors 
themselves. 
But what in the end will prove to be the greatest challenge is the absence 
of general reform and ‘good governance’ within the governments of the 
Caspian states themselves. Business risk arising from generally corrupt 
Soviet bureaucracies is well recognised. It requires no further elaboration 
here. But recent developments in Kazakhstan have alarmed Caspian 
energy investors. Kazakh foreign operators have been subject to spurious 
and continued harassment from local tax authorities and environmental 
interest groups. Fundamental legal rights within production-sharing 
agreements (PSAs) are also being challenged by the Kazakh government. 
In general Caspian governments and politicians do not particularly like 
international PSAs, although they are the most successful form of 
international long-term petroleum contract developed so far. For Caspian 
governments there is a fundamental downside. For multi-billion dollar oil 
projects within a PSA, the contractual cost recovery mechanism is 
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applied in such a way that material cash flows to the State are 
significantly delayed (generally 7 to 9 years from start-up). This reflects 
the early cost recovery of capital and operating costs through ‘Cost Oil’ 
by the foreign investor, who in all fairness have taken all the front-end 
financial risk. Both government and investor reach ‘Profit Oil’ at the 
same time, which is then shared in proportions negotiated under original 
contracts.  
When high levels of front-end capital have been invested by the foreign 
operator, however, governments are tempted to renegotiate contract terms 
to the disadvantage of the investor. This is now happening in Kazakhstan. 
The government is attacking ‘transfer pricing’ under Kazakh oil 
contracts, which is seriously eroding investor confidence in the long-term 
sanctity and security of their contractual arrangements. Likewise the 
increasing monopoly that is developing over Kazakh oil transport under 
the state company Kaztransneft is also causing considerable concern, 
with fears that this monopoly will create a negative environment for 
foreign investment comparable to Transneft in Russia. If such hostility 
continues to grow within the Caspian business environment, the pace of 
Caspian oil and gas development will inevitably slow and materially 
reduce levels of projected oil production. Add to this the additional risks 
in regional security arising from both frozen and active ethnic conflicts in 
the Caucasus, together with the political uncertainties that surround the 
succession plans of ageing Caspian leadership, then the fragility of the 
Caspian business environment is clearly demonstrated. Current hostilities 
in Afghanistan can perhaps only increase instability in the region, 
especially in the north Caucasus. Nevertheless after nine years of foreign 
oil investment in the Caspian, a positive track record has still emerged. In 
general Caspian PSAs are working well compared to Russia in the north. 
Development pace, cash flow and protection of long-term returns are the 
genuine uncertainties. But for the la rger multinationals with global risk 
portfolios, their presence in the Caspian is assured. Access to low 
technical risk giant oil and gas reserves in the Caspian is too attractive an 
opportunity for them to miss. 
3.  Caspian Oil Transportation, Black Sea Oil 
Over the past five years, there has been considerable success in the 
development of Caspian regional oil transportation (Figure 2). Some 
800,000 barrels (40mty) of export capacity was already available before 
an additional 600,000 barrels (28mty) came on line with the successful 
commissioning of phase one of the Caspian Pipeline Company (CPC) 
pipeline from Tengiz to Novorosysk (October 2001). Multiple oil export 
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routes by pipeline railway and river barge, all with competitive tariffs, are 
working well. Attractive commercial net-backs and regional markets 
thirsty for environmentally friendly Caspian oil have both dictated a 
predominantly westward movement of Caspian oil into the Black Sea and 
to the Mediterranean. Within a 10-year time frame, it is predicted that 
these markets will absorb up to 2.5 to 3 mmbd (125 to 150 mty) of 
Caspian crude. Significant volumes of Caspian oil will also move south 
to Iran (up to 500,000 barrels or 25 mty) for oil swaps from the Persian 
Gulf. Iran, however, is a market for Caspian crude (to be supplied 
primarily from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), rather than a transit 
country to take Caspian oil into the Persian Gulf. It is difficult to 
conceive that Iran would allow the transit of material volumes of Caspian 
crude, which would then move to and undermine their own Iranian oil 
markets in East Asia. Therefore the bulk of north Caspian and Russian 
export oil must transit the Black Sea on route to international markets. 
Competitive tariffs and operational security will ensure that the multiple 
export options we see functioning today will continue to operate in the 
future, together with two new regional pipelines (one pending) to supply 
oil markets in the West. The Caspian Pipeline Company (CPC) exiting 
the North Caspian will feed some 1.2 mmbd (60 mty) into the Black Sea. 
Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) will bypass the Black Sea and will feed 1 
mmbd (50 mty) into the Mediterranean. The BTC pipeline has not yet 
been fully sanctioned by its sponsor group. However unequivocal 
statements from BP as the lead sponsor together with unrelenting political 
pressure from the governments of Azerbaijan, Turkey and the US would 
suggest that this regional pipeline will be built to become operational as 
planned in 2005. The recent financial sanction by AIOC for the next 
phase of field development reinforces this commitment. It should be 
noted, however, that despite reports to the contrary, surplus Kazakh crude 
from the new discovery at Kashegan may not be available for early BTC 
operations. By the time that field goes on-stream, AIOC should require 
the full BTC design capacity for its own production. There will also be no 
surplus Azeri crude for shipment to Iran, as all Azeri crude will be 
needed to service BTC. Some Kazakh onshore (North Buzachi) oil could 
move to Baku to fill the empty Baku-Supsa pipeline, when this spare 
capacity becomes available once BTC is commissioned. Only when the 
AIOC production goes off peak at around 2015 would substantial export 
capacity be made available in BTC for others, unless there is an earlier 
expansion of the system. 
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It is therefore important to understand how all these oil movements 
impact the Black Sea, with its highly congested exit through the narrow 
Turkish Bosphorus Strait to the Mediterranean. With BTC awaiting 
sanction and CPC not yet fully operational, current oil flows into the 
Black Sea will remain at similar levels to last year, as all Black Sea oil 
export terminals were already operating at full capacity. In 2000 crude oil 
export from Russia and the Caspian through these five marine terminals 
totalled 66.6 mty, with an additional export level of 13.8 mty for oil 
products. Bulgaria and Romania between them imported 10.8 mty of 
crude (mainly Russian blend). Some 2.2 mty of Middle East oil was also 
imported into the Black Sea, for use by Romania and Bulgarian refineries 
(Figure 3). This resulted in a total oil flow through the Bosphorus (both 
imports and exports) of 74 mty (1.48 mmbd). These volumes will 
increase this year after the commissioning of CPC Phase 1 to 28 mty. 
However as future crude oil flows into the Black Sea will be unaffected 
by the commissioning of BTC (2005), the next step jump in Black Sea 
crude transit volumes will not occur until CPC is expanded to full 
planned capacity (62 mty) some time around 2010. This also coincides 
with probable Kashegan full field expansion 
Preferential markets for these Black Sea oil flows have developed in both 
the Black Sea region itself and more importantly within the 
Mediterranean. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, crude 
markets in the Black Sea are once again developing but at a slower rate 
than was originally expected. It is predicted that Black Sea demand will 
increase from 10.8 mty in 2000 to 18 mty in 2010. However Black Sea 
refineries are primarily conf igured to run on sour crude for residual fuel 
oil production, for which there is a strong demand. For this the Russian 
export blend (32 degree API and 2.9% sulphur) has a competitive 
advantage. Therefore for the foreseeable future the bulk of Caspian 
lighter crude (32 to 48 degrees API with low or no sulphur) will of 
necessity move to the Mediterranean, through the heavily congested 
Turkish Bosphorus Strait. The Eastern Mediterranean market is fairly 
large (Turkey, Greece and Israel), but refineries here prefer supplies of 
cheap sour crude from the Middle East. Such crude is readily available, 
from Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia through the Suez Canal and Sumed 
pipeline. There is no commercial incentive for the East Mediterranean 
refineries to pay a premium for Caspian light crude that will need to 
search for premium market share elsewhere. 
The eastern coastal markets of Europe are large with a focus on Italy. 
Here refineries run at around 50% on sweet crude, with an increasing 
demand for low sulphur fuels. Caspian supplies will be in direct market 
CASPIAN OIL &  GAS DEVELOPMENT AND THE BLACK SEA REGION 
 49 
competition with North African producers. Exceptionally keen Caspian 
pricing will be needed to displace established Libyan crude supply. 
Therefore the most important coastal markets for Caspian crude will be in 
the Western Mediterranean, which has the largest demand for sweet crude 
imports within the Mediterranean region. Refineries in Spain and France 
and pipeline links to refineries in Germany and Switzerland must be the 
primary markets for Caspian crude supply into the Mediterranean. Here 
Caspian crude will need on a highly competitive basis to displace both 
North and West African supplies. The remaining markets of Central 
Europe are not large, and are already almost entirely supplied by Russia 
through their Druzbha export system. Some media profile has been given 
to the fact that Poland, Hungary and Slovenia are searching for new 
supplies as alternatives to the North Sea. But their demand volumes are 
still modest. Therefore to a large extent Caspian oil exports must focus on 
Mediterranean markets to the west, where there is a refinery demand for 
‘just-in-time’ supplies. This would give preference to smaller tanker sizes 
that are also suitable for continued Bosphorus transits. This may well 
colour Russian thinking on their future oil transits through the Bosphorus. 
However there are alternative trading views. It is believed that resistance 
from Middle Eastern and North African producers against infiltration of 
Caspian crude into their established Mediterranean markets will be so 
intense, that it would of necessity drive Caspian oil to more distant 
markets in both Northwest Europe (where the North Sea supply is 
potentially in terminal decline), and to markets on the eastern seaboard of 
the United States. In this event, la rge tankers (VLCCs and ULCCs) 
would be the most commercially viable transportation option. This would 
automatically require deepwater export facilities for Caspian exports, 
such as the existing terminal at Ceyhan (or Vlore on the Adriatic if the 
port is ever built). The passage of such large tankers through the 
Bosphorus would be prohibited and the need for a Bosphorus pipeline 
bypass for Black Sea export would then be critical. Likewise if the use of 
smaller tanker transport were to continue to expand from the Black Sea, 
then either a more highly controlled and improved maritime oil transit 
through the Bosphorus must be adopted or a bypass pipeline must be 
built.  
4.  The Turkish Bosphorus Strait and Black Sea Bypass Options  
For Turkey, oil transit and the transit of other hazardous cargoes through 
the congested Turkish Straits is an international bottleneck of immense 
historical, social and economic importance (Figure 4). It presents a 
difficult challenge involving legal status and multinational rights of 
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passage (under the now outdated Montreux Convention of 1936), 
technical marine management, cost sharing, and important elements of 
potential regional conflict. The Bosphorus is approximately 31 km long 
but on average only 1.5 km wide (700 metres at its narrowest point). It 
has several sharp turns, and ships alter course at least 12 times at these 
difficult bends. More critically the Strait runs through the heart of 
Istanbul. Strong currents and counter currents (reaching 5 to 8 knots) 
continually change their pattern, and seasonal fog, snow and rain increase 
the hazards of transit. For mariners the Bosphorus is one of the most 
hazardous, crowded and difficult waterways in the world. The channel 
currently handles over 50,000 vessel transits a year (up from 25,000 in 
1988). With the projected economic growth expected for the littoral states 
of the Black Sea, these levels of transit are expected to grow 
exponentially. Oil tankers (including not only crude oil and refined 
product but also LPG) account for less than 15% of the total shipping, 
and their share is expected to decline as non-oil traffic, such as dry-bulk 
and container vessels continue to grow even faster than oil. But none of 
this takes into account the number of daily cross-ferry and other shuttle 
boats that transport 2 million people from one side to the other. These 
currently exceed more than 1000 crossings per day. All this adds to the 
complexity and risk. For Turkey it is the multi-billion dollar loss 
exposure that would arise from a single catastrophic marine disaster at the 
heart of Istanbul that is now the pressing issue. But Russian and Caspian 
oil investors are polarised over their conflicting views on transit risk, 
between those who believe a Bosphorus bypass should be built as soon as 
practicable, and those who believe Bosphorus oil transit can continue to 
be safely managed using upgraded marine technology. 
Comparisons are made with hazardous cargo transits through the Houston 
Shipping Canal, the Mississippi River, the Malacca and Singapore Straits, 
and the Suez Canal. However the incidence of marine accidents in the 
Bosphorus are significantly higher than in these channels (6 Bosphorus 
marine accidents per million transit miles, versus 3 in the Suez Canal, and 
0.2 in the Mississippi River). These statistics are quite startling but do in 
fact reflect the incremental benefits that arise from high quality marine 
and traffic management systems (especially VTS) that have been adopted 
elsewhere. Undoubtedly the Bosphorus will benefit materially from the 
installation of their new $30 million VTS system, but it would be in the 
interests of all if all Bosphorus transit vessels (especially for hazardous 
cargoes) took on a Bosphorus pilot, which is not yet mandatory. Similarly 
Bosphorus transit risk would be materially reduced if standards of vessel 
quality and reliability were raised to EU (and US) requirements. But this 
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would present an enormous commercial and political challenge for Russia 
and the other Black Sea states. However as Russia will be obliged in 
2005 to meet EU tanker standards at their receiving terminals for future 
oil deliveries if it wishes to retain its European market share, then perhaps 
the new tanker requirement is not an issue for that country. 
Total oil flows through the Bosphorus have grown significantly in recent 
years but not hugely. Between 1998 and 2000, growth was 7% per year, 
reflecting both the commissioning of the Supsa terminal in Georgia and 
the impact of high oil prices on increased Russian production. But it can 
be noted that the 74 mty Bosphorus oil transit of 2000 is still significantly 
lower than the 91 mty transit peak of 1989 (which, it should be pointed 
out, was a time when non-oil traffic was also much lighter). CERA has 
recently completed a projection for possible oil flows through the 
Bosphorus to 2010. They studied three scenarios. CERA’s preliminary 
analysis revealed some interesting results. By 2010, the flow of oil 
through the Bosphorus would not more than double or triple as feared in 
many quarters, but was projected to increase to no more than 110 to 120 
mty. Even in their worse-case scenario, CERA predict that the growth in 
volumes transiting the Strait within this time frame would only be some 
60% greater than today. Some do hold a more pessimistic view, but even 
then transit volumes do not double (up to 127 mty by 2010).  
Therefore this more moderate growth in transit numbers may perhaps 
support the case for improved marine management in the Straits without 
the requirement for a new Bosphorus bypass. Most Caspian 
multinationals see a 50 mty increase in crude transit through the 
Bosphorus as requiring no more than one modern double -hulled Suezmax 
tanker daily. But herein lies the rub. Transit through the Bosphorus under 
the current terms of the governing international Montreux Convention 
prevents Turkey from either imposing new transit rules and operating 
standards to lower transit risk, or the right to retrieve the costs involved in 
upgrading Bosphorus marine management systems. Current transit 
through the straits is in economic jargon a ‘free good’. As long as 
shippers believe that they can continue to move their oil freely through 
the Bosphorus, there are few incentives for them to undertake increased 
costs from either the building of a bypass pipeline or to contribute 
financially to improved control systems in the Bosphorus. Turkey is 
therefore left on the horns of a political and environmental dilemma. 
BP and the BTC sponsor group so far have been the one group of Caspian 
producers to declare their firm posit ion on the Bosphorus. They see the 
undoubted transit risks as being unacceptable, both from the point of 
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view of international reputation and environmental economic prudence. 
They recognise the magnitude of the multi-billion dollar ‘negative 
opportunity costs’ that could arise from a catastrophic oil disaster at the 
heart of Istanbul. This would be far greater than say the ‘Exxon Valdez’ 
incident in Alaska (with a reputed retrieval cost of $10 billion), or the 
clean-up costs arising from the recent break-up of the ‘Erika’ off Brittany 
last year. For BP’s South Caspian export, BTC is already their most 
expedient Bosphorus bypass. For the past three years the focus of 
Turkey’s political attention on BTC largely removed the transit crisis in 
the Bosphorus from the regional debate. Turkey’s environmental 
arguments were seen by many more to reflect their support for BTC than 
the realities of a catastrophic threat to Istanbul. But with the recent 
commissioning of CPC and the associated growth in oil transit volumes, 
the Bosphorus transit issue is once more centre stage. It needs to be 
addressed with urgency. A multilateral initiative between the Caspian and 
Russian oil exporters and the Black Sea littoral states is now urgently 
required to advance this critical debate. BSEC is an ideal and existing 
forum that could help the regional debate move forward. 
At least eight Black Sea Bosphorus bypass options have already been 
proposed to address the issue, but with few firm commitments (Figure 4). 
One popular proposal is for the construction of a new 320 km 42” 
pipeline from Bourgas on the Bulgarian Black Sea to Alexandroupolis on 
the Aegean coast of Greece. This line is designed to handle some 32 to 50 
mty, with new storage and offshore marine handling facilities at either 
end. The project’s cost is estimated at some $800 million with transit 
tariffs of 46-79¢/bl. Environmental concerns have been raised over the 
increased environmental and operating risks arising from the introduction 
of substantial volumes of Black Sea crude into the Aegean. It is self 
evident that VLCCs could not be used in these restricted waters for oil 
transport to distant markets.  
For some time, Russia’s Gazprom expressed considerable interest in this 
bypass option, and it is still in favour with several Russian Ministries. 
The Russian preference for a Bourgas-Alexandroupolis bypass was 
recorded in the final communiqué from the ‘Prodi Energy Dialogue’ 
between Russia and the EU last year. A trilateral meeting recently 
increased momentum for this Greek-Bulgarian-Russian project. In late 
October 2001, during the official visit of the Greek Minister of 
Development to Bulgaria, there was a pragmatic shift by the new 
Bulgarian administration to accelerate the final steps required for the 
legal establishment of the Trans-Balkan Oil Pipeline Company that will 
undertake the construction of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline. The 
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project was also discussed during the official visit of Russian President 
Vladimir Putin to Greece on 10 December 2001. At a trilateral meeting in 
Moscow in January 2002, representatives from the governments of the 
three countries signed a Protocol of Cooperation in which they declared 
their intention to continue negotiations for the early establishment of the 
Trans-Balkan Oil Pipeline Consortium. 
A second Bosphorus bypass option, which is being heavily promoted by 
AMBO, proposes a new 900 km 32” from Bourgas to Vlore on the 
Adriatic coast of Albania. With a design capacity of 30 to 37 mty, this 
would be built at an estimated cost of $900 million with a pipeline tariff 
of $1/bl. Vlore has the strategic potential for a deepwater port to handle 
VLCCs and ULCCs in the long term. This pipeline transits three Balkan 
countries, however, in which the security risk arising from internal 
conflict is high, and for that reason, this option has yet to attract the 
support of the Caspian multinational shippers. 
Two further Balkan bypass options have been proposed that involve 
western Black Sea ports. The Romanians are promoting a new 630 km 
32” line from Constanza, to connect with the existing Adria pipeline 
system in Hungary, with a pipeline extension to an Adriatic export 
terminal at Trieste. A transit tariff of $1.37/bl to $1.50/bl has been 
proposed. This project remains at a conceptual stage. The Ukrainians 
have already completed 673 km of new pipeline linkages and upgrades 
within existing infrastructure for a 920 km 33” pipeline system from 
Odessa to Brody, connecting the Black Sea with the Russian Dhruzbha 
pipeline system. Phase 1 with a capacity of 9 mty will soon be 
operational, with plans to expand capacity to 40 myy by 2005. A transit 
tariff of $1.37 to $1.50 was originally proposed, but recent press reports 
suggest that the system may well become operational with tariffs of less 
than $1/bl. Both these Balkan bypass systems are exposed to the same 
commercial challenges, however. These arise from shared capacity 
limitations in the existing Druzbha and Adria systems; and from 
contractual requirements to deliver crude supplies at sub-market prices to 
refineries in Central and East Europe, that are for the most part already 
being supplied by Russia. The pipelines also suffer from the security risk 
arising from multinational transits in countries where there is already a 
poor track record for crude and product theft. The Russians recently 
expressed the view that this bypass system could not be commercially 
viable until such time when the pipeline is extended to Gadansk. 
Two shorter Black Sea Bosphorus bypass alternatives have also been 
identified. The first is for a 200 km 40” pipeline through Turkish Thrace 
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from Kyiko on the Black Sea to Ibrikhaba on the Aegean. The estimated 
cost for this line is $800 million, but no tariff estimates have yet been 
proposed. At the time it was being reviewed, Turkey was focusing on 
securing BTC above all other Turkish options. The solution would be 
incapable of accommodating VLCCs or ULCCs. The second Turkish 
alternative was to build a 40 km pipeline low-cost link from the Black 
Sea to the TUPRAS Izmet refinery on the Sea of Marmara, to handle 
some 9 to 12.5 mty of Russian blend. Although this is a very practical 
proposal, it would have little material impact on the issue of long-term 
Bosphorus transits. 
A more attractive Turkish Black Sea Bosphorus bypass option is likely to 
emerge once BTC is built. It is proposed that a new 250 km 40” pipeline 
is laid from Samsun on the Black Sea to Kirikkale, which on a like-for-
like basis with the current Turkish onshore sector of the ‘Blue Stream’ 
gas pipeline would suggest an investment cost of $170 million. This 
could initially join with an existing Botas pipeline that already connects 
with the deepwater port of Ceyhan. Throughput would be limited in the 
initial phase, but as the bypass route follows an existing pipeline right-of-
way, a new 40” line could then be built to link Samsun to Ceyhan. Again 
on a like-for-like basis with BTC, a transport tariff of around 60¢/bl 
would seem to be appropriate. This bypass option is certainly 
commercially competitive and could bring with it substantial political 
benefits. It would create direct energy interdependence between Russia 
and Turkey, with the latter dependent on Russia for its strategic gas 
supply and with Russia dependent on Turkey for export of its Black Sea 
oil to international markets. The fact that Ceyhan is currently the only 
deepwater port capable of handling VLCC and ULCC tankers for long-
distance export reinforces its attraction. 
Finally the State Oil Company of Georgia (GIOC) have proposed a novel 
alternative that would provide the only bypass solution (other than BTC) 
not to use marine transit or double crude loading in the Black Sea. They 
have promoted the idea of a 40” land based trunk line skirting the eastern 
margins of the Black Sea, from Novorosysk through Sochi and Sukhumi 
eastwards to Tbilisi, to link with BTC on the Georgian Turkish border. 
But this 700 km landline would need exceptional political support from 
Russia to cooperate with Georgia, at a time when government relations 
are strained. More importantly the pipeline would need to transit 
Abkhazia, where a frozen ten-year conflict between Abkhazia and 
Georgia presents a critical stumbling block. It has been argued that the 
opposite could apply, whereby the commercial benefits that would arise 
from a trunk pipeline transit would in fact help facilitate conflict 
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resolution in this volatile area. GIOC have suggested that a transit tariff 
of $1/bl could be achieved from comparisons with BTC. This would not 
include the additional tariff for the BTC sector from Tbilisi to Ceyhan. 
Nevertheless, for the long-term protection of the Black Sea, this landline 
solution is without doubt environmentally the most attractive bypass 
option. All other Black Sea options carry inevitable environmental risk 
from the double handling of Caspian-Russian crude at both ends of the 
Black Sea. 
The immediate need for a Bosphorus bypass is not universally accepted, 
however. Russia currently believes that they already have Turkish 
agreement for short- to medium-term free transit of their oil through the  
Bosphorus, and have repeatedly stated so in public. In addition both 
Russia and the North Caspian oil exporters believe they too had the 
support of the US government on this issue, arising from the intense 
diplomatic pressure imposed on Russia by the US State Department to 
facilitate a commercial resolution of the CPC trunk pipeline (and thus 
protect US investment in Kazakhstan). Consequently early agreement to a 
new Bosphorus bypass may not be high on the Russian agenda today. 
Recent statements from Russia suggest that they believe that a Bosphorus 
bypass is not required until such time as oil transits through the 
Bosphorus exceed 120 mty sometime early in the next decade. Veiled 
threats have been made within the media that Turkish gas supply from 
Russia would be at risk if Russian Bosphorus transits were blocked.  
Inevitably any closure of the Bosphorus to oil transits will attract an 
additional transportation cost that will undermine existing $net-backs for 
the Black Sea barrel in markets to the West. It is useful for comparative 
purposes to target a single oil refinery in the Mediterranean against which 
to compare Black Sea transportation costs. If Caspian oil tankers were to 
continue unhindered through the Bosphorus, one could use an indicative 
transportation tariff from Tengiz through CPC to Novorosysk ($3.50/bl), 
and then across the Black Sea to the Augusta refinery in Sicily (60¢/bl) to 
give a built-up transportation cost of $4.10/bl. The tariff for transport of a 
comparable barrel from Baku to the Mediterranean at Ceyhan would be 
$2.60/bl (although this could rise as financing discussions for the BTC 
project proceed). With tanker shipment to Augusta (50¢/bl), this would 
result in a built-up transportation tariff of $3.10/bl, which would already 
give Baku oil a $1/bl competitive advantage over Tengiz. However if the 
Bosphorus were closed to CPC oil transit, this would introduce additional 
transportation costs for double crude handling across the Black Sea, a 
new Bosphorus bypass tariff, and an additional tanker transportation cost 
to Augusta. Through Bourgas Vlore this would raise transportation costs 
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for Tengiz crude to some $5.30/bl. The comparable cost through Bourgas 
Alexandroupolis would be $4.90/bl. It would therefore mean that closure 
of the Bosphorus to Novorosysk crude transit would reduce existing 
Tengiz Mediterranean net-backs by some 80¢ to $1.20/bl. that would 
further increase the competitive advantage of Ceyhan. This is a 
significant cost increase in transportation for Black Sea shippers that may 
be resisted. It could result in continued support for the current risky status 
quo. 
Nevertheless despite the legitimate concerns of Turkey over the risk of 
hazardous cargo transits through the heart of Istanbul, Turkey has no 
existing international legal redress to impose a new solution. In fact the 
obsolete (though still very much in force) Montreaux Convention of 1936 
sets strict limitations on the Turkish government, to ensure complete 
freedom of transit for all cargo without formalities, taxes or charges. In 
1994, following a major tanker accident in the Straits, the Turkish 
government did unilaterally impose a new set of regulations governing 
passage of oil tankers through the Bosphorus. These regulations were 
presented to the IMO for review and comment. Subsequently the IMO 
approved the more important parts of the new Turkish regulatory regime, 
but due to the constraints of the Montreaux Convention they could not be 
made mandatory, and many shippers still do not respect them. At the 
same time the EU too has been moving aggressively to strengthen 
regulations concerning tanker movements in EU waters. A recent draft 
EU Directive has moved forward from 2012 to 2005, the date by which 
EU oil terminals will only handle double hulled tankers. Given Turkey’s 
own initiative to prepare for EU membership, the suggestion that such 
maritime standards should not equally apply to the Bosphorus is an 
unrealistic expectation. Environmental activism has also arrived at the 
Bosphorus that imposes further pressure on the oil shippers to respond to 
increased international reputation risk. 
But it is clear that the Turkish government has no desire to antagonise 
Russia or other Black Sea littoral states over Bosphorus transit 
constraints. It has consistently opposed abrogation of the Montreaux 
Convention, which is within Turkey’s right to do. The raising of 
standards for Bosphorus marine management is essential, and is not 
opposed by the multinational oil shippers who wish to continue with the 
Bosphorus transit. However as tanker transit growth within the Straits is 
likely to be gradual and not explosive, it is in the interest of all parties 
that any reaction to this issue is not precipitate. Turkey as a matter of 
some urgency is now politically (and morally) behoven to raise the 
international profile and debate over Bosphorus transit at a formal 
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multinational forum. Any multilateral solution must clearly involve all 
Black Sea countries, as well as the IMO. It is equally imperative that an 
agreed time frame must be set by which date a long-term and effective 
solution for Bosphorus hazardous transits is resolved. The technical and 
commercial realities of all bypass options must be refined so that direct 
cost comparisons can be made. A commercial risk assessment for 
improved shipping standards through the Straits in comparison to a new-
build pipeline bypass is the only practical basis on which to progress. 
For Turkey the continued use of the Bosphorus as a ‘free good’ is not a 
valid option. The case for a market-led solution is now compelling. It 
would appear that the cost differential for the Black Sea barrel using a 
bypass route against continued use of a Bosphorus free transit is 80¢ to 
$1.20/bl. This gives a benchmark against which future Bosphorus marine 
transit costs can be compared. Nevertheless in the final analysis it would 
only take one catastrophic event in the heart of Istanbul to attract a multi-
billion dollar retrieval cost, which should in the future be reflected in 
increased tanker insurance rates. For many this means that a Bosphorus 
bypass is inevitable. If a five-year deadline is envisaged for such a bypass 
to be put in place, then the final decision on any route selection must be 
made within the next two years, to allow sufficient lead time for design 
financing construction and commissioning. For Turkey and the 
Bosphorus, time is clearly of the essence. It is certainly a Caspian energy 
issue that requires the attention of both Russian and Caspian energy 
investors as a matter of urgent priority. Clearly BSEC provides an 
existing and attractive vehicle to progress this regional debate. 
5.  Caspian Central Asian Gas 
Once it is on board a tanker, oil is an internationally tradable commodity. 
Gas export on the other hand (excluding LNG) is generally tied to 
regional markets through dedicated pipelines under long-term sales and 
purchase agreements. The Caspian region, including Central Asia 
together with Russia Iran and Iraq, incorporates a surfeit of proven 
remaining recoverable gas reserves (82 trillion cubic metres (tcm)). This 
represents more than half of the world total (151 tcm). But there is a 
corresponding dearth of regional gas markets. For the South Caspian, 
including Iran, up to 2010-15, this gas market will be Turkey, with 
possible onward transits to the European Union. For the North Caspian 
and Central Asia, the gas market will be Russia. Remote geography, 
complex geopolitics, and high development and transportation costs will 
combine to frustrate the export of Central Asian gas to alternative 
international markets. Current military conflicts in Afghanistan, if 
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successfully resolved, could perhaps at some time in the distant future 
resurrect visions of a Central Asian gas line through Afghanistan to 
Pakistan and India. Until last year the transnational gas pipeline (TCGP) 
from Central Asia across the Caspian and through the Caucasus to Turkey 
and beyond received intense geopolitical support from the US 
government. But with the discovery of a super-giant gas condensate field 
at Shah Deniz (offshore Azerbaijan), long-term commercial competition 
and unrealistic commercial demands from the Turkmen government 
removed this politically fraught option from the Caspian gas agenda. 
So what are the critical issues surrounding future domestic gas demand in 
Turkey? Until their recent economic crisis, Turkey was forecasting rises 
in demand for imported gas (primarily power sector driven) of some 42 
billion cubic meters a year (bcmy) in 2005, 55 bcmy in 2010, and 83 
bcmy by 2015. Turkey consumed 14.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) in 
2000. But new economic realities suggest that for the coming decade it 
would be prudent to revise downwards Turkey’s optimistic gas demand 
projections, to a 23 to 28 bcmy low/high case in 2005, and 38 to 45 bcmy 
in 2010. There will inevitably even be a market bias towards the lower 
case. But Turkey has been particularly vigilant in securing future gas 
supplies. They already have supply and purchase agreements (SPAs) in 
place for the contractual supply of 52 bcmy (30 bcmy from Russia, 16 
bcmy from ‘Blue Stream’ and 14 bcmy through the Balkans; 10 bcmy 
from Iran; 6.5 bcmy from Azerbaijan; and 5.5 bcmy from LNG). For at 
least the coming decade the Turkish domestic gas market is oversupplied. 
Therefore new opportunities for market growth in Turkey for South 
Caspian gas, including Iran (‘eastern gas’), are effectively closed.  
But could Turkey then become a transit hub for ‘eastern gas’ supplies to 
markets in the EU? For this a Balkans transit must hold the key (Figure 
5). An alternative solution could emerge for a direct gas pipeline from 
Turkey to Greece and onwards into Italy. Intergovernmental discussions 
are already taking place. But in both scenarios Russian interests in these 
markets are likely to dictate the outcome. Russia is highly protective of 
its lucrative gas position in Europe. For ‘eastern gas’ to access a EU 
market the first step required should be the negotiation of a commercially 
driven gas swap arrangement with Russia, to back out their current 14 
bcmy supply to the Turkish market through the Balkans. This would not 
only accommodate an increased market share for ‘eastern gas’ in Turkey, 
but would also allow ‘eastern gas’ access to existing Balkan gas 
infrastructure, for more direct gas transits into Europe.  
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But this would only happen if it were clearly in the national interest of 
Russia so to do. It would require that it be commercially more beneficial 
for Russia to redirect their Balkan supplies away from Turkey into their 
own domestic gas market, where there is a current supply shortfall and 
where domestic gas prices are expected to rise to commercial levels. 
Alternatively Russia could redirect their Balkan gas supplies into more 
lucrative gas markets in Western Europe where higher gas prices 
generally prevail. It is impossible to envisage that ‘eastern gas’ could also 
back out Russian ‘Blue Stream’ gas from the Turkish market. ‘Blue 
Stream’ is a Russian prestige project that directly links with Turkey 
across their common offshore Black Sea border. It enjoys exceptional 
levels of political commitment and investment. Two 375 km of offshore 
pipelines are currently being laid in the ultra-deep waters of the Black 
Sea. The project involves the application of leading-edge technology in 
an aggressively corrosive environment, where long-term maintenance 
will be difficult. Environmental risk for this novel Black Sea project is 
high. (This is reflected in the simultaneous laying of two gas lines to 
ensure continuity of gas supply).  
But it would be an equally brave political decision by Europe, if they 
were to unilaterally select a Turkey-Greece solution for the direct export 
of ‘eastern gas’ to Italy and Europe. Russia is protective of its Italian gas 
market that would be undermined. Any Turkish-Greece gas transit would 
need early Russian buy-in to protect Europe’s broader interests to secure 
their long-term dependence on other Russian gas supplies. Consequently 
in all scenarios Russia can to a large extent dictate the pace of how and 
when a Turkish-European transit hub may form. It is unlikely to be soon. 
The regional context for Central Asian gas is different. Despite current 
geopolitical events in Central Asia, it is difficult to envisage in the short 
to medium term (2010), that Central Asian gas will ever be transit 
Afghanistan to markets in Pakistan and India. Likewise an alternative 
land route through Iran to these same markets is also most unlikely. Iran 
will wish to control access to these markets for their own gas supplies. 
North Iran will absorb some small amounts of Turkmen gas (+/- 7bcmy) 
for domestic use. But for the same competitive reasons Iran will never be 
a transit country for Turkmen gas to Turkey. The gas markets of China 
and East Asia are potentially very large, but in the short to medium term 
remote geography, politics and built-up delivery costs will combine to 
undermine a Central Asian gas supply. China and East Asia already have 
more commercially attractive options, such as East Siberian Russian gas 
for which a new project is already in progress.  
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Therefore for Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, supplying gas 
(‘southern gas’) to the Russian domestic gas market is now their only real 
option. Russia needs this Central Asian ‘southern gas’ (Figure 6). For 
various reasons Russian domestic gas supplies are in decline. Despite 
operating the ir West Siberian gas fields at full capacity, Russian gas 
production fell from 545.6 bcm in 1999 to 523.2 bcm in 2000. New 
Gazprom investment in the Zapolarnoe gas field failed to deliver the 
incremental 25 bcmy that was expected. Over the same period, Russian 
domestic consumption increased by 31 bcmy, from 533.1 bcm in 1999 to 
564.1 in 2000. Therefore the current squeeze for Russian domestic gas is 
real. For Russia to preserve its lucrative supply of gas to Europe, which is 
critical to the central government for generating hard currency reserves, 
then current shortfalls of gas into the Russian domestic sector must be 
acquired from elsewhere. Russia can do this through the purchase of 
southern Central Asian gas where there is an existing gas surplus. 
However it is difficult to envisage that Russia would then go one step 
further, to allow commercial transit of Central Asian gas to Europe to 
compete with Russian gas in the markets of the EU. The same constraints 
may not of course apply to the delivery of Central Asian gas to the high-
risk markets of the Caucasus, Ukraine and the Balkans, where debt 
repayments are uncertain and where Russia needs security of transit for 
its own export of gas to Europe. 
Likewise despite the hopes of many it is most unlikely that Russia will in 
the short to medium term engage in a major structural reform of 
Gazprom. This semi-state monopoly is serving Russian interests well and 
sees no urgency in the need to expand external investment within its 
domestic gas sector. But even with Russia as a semi-monopolistic buyer, 
this need not necessarily be bad news for Central Asia. The current 
evolution of a two-tier domestic gas market in Russia (regulated and 
unregulated) is already producing commercially attractive net-back 
pricing in the unregulated gas sector. Russia will make every effort to 
drive down the price it pays for Central Asian gas through barter deals, 
political pressures, and through market competition between the main 
suppliers. But Russia is still dependent on security of supply from 
‘southern gas’, which means they cannot drive the price down to 
unrealistic levels without incurring a strategic risk themselves. Central 
Asian gas tariffs of between $25 to $40 per million cubic meters should 
be realistically achievable.  
Within this context the urgency with which the Kazakh foreign oil 
companies will need to dispose of their associated gas cap gas for future 
oil and condensate production, will weigh heavily into this market 
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equation. But the increasing dependence of Russia on Central Asian gas 
supplies will itself reinforce and bring discipline to the market. It would 
seem unlikely that Russia could or would even wish to attract sufficient 
global capital for major new investments in its own gas upstream to meet 
domestic shortfall in gas supply. Time is not on their side. Thus Russia 
and ‘southern gas’ are already in a commercially symbiotic relationship 
that has directly attracted private-sector gas investment from Russian oil 
and gas companies, both in Russia and in Central Asia. By 2005, Russia 
should be importing between 43 to 56 bcmy of Central Asian gas. These 
amounts could double by 2010, but this will need substantial sums of 
capital investment in both field and infrastructure upgrades, that will 
reinforce the need for competitive gas tariffs being paid by Russia to 
support this new investment.  
It would therefore seem that Central Asian gas may have a brighter future 
in the short to medium term than many currently perceive. This is 
particularly true when all factors are placed within a Central Asian 
demographic context. Likewise, if cooperation between Russia, the 
United States and Europe develops from current geopolitical events in 
Central Asia, then one could perhaps envisage the development of a 
coherent and integrated Russian-EU energy supply strategy along the 
lines proposed last year by President Prodi (‘The EU-Prodi Russian 
Energy Initiative’). Such an initiative would have material benefits in 
terms of improved regional security for Central Asia, the Caspian and the 
countries of the Black Sea region. 
6.  The Caspian Legal Regime and Offshore Territorial 
Boundaries 
One final issue impacts on the likely pace of Caspian oil and gas 
development that needs to be addressed. Legal uncertainties over the 
national ownership of the waters of the Caspian arose from the collapse 
of the FSU. In 1991, the Caspian legal regime changed from existing 
bilateral treaties and agreements between Iran and the Soviet Union to 
today’s unclear position under international law. This now requires the 
formal recognition of the national interests of the three newly 
independent states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as well. 
With so many other priorities requiring attention at the time of the Soviet 
collapse, resolution of the Caspian legal title was low on the Caspian 
political agenda. With the arrival of Western energy investors in the 
Caspian, however, subdivision of the offshore into territorial waters and 
the rights of each riparian state to award production sharing contracts 
(PSCs) rebalanced the debate. It soon became an issue of potential 
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regional conflict and security that introduced an element of significant 
business risk for international investment.  
For the states themselves it was a matter of national rights of access to 
offshore energy resources that are essential for their economic revival. 
For the foreign energy investor it was a matter of confidence in their 
offshore title under their PSCs. Obtaining secure title is essential for 
long-term contractual confidence as well as future access to new sources 
of conventional project financing. It impacts equally on the ability of the 
foreign investor to acquire political risk cover from the multilateral 
lending agencies (World Bank, IFC, EBRD). Conflict over offshore 
Caspian title came to a head in September 1994, when Azerbaijan signed 
its ‘Contract of the Century’ with the foreign oil investors in the AIOC 
consortium. This provoked the Russian MFA to issue a formal warning 
that the Azeri PSA was flawed. This was clearly stated despite the fact 
that Russian Lukoil was by then also part of the new consortium, with the 
written approval of their Ministry of Energy. Nevertheless work under the 
contract continued, as AIOC used balance sheet self-financing in the 
short term to solve their financing problems. 
So what is the fundamental legal issue? The land-locked Caspian, 
although connected to the Black and Baltic Seas by a series of canals, a 
priori does not meet the criteria for a ‘closed’ or ‘semi-closed’ sea, as set 
by the Convention of the United Nations on the Law of the Sea (1982). 
Furthermore the newly emerging Caspian states have not yet ratified this 
1982 Convention. The problem as to whether or not the Caspian may be 
an international lake under international law remains ambiguous. 
However the essential challenge at the heart of the debate is whether 
sovereignty or jurisdiction over the Caspian seabed is based on the 
principle of ‘common ownership’ or ‘separate ownership’. Until 1991, 
the Caspian had two littoral states, Iran and the USSR. With the collapse 
of the USSR, Caspian jurisdiction is now claimed by five riparian states: 
the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran. 
Existing Caspian Treaties (1921, 1928 and 1940) that established an 
agreed regime between Iran and the USSR became subject to renewed 
legal challenge but are still in force. Although these early treaties 
addressed the issues of a common border and rights of navigation, they 
made no reference to the exploitation of natural resources beneath the 
seabed and the legalities involved. 
By 1994, the Russian Federation had concluded that they alone retained 
the rights and obligations under existing treaties, and warned the newly 
independent states against unilateral action in offshore resource 
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development. These new Caspian states soon recognised, however, 
perhaps with some reluctance, the need for dialogue and mutual 
cooperation if long-term stability and sustainable economic development 
was to be achieved. In 1995, the littoral states agreed to establish a 
permanent mechanism for negotiations on the legal status of the Caspian, 
in the form of Joint Working Groups. These were to be led by the 
respective Legal Directors in their Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The first 
meeting took place in Tehran (June 1995), followed by Almaty 
(September 1995), at which time the participants (excluding Russia) 
confirmed their commitment to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter as it applied to the Caspian. This was done with particular 
reference to territorial integrity, demilitarisation, protection of the 
environment and free navigation for the littoral states. 
In March 1996, Azerbaijan signed a formal Intergovernmental Agreement 
(IGA) with Russia, in which the latter provided guarantees for the safe 
transit of Azerbaijani oil through its sovereign territory, which de facto 
recognised Azerbaijan’s right to produce and develop the sub-surface 
resources of its offshore oil fields. (It is also claimed, however, that 
Azerbaijan may have signed a separate and confidential MoU foregoing 
this precedent). In particular the IGA confirmed the titular rights of the 
new Azerbaijan International Oil Company (AIOC) to produce oil from 
the Chirag Oil Field. A year earlier, NIOC (State Oil Company of Iran) 
had applied for membership of the AIOC consortium, which de facto also 
provided recognition of Azerbaijan’s rights to develop its Caspian oil 
resource. The subsequent participation of Iran in the Shah Deniz PSA and 
Lenkoran PSA reinforces this interpretation. By 1997, a polarisation of 
views developed between the littoral states. Both Iran and Russia 
advocated that the Caspian should be divided on the basis of a 
Condominium of equal interests, with the creation of a 12-mile coastal 
zone under national jurisdictions (the ‘Caspian doughnut’).  
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan proposed an opposing solution based on a 
sectoral split of the Caspian, using common norms of international 
practice for the determination of median lines. The sectoral subdivision 
obtained the progressive support of Turkmenistan, which embarked on 
negotiations for a determination of a median line over a disputed area 
with Azerbaijan in which undeveloped oil fields were located 
(Kapaz/Sirdar). But in July 1998, Russia and Kazakhstan unexpectedly 
signed a bilateral Caspian Delimitation Agreement, over the seabed of the 
North Caspian. This was done for the specific purpose of their exercising 
respective sovereign rights to develop separately their offshore mineral 
resources. For the first time a new Caspian successor state to the USSR 
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established an exclusive right to develop and manage their subsurface 
resources, whilst at the same time clearly separating the issue of seabed 
delimitation from the issue of the full legal status of the Caspian. 
Consequently this 1998 agreement recognised that freedom of navigation 
(and aviation), placement of underwater pipelines and cables and all other 
uses of the Caspian Sea, would be regulated by future 
bilateral/multilateral agreements between the littoral states, within a 
broader convention that would only then address the legal status of the 
Caspian as a whole. 
Iran and Turkmenistan immediately disputed the validity of this 
independent bilateral agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan. They 
emphasised ‘the irreversible principle of unanimity by the five littoral 
states on all decisions regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea’, to 
ensure equality in the sharing of Caspian resources by all five states. 
However, this alignment of common interest between Iran and 
Turkmenistan was soon short-lived. By February 1999, Turkmenistan 
was committed to the construction of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline from 
Turkmenbashi to Baku. This culminated in November 1999, in the 
signature of a framework agreement between Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey, for a gas pipeline that would bypass both Iran and 
Russia. This initiative was subject to continuing protest by Russia, on 
grounds of disputed legal status and ecological risk. For commercial 
reasons the project was subsequently abandoned.  
By then Iran was also taking independent action. In December 1998, Iran 
signed an exploration study contract with Lasmo and Shell, to assess the 
hydrocarbon potential of the Iranian sector of the Caspian Sea. This 
agreement included certain rights for the award of subsequent contract 
areas to the participants, on previously negotiated contract terms. In May 
1999, Iran claimed formal territorial rights over a substantially extended 
sector in the South Caspian. This impinged on areas that both Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan claimed as their territorial waters, and included 
contract areas already awarded to foreign energy investors by Azerbaijan. 
At the same time Iran continued to claim an equal share of all Caspian 
mineral resources under a Condominium, to provide them with 20% of 
the regional economic benefits from all existing and future energy 
developments. Clearly Iran has the most to gain and the least to lose from 
procrastination over Caspian title resolution. A settlement through the 
International Court could be obtained, although the track record for 
reaching such international resolutions extends to decades. It would also 
set an unattractive precedent for Iran in its ongoing offshore territorial 
dispute with the UAE over certain islands in the Persian Gulf. 
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Despite repeated attempts over the past two years by Russia to bring 
matters to a close, resolution of a common Caspian legal regime remains 
elusive. Periodic challenges between Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan 
over offshore territorial boundaries continue, with Iran increasingly 
suspicious that Russia was focusing its efforts on reaching separate 
settlements with the other Caspian players, to the detriment of Iran’s 
national interests. On 23 July last year, Iran raised the profile of the 
dispute when its gunboats accompanied by air support brought to a halt 
some seismic work being carried out by BP on its ‘Alov’ offshore 
contract block (Figure 7). Iran had previously laid claim to this area 
(which they call ‘Elborz’) in 1998, and saw their action as a legitimate 
response comparable to an earlier event in October 1999. Azerbaijan had 
then threatened to seize the company assets of Fugro-Geoteam in Baku, if 
they commenced seismic operations on behalf of PetroIran Development 
over the disputed structure. This forced the Dutch company’s withdrawal 
from its Iranian contract.  
Thus Iran’s direct action at Alof/Elborz was seen by them to be their 
legitimate right to protect their national territorial interests in the Caspian 
until such time as a mutually acceptable multilateral agreement on 
Caspian demarcation was agreed. At the same time Iran took the 
opportunity to propose the immediate demilitarisation of the Caspian. 
This was primarily directed towards the activities of Russia. Through this 
event Iran has forcefully and successfully registered its position within 
the Caspian title debate, and reinforced their opening position for a 
territorial claim for 20% of the Caspian Sea area. Turkmenistan quickly 
followed the ‘Alov’ incident by reiterating its own claims to disputed 
territory with Azerbaijan, especially over what they saw as the ‘illegal’ 
development of the Azeri-Chirag fields by AIOC. Russia now publicly 
supports Azerbaijan on this issue against Turkmenistan, which was raised 
by President Putin in Moscow meetings with the two Caspian Heads of 
State earlier this year. In theory, a multilateral meeting to make progress 
on the Caspian title issue was scheduled to take place in Ashgabat in 
April (2002), but an early resolution of the title conflict is not to be 
expected. It is entirely within the national interest of Iran to make haste 
slowly on the issue, even with the increased risk of militarisation that 
may be happening in the Caspian today. 
But is early resolution of Caspian demarcation a matter of such 
importance? If the matter were investment driven for incremental oil 
production, then Caspian geology would suggest that it only truly impacts 
two existing projects. These are at AIOC and the Chirag-Azeri dispute 
between Azerbaijan and its neighbour Turkmenistan; and for Lukoil with 
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its new discovery at Severen that straddles the offshore Kazakh/Russian 
boundary. Long-term conventional financing for the development of both 
these projects could be at risk, but so far the title debate does not seem to 
have resulted in delays. On the other hand, both Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan are losing economic benefits from the disputed stranded asset 
of the proven Kapaz-Sirdar oil field that could also provide valuable 
incremental oil for the proposed BTC pipeline to the Mediterranean. 
The remaining deep waters of the South Caspian are effectively areas of 
high-risk exploration where investment can be postponed without 
material short-term loss. However there are alternative solutions available 
to governments and investors for Caspian title resolution that do not 
require a full and immediate resolution of Caspian offshore demarcation. 
There are already many international precedents for the adoption of 
bilateral solutions, whereby the disputing Parties can agree to the 
formation of Joint Development Zones within disputed areas on a project-
specific basis. The initiative taken by Azerbaijan in 1997 to postpone 
Caspian median line negotiations under principles described within the 
convention of Montego Bay (1982) was driven by similar thinking. It 
would have enabled the parties to focus on the recognition of exclusive 
areas of undisputed territory previously described within Soviet Oil 
Regulations (1970). But this would have still had to take into account the 
particular interest of Iran, which no longer recognises the legal status of 
the offshore boundary line adopted during Soviet times. The Montego 
model would have left such matters as freedom of navigation, fishing and 
the management of the Caspian marine environment as separate issues, to 
be dealt with under the International Law of the Environment. According 
to the International Court of Justice, it ‘is the general obligation of the 
States to ensure that activities executed within their jurisdiction and 
control and respect the environment of other states or of areas beyond 
national control, and that this is now part of the corpus of international 
law relating to the environment (and) this need is aptly expressed in the 
concept of sustainable development to reconcile economic development 
with the protection of the environment.’ The creation of a common 
ecological baseline for the future management of the Caspian is clearly a 
matter of regional priority, and needs to be addressed with urgency. This 
can and should be done outside the resolution of offshore territorial 
boundaries. Nevertheless, until a comprehensive Caspian legal regime is 
satisfactorily resolved for all the Caspian states involved, there is an 
inherent business risk for the Caspian energy investor. 
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7.  Conclusions  
The post-Soviet history of Caspian energy investment has generated nine 
years of unprecedented misinformation and misunderstanding. Extreme 
views have been forcefully expressed, with some considerable 
interference in the private sector investment process by various  
international powers. Some saw the province emerging as an alternative 
global oil supplier to the Middle East. Others saw the geographical 
isolation of the Caspian as an insurmountable obstacle that together with 
the many frozen conflicts seen within the region would prohibit any 
large-scale oil developments that could benefit the West. The latest 
fictional James Bond film, ‘The World is not Enough’ was based on 
much of the attendant intrigue, and correctly identified the Bosphorus as 
the critical bottleneck through which Caspian oil must pass to reach its 
primary market.  
Three proven but undeveloped Soviet oil and gas fields (Tengiz, 
Karachaganak and Azeri-Chriag-Guneshli) drove original Western 
energy investment into the Caspian, and the same three fields dominate 
Caspian energy development today. To a large extent Western 
exploration activity has confirmed earlier Soviet resource predictions. 
Two new super giant fields have been discovered (Kashegan and Shah 
Deniz), but eleven dry holes so far in the South Caspian offshore have 
materially downgraded future expectations for new oil. Exploration 
failure costs have been exceptionally high, but when successful, 
exploration finding costs have been correspondingly low. Development 
costs are also high, but with the application of new technology and falling 
transportation costs, the fully built-up cost of the Caspian barrel should 
soon fall within an $8 to $10/bl band. Caspian oil is globally competitive, 
but still needs a sustainable oil price in excess of $18 to $20/bl real to 
maintain commercial and investor confidence. Therefore Caspian 
offshore exploration and production only suits those multinationals with 
international E and P portfolios that allows for risk investment for the 
longer term. 
Proven remaining recoverable oil reserves in the Caspian Sea fall within 
the range of 8 to10 bnbls for the North Caspian Basin, and 6 to 8 bnbls in 
the South Caspian. The future Caspian yet to find potential is currently 
predicted to reach 50 bnbls, the bulk of which will be confined to the 
North Caspian Basin. By 2010 Caspian production should reach some 3 
million barrels a day, two-thirds from the North and one-third from the 
South. Caspian production could peak at 5 million barrels a day by 2020, 
which conventional industry wisdom would suggest would provide a 3% 
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contribution to future global oil supply. Caspian energy supplies will 
never be a strategic alternative to the OPEC producers of the Persian 
Gulf, but are certainly strategically important to consumers in Europe and 
the Black Sea. Nevertheless the future pace of Caspian oil development is 
still heavily dependent on the timely construction of new support 
infrastructure and the training of critical national manpower. New 
Caspian energy investment will also require freely available conventional 
global financing, which is by no means certain. A necessary self-imposed 
capital rationing by Caspian multinationals will result in development 
constraints. But more importantly the continuing absence of ‘good 
governance’ in Caspian governments will erode investor confidence and 
slow down the investment process. Resolution of Caspian title is 
important, especially if the demand for conventional project financing is 
increased. It is self evident that the Caspian business risk is high. 
The development of Caspian export capacity continues to improve. 
Multiple export options already exist that can accommodate up to 1.4 mm 
bls/d through pipelines, rail systems and barges through the Volga Don. 
A northern regional pipeline (CPC) from Tengiz to Novorosysk has just 
come on-stream with an initial export capacity of 560,000 barrels a day 
(bls/d). In the South Caspian a major pipeline with a capacity of 1 
mmbls/d will be built from Baku to Ceyhan in Turkey (BTC), to become 
operational in 2005. Up to 500,000 bls/d of Caspian crude will move to 
north Iran. Iran provides a market for Caspian crude but is not a transit 
country. The bulk of Caspian sweet crude will move to markets in the 
West Mediterranean where it must displace alternative supplie s from 
North Africa, West Africa and the Middle East. Resistance to market 
penetration may provoke the need for Caspian sweet crude to access more 
distant markets, in northwest Europe and the US eastern seaboard. In this 
event, economies of scale will dictate the use of large tankers (VLCCs 
and ULCCs) from an appropriate deepwater port, which only currently 
exists at Ceyhan. Such large vessels could not transit the Bosphorus 
Straits. For Turkey and many Black Sea shippers the increased risk of a 
catastrophe arising from hazardous oil transits through the heart of 
Istanbul is no longer acceptable. The selection of either a Bosphorus 
pipeline bypass or dramatically improved maritime system for Bosphorus 
transits is now a matter of social political and economic  priority. The 
increased transportation costs involved within a bypass option would 
potentially erode Black Sea export $netbacks by some 80¢ to $1.20 a 
barrel. This sets the benchmark price for costs involved in any alternative 
solutions. The pressing need for BSEC to promote a forum for early 
resolution of this issue is now a matter of considerable priority. The 
CASPIAN OIL &  GAS DEVELOPMENT AND THE BLACK SEA REGION 
 69 
recent use of military force by Iran against Azerbaijan in their assertion 
of Caspian offshore territorial rights has raised the Caspian profile on 
unresolved title. Full settlement will require a broad-based multilateral 
agreement between all the Caspian riparian states. That is unlikely to 
occur within the shorter term. Nevertheless the realities and fundamentals 
of Caspian oil development are clearly understood; and the nature of 
Caspian business risk although demanding is also clearly manageable. As 
a global oil producer, the Caspian has been materially downsized. For the 
coming decades, Caspian oil will be strategically important to Europe at a 
time when North Sea oil production is already in terminal decline. 
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Figure 1. Exploration in the Caspian 
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Figure 2. Oil pipelines in the Caspian 
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Figure 3. Black Sea oil flows, 2000 (crude and products) 
 
Notes: All figures in millions of tonnes annually. The figures for Romania and 
Bulgaria represent crude oil imports. Except for the volume of crude oil 
imported into the Black Sea, these imports are roughly the equivalent of 
Russian and Caspian crude; this drawing thus reduces total flow through 
the straits. 
Source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA). 
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Figure 4. Bypassing the Bosphorus: Proposed options 
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Figure 5. The Turkish market: Pivot for new gas geography? 
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 Figure 6. Central Asian gas pipelines 
 
Source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA). 
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Figure 7. South Caspian disputed areas 
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PROTECTING THE BLACK SEA ENVIRONMENT: 
A CHALLENGE FOR COOPERATION 
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE 
LAURENCE DAVID MEE 
1.  Introduction1 
The expansion of the European Union will eventually bring its borders to 
the Black Sea., which has a recent legacy of environmental degradation 
through pollution, loss of habitats and overexploitation. Protection of this 
sea and its coastal environment will become an inescapable responsibility 
of the enlarged Community but one that will require cooperation beyond 
its frontiers. The present paper examines the nature of the environmental 
crisis facing the Black Sea, the measures adopted to overcome it and the 
obstacles for implementing those measures. It explores how the new 
geopolitical framework of Europe will change the basis of environmental 
polit ics in the region. 
The Black Sea covers almost 2 million square kilometres and includes 
parts of 17 countries and Europe’s second, third and fourth rivers 
(Danube, Dnieper and Don). 
2.  Examining the Symptoms of Environmental Degradation 
The Black Sea is a remarkable by-product of the geological collisions 
between the ill-fitting jigsaw pieces that constitute the world’s continents. 
It is a sea of great depth – over two kilometres in places – and 
comparable in surface area to the shallow Baltic or North Seas. However, 
what makes it unique is its virtual isolation from the rest of the world’s 
oceans and its huge drainage basin covering two million square 
                                                                 
1 The author wishes to express his thanks to his many colleagues in the Black 
Sea region, particularly the staff of the Black Sea Project Co-ordination Unit in 
Istanbul for sustaining their vision during the past ten years of rapid change and 
trying circumstances. This paper was prepared partly thanks to the support of a 
Pew Fellowship in Marine Conservation, an initiative of the Pew Charitable 
Trusts in Partnership with the New England Aquarium. Interpretations of current 
events in the Black Sea do not necessarily reflect the official positions of CEPS, 
the ICBSS or the Pew Charitable Trusts or Pew Fellows Progra m in Marine 
Conservation. Thanks are expressed to Michael Emerson of the Centre for 
European Policy Studies for suggesting and commissioning this paper. 
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kilometres; over one-third of the area of continental Europe. On the one 
hand, the Black Sea receives water (and waste) from 17 countries from 
Germany to Georgia, and on the other hand, it is connected to the 
Mediterranean through the narrow, twisting Bosphorus, the Sea of 
Marmara and the Dardanelles. Every year the Bosphorus, 700 metres 
wide and less than 60 metres deep in places, carries about 600 cubic 
kilometres of surface water flowing from the Black Sea and 300 cubic 
kilometres of deep water replacing it from the Mediterranean. It also 
carries some 50,000 cargo ships (including 1,500 tankers) annually,2 and 
flows through the middle of the megalopolis of Istanbul. 
Figure 1. The Black Sea basin  
 
The Black Sea is also one of Europe's newest seas. It was formed a mere 
7,000 or 8,000 years ago when a rise in the sea level caused 
Mediterranean waters to break through the Bosphorus valley refilling a 
vast freshwater lake tens of metres below the prevailing sea level. The 
salty water sank to the bottom of the lake, filling it from below and 
forming a strong density gradient (known as a pycnocline) between the 
Mediterranean water on the bottom and the freshwater mixed with some 
seawater near the surface. The depth of this natural density barrier 
depended (and still depends) upon the supply of fresh water from rivers 
and rain, and the energy available from the wind and the sun for mixing it 
                                                                 
2 See Mee [1997]. 
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with the underlying seawater. The oxygen in the incoming water was 
quickly exhausted by the demands of bacteria associated with decaying 
biota and terrestrial organic material falling through the density gradient 
into the bottom water. Within a few hundred years, the Black Sea, some 
100-200 metres below, became depleted of oxygen. The bacterial 
population switched to organisms capable of obtaining their oxygen by 
reducing dissolved sulphate to toxic hydrogen sulphide and the resulting 
water body became the largest volume of anoxic water on our planet. 
For several thousand years therefore, only the surface waters, down to the 
‘liquid bottom’ pycnocline, have been capable of supporting higher life 
forms. Though not very biologically diverse compared with open seas at 
similar latitudes, the Black Sea developed remarkable and unique 
ecosystems, particularly in its expansive northwestern shelf where the sea 
is relatively shallow. The seabed in this part of the Black Sea was well 
oxygenated since it is well above the pycnocline. This area, and the 
adjacent shallow Sea of Azov, also receives the inflow of Europe's 
second, third and fourth largest rivers, the Danube, Dnieper and Don. A 
particularly unique ecosystem developed based on the ‘keystone’ benthic 
(bottom living) red algae, Phyllophora sp., which formed a vast bed with 
a total area equivalent to that of Belgium and the Netherlands. The term 
‘keystone’ is not used lightly: like the keystone in the middle of a stone 
bridge, its removal causes the entire structure to collapse in a precipitous 
manner. This particular keystone was also a place of great beauty, vast 
underwater fields of red algae and home to a myriad of dependent 
animals, all linked together in a complex web of life. 
Despite its uniquely fragile natural physical and chemical characteristics, 
the Black Sea ecosystem appears to have been relatively stable. During 
the first half of the 20th century, perhaps until three decades ago, there 
was little obvious evidence of human impact on the Sea or on its flora 
and fauna. Some changes had occurred, however, and these were 
precursors of much worse events to come. Sensitive monk seal 
populations, for example, began to decline from the late 19th century, 
driven from their breeding grounds by human activity. Nowadays the 
rarely sighted minuscule population of these seals seems likely to be 
doomed. Indeed, there is no certainty that any of these animals remain in 
the Black Sea. From the first decades of the 20th century, all Black Sea 
countries ruthlessly hunted dolphins. In 1954, for example, almost 
270,000 dolphins were killed. 3 Populations were in rapid decline; the 
USSR declared a moratorium in 1966 and other countries except Turkey 
                                                                 
3 See Ivanov and Beverton [1985].  
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followed suit. It was not until 1983 that dolphin hunting ceased in 
Turkey, and calls for renewed hunting continue to be heard today.4 As a 
precautionary measure, however, dolphins have now been included in the 
Black Sea Red Data Book and all countries have agreed to protect marine 
mammals. 
Another early change was through the introduction of a number of exotic 
animal species, introduced by accident from the hulls, bilges or ballast 
tanks of ships, and which flourished to the detriment of the Black Sea's 
characteristic fauna. The voracious predatory sea snail Rapana 
thomasiana, for example, arrived from waters around Japan in the mid-
1940s and devastated beds of the Black Sea genotype of the common 
oyster, Ostrea edulus. It is one of a list of at least 27 species introduced 
through human activity (accidentally or intentionally) since the beginning 
of the century and which have profoundly altered the Black Sea 
ecosystem.5 
Another gradual change was taking place on the coastlands of the Black 
Sea. Urban construction occurred in an unplanned and haphazard manner 
or one that paid little respect to environmental protection. The Black Sea 
was an increasingly popular tourist venue, particularly for the peoples of 
the former Soviet Union and the other Central and East European 
COMECON countries. This, together with competing demands for space 
from shipping, industry and coastal settlements (mostly with inadequate 
waste disposal), placed increasing demands on coastal landscapes. The 
damming of many rivers brought hydrological changes, particularly 
through the decrease in sediment flux to the coast, a phenomenon that 
contributed to major problems of erosion.6 This, in turn, was often 
ineffectively combated by the construction of a very large number of 
breakwaters to protect beaches. In the Sochi district of Russia alone, 80 
km of breakwaters, 50 km of walls and 900 jetties were built. Soviet civil 
engineers poured millions of tonnes of concrete to cap stony beaches 
along part of the coasts of Crimea, scarring the landscape and destroying 
habitats as well as exacerbating pollu tion problems. This is not only a 
problem of former Communist countries but also in Turkey, where high 
                                                                 
4 In the proceedings from the Black Sea Symposium in Istanbul, 16-18 
September 1991, organised by the Black Sea Foundation (p. 229), Çelikkale 
stated, for example, that ‘this [his opinion that there are too many dolphins] is 
one of the main problems which needs to be solved by international 
cooperation’. 
5 See Zaitsev [1992a]. 
6 See Kos’yan and Magoon [1993].  
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levels of economic growth have sometimes been at the expense of 
environmental protection. More than 100 km of coastal road eastwards 
from Trabzon have been constructed along the shore, for example, 
severely altering its ecology and limiting the value of the landscape for 
other human uses. Throughout the entire Black Sea region, a large 
proportion of ecologically important coastal wetlands were also lost to 
developers, polluters or those who considered they could ‘improve’ such 
habitats.7 In the competition for coastal space, the natural environment 
was the inevitable loser. Though many areas of great beauty remain, the 
Black Sea has virtually no areas where marine life is protected. 
Throughout its entire coastal area, the human population has continuously 
encroached on the ecosystem that it is part of and upon which it depends. 
From the late 1960s to the early 1990s, events occurred in the Black Sea 
that can objectively be considered as an environmental catastrophe.8 The 
strongest single symptom of the catastrophe was the virtual elimination of 
the Phyllophora ecosystem of the Black Sea's northwestern shelf in a 
matter of some ten years. The chain of events leading to the decline of 
this ecosystem started with an increase in nutrient flux down the major 
rivers, particularly in the late 1960s when fertiliser use increased 
markedly as a result of the ‘Green Revolution’. This brought about a 
decrease in light penetration in the sea due to the increased intensity of 
phytoplankton blooms (eutrophication). Deprived of light, the red algae 
and other photosynthetic bottom-dwelling (benthic ) species quickly died. 
Their function was lost as a source of oxygen to the bottom waters of the 
shelf seas and as a habitat for a wide variety of organisms. The bottom 
waters of the northwestern shelf became seasonally hypoxic (very low 
oxygen) and even anoxic (no measurable oxygen). Between 1972 and 
1990, it is estimated9 that some 60 million tonnes of large benthic animals 
(macrofauna) perished through oxygen depletion. Thousands of tons of 
dead plants and animals were washed up on the shores of Romania and 
Ukraine every year and the seabed became a barren area with a very low 
biological diversity.10  
The loss of the northwestern shelf ecosystem had an impact on the entire 
Black Sea. It also coincided with a period of expansion in the fisheries 
                                                                 
7 See, for example, Wilson and Moser [1994]. 
8 See Mee [1992]. 
9 See Zaitsev [1992b]. 
10 This problem has still not disappeared; warm temperatures in the summer of 
2001 resulted in increased stagnation and a huge mortality of organisms that 
were subsequently washed up on Romanian beaches. 
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industry and the application of high-technology fish-finding 
hydroacoustics and more efficient, though poorly regulated and 
destructive, purse-seining and bottom-trawling gear. The consequence 
was a decrease in the diversity of commercially exploitable fish species 
from some 26 to 6, in less than two decades. As eutrophication advanced 
in the Black Sea, the smaller fish species such as anchovies and sprat 
were favoured since they depend upon the phytoplankton-driven pelagic 
ecosystem, rather than the benthic one. Furthermore, their predators had 
often been removed by overfishing or habitat loss. As a consequence, 
fishing efforts switched to these lower-value species. Annual catches of 
anchovy, for example, rose from 225,000 tonnes in 1975 to some 450,000 
tonnes a decade later.11 
In the mid-1980s, another exotic species arrived in ship’s ballast waters, 
the ctenophore Mnemiopsis leidyi, sometimes known as the comb jelly.12 
This species was brought from the eastern seaboard of America and, 
without predators, flourished in the eutrophic Black Sea environment 
where it consumes zooplankton including fish larvae. Perhaps the word 
‘flourished’ is an understatement. At its peak in 1989-90, it is claimed to 
have reached a total biomass of about one billion tonnes (1,000,000,000 
tonnes wet weight) in the Black Sea, more than the world annual fish 
harvest! This massive population explosion had an enormous impact on 
the Black Sea's ecosystems and commercial fish stocks. The loss of 
zooplankton allowed huge populations of phytoplankton to develop in a 
series of blooms that reduced the mean Secchi depth (the maximum depth 
to which a white disk lowered into the sea from a ship remains visible) 
from the normal average of 20 meters, to only five meters. Anchovy 
catches plummeted in 1990 to only 60,000 tonnes. 
The situation in the Black Sea was mirrored by another environmental 
stress on its coasts. The economic decline of the Black Sea coastal 
countries and the political upheaval of transition to a market economy led 
to a lack of maintenance of waste treatment facilities for domestic sewage 
and industrial waste. Of course, many cities had never had effective 
sewage treatment, but the general decline was evidenced by an increased 
frequency of outbreaks of waterborne diseases, such as cholera, and 
frequent beach closures due to unsanitary conditions. In Ukraine, for 
example, 44% of bathing water samples taken in 1995 did not meet the 
national microbiological standards.13 Summer closure of beaches in the 
                                                                 
11 See MacLennan et al. [1997].  
12 See GESAMP [1997].  
13 See Black Sea Environmental Programme [1997]. 
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Odessa region became a regular phenomenon. This added to the woes of 
a tourist industry suffering a chronic lack of investment and declining 
infrastructure.14 Spending power of many people in the new economy 
was also reduced and there were competing opportunities for cheap 
foreign travel (e.g. to Turkey) for those who could afford it. All of these 
factors led to a sharp decline in tourist numbers and in income for the 
local economies. 
The state of the environment in the Black Sea in the early 1990s gave 
little reason for optimism. The economic crisis did however give some 
respite for pollution. Farmers were often unable to apply the quantity of 
fertilisers used in the former centrally planned economies. In the Danube 
basin, for example, by 1997, phosphate fertiliser application was lower 
than in 1962 and nitrogen fertiliser was at its 1967 level. 15 Furthermore, 
many large energy-inefficient and polluting industries were forced to 
close. By 1996 there was already some evidence of recovery of the 
benthic ecosystem on the northwestern shelf of the Black Sea, albeit 
small. Furthermore, Mnemiopsis populations started to decline, especially 
with the arrival of its own natural predator, a similar but larger organism 
called Beroe ovata. Anchovy fisheries recovered, almost to their mid-
1980s level. Most local economists and ecologists agree, however, that 
the pressure on the environment will return as the economies recover, 
unless urgent measures are taken to limit the environmental impact of 
renewed growth.  
As the new century dawns, additional environmental pressures are 
emerging as a result of the rapid increase in the use of the Black Sea as a 
maritime transport route, particularly for the shipment of oil en-route 
from the newly opened Caspian oil fields. This issue has given rise to 
major political differences between the coastal countries of the Black Sea 
as the countries compete for revenue-generating pipeline routes across 
their territories or defend their rights to use the Black Sea as an 
international shipping route (see the preceding paper in this volume by T. 
Adams). Unfortunately, the eagerness to join this perceived bonanza is 
often leading to the failure to follow proper environmental impact 
assessment procedures or to invest in measures to protect the natural 
environment and assure sustainable development.  
 
                                                                 
14 See Black Sea Environmental Programme (BSEP) [1996]. 
15 See Mee [2001].  
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3.  International Action for protecting the Black Sea 
Protection of the Black Sea environment requires a concerted approach 
between the six coastal countries. This must be accompanied by measures 
implemented at the national level. Cooperation on environmental issues 
between Black Sea countries was very slow to develop, given the 
historical division across the Sea between the Communist north and 
Western-leaning Turkey in the south. This was only part of the reason 
however. Admitting that there was a serious problem in the first place 
was a major barrier that was only overcome at the time of Perestroika, 
more than a decade after some of the worst symptoms of environmental 
decline had become apparent.  
3.1  Unsuccessful early attempts to take international action  
The Varna Fisheries Agreement. A fisheries convention (the Varna 
Convention) was signed by the Black Sea members of COMECON: 
Bulgaria, Romania and the USSR, in 1959. This convention focused on 
data gathering and exchange of information, but it did set minimum size 
limits for eight species and a minimum mesh size for turbot and 
prohibited fishing for one species of sturgeon deemed close to extinction. 
Turkey remained outside this agreement, however, and it had practically 
no enforcement provisions. Thus it had no significant impact on 
restraining the fisheries effort or managing stocks.16 Bulgaria, Romania 
and Turkey cooperated within the framework of the General Fisheries 
Council for the Mediterranean, but the USSR was not a member and the 
Council had little or no impact on the management of fishing in the Black 
Sea. 
Black Sea fisheries remain internationally unregulated to this day. 
National regulations vary considerably between countries and are poorly 
enforced. There are frequent accounts of conflicts due to the violation of 
territorial waters, mostly but not exclusively by Turkish fishermen. A 
particularly serious incident occurred in March 2000, when a Ukrainian 
patrol vessel sank a Turkish fishing boat resulting in two deaths. The 
patrol vessel had invited a TV crew on board to film the macabre event. 
With the collapse of centrally planned economies in the North (and of 
their fishing industries in the Black Sea), Turkish fishing now accounts 
for some 90% of the economic value of all landings in the Black Sea.17 
Private investors in countries such as Ukraine and Bulgaria are now 
                                                                 
16 See Reynolds [1987].  
17 McLennan et al. [1997].  
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displacing traditional cooperatives by purchasing sophisticated trawlers. 
The cooperatives (and some local NGOs) accuse them of trawling 
intensively close to the coast, resulting in immense habitat destruction. 
There are persistent rumours in the press, however, that members of 
cooperatives themselves are illegally trading part of their catch in the 
high seas to Turkish fishermen in order to circumvent the regulations on 
both sides of the Black Sea. Similarly, there are frequent press reports in 
Turkey of trawling in national prohibited zones including the entrance to 
the Bosphorus. Overcapacity in the industry is chronic and fishermen 
often plead that their illegal activities are driven by the need to pay back 
costly loans.  
The stakes are high for an international management policy (including 
quotas) to be completed, but the individual country perspectives on an 
equitable division of resources are divergent. There are powerful private 
interests happy to maintain the status quo. Serious negotiations for a new 
Black Sea Fisheries Convention have been underway since the early 
1990s. ‘Final’ draft conventions are circulated from time to time but 
progress is painfully slow. It is now widely recognised that trawling is 
one of the most destructive human stresses on global marine habitats.18 
Without restrictions on trawling, it is unlikely that benthic algal 
communities will ever be restored, irrespective of measures to control 
eutrophication. 
The MARPOL Convention Special Areas Provision. Another early 
international convention is MARPOL 73/78, a global convention that was 
signed in its original version in 1973 and is designed to protect the sea 
from ship-based pollution. Though ratified by all Black Sea countries 
(and legally fully in force in the region), its provisions have not been 
fully nor consistently applied. MARPOL 73/78 offers a possibility of 
extra protection for the Black Sea region, having designated the Black 
Sea as a ‘specially protected area’ within several of its Annexes.19 Under 
this regime, if in force, discharge of oil or garbage within the region 
would be prohibited. In order to enforce this regime, however, Black Sea 
countries will need to provide for sufficient reception facilities in their 
Black Sea ports. Effective enforcement, however, will also require clarity 
concerning the delimitation of exclusive economic zones, a process likely 
                                                                 
18  See Jackson et al. [2001]. 
19 MARPOL 73/78 has five Annexes, concerned with: oil (Annex I), noxious 
liquid substances in bulk (Annex II), harmful substances carried by sea in 
packaged forms (Annex III), sewage (Annex IV) and garbage (Annex V). 
Acceptance of Annexes I and II is obligatory for all contracting parties. 
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to be rather lengthy. It will be in the economic interest of the coastal 
countries to implement the special area provisions, as they will be able to 
increase tariffs for ships entering Black Sea ports. The use of the Black 
Sea as an oil tanker super-highway makes the implementation of this 
legislation an urgent priority for environmental protection. 
One of the positive developments arising from MARPOL is the gradual 
replacement of single -hulled tankers with double -hulled vessels. These 
have separate cargo and ballast tanks, improving safety and reducing 
operational oil discharges. On the other hand, however, they may increase 
the risk of transporting opportunistic species such as Mnemiopsis. The 
International Maritime Organisation is currently studying options to 
reduce this problem using the Black Sea as a case study.  
3.2  The Bucharest Convention: The first steps  
In late summer 1986, at the initiative of the then USSR, representatives of 
the then four countries of the Black Sea (Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and 
the USSR) met to discuss the possibility of drafting a Convention for the 
Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution. This was to be largely 
modelled on the Regional Seas Conventions of UNEP, notably the 
Barcelona Convention, though the negotiating process was conducted 
between the four countries with no external participation. The opening of 
this chapter in cooperation was a direct consequence of Perestroika in the 
Soviet Union and marked a new era in relations with its neighbours, 
which was to see dramatic developments in a short space of time. The 
negotiating process continued for a period of six years during which time 
the Soviet Union itself was to break up. The four countries became six – 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine – 
but all parties demonstrated their commitment to complete the process.  
The Convention and its three Protocols20 were adopted by the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution held in 
Bucharest on 21 April 1992, and deposited with the Government of 
Romania. The Convention, as well as the Land-Based Sources Protocol 
and the Emergency Response Protocol entered into force on 15 January 
                                                                 
20 Protocol on Protection of the Black Sea Marine Environment Against 
Pollution From Land-Based Sources (Land-Based Sources Protocol), the 
Protocol on Cooperation in Combating Pollution of the Black Sea Marine 
Environment by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Emergency Situations 
(Emergency Response Protocol), and the Protocol on the Protection of the Black 
Sea Marine Environment Against Pollution by Dumping (Dumping Protocol). 
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1994, in accordance with Art. XXVIII of the Convention, i.e. 60 days 
after their fourth ratification. 
Structure and contents. The name ‘Bucharest Convention’ actually refers 
not only to the framework convention itself, the Convention for the 
Protection of the Black Sea, but also to its five Resolutions and three 
Protocols: the Land-Based Sources Protocol, the Emergency Response 
Protocol and the Dumping Protocol. Annexes containing so-called black 
and grey lists accompany the Land-Based Source Protocol and Dumping 
Protocol. In accordance with general practice, pollution by the substances 
and matter on the black lists (Annex I), categorised as hazardous, needs 
to be prevented and eliminated by the Contracting Parties. Pollution by 
substances on the grey lists (Annex II) categorised as noxious, need to be 
reduced and where possible eliminated. In the case of land-based sources, 
there is an additional Annex III, which prescribes restrictions to which 
discharges of substances and matters listed in Annex II should be subject. 
Furthermore, dumping of wastes and materials containing the noxious 
substances contained in Annex II requires a prior special permit from ‘the 
competent national authorities’, while, according to Annex III, dumping 
of all other wastes and materials requires a prior general permit. 
The Convention addresses five of the six generally recognised sources of 
marine pollution21: land-based (in Art. VII and Protocol), vessel-source 
(Art. VIII), ocean dumping (Art. X and Protocol), exploitation of the 
seabed of the continental shelf or margin (Art. XI), and from or through 
the atmosphere (Art. XII). The only source not covered is exploitation of 
the seabed of the international area, simply because the Black Sea does 
not contain territory that falls under this definition. It also deals 
extensively with emergency response (Art. IX and Protocol), a term that 
refers to the use of techniques to prevent pollution arising from accidents, 
since the Black Sea, but especially its entrance, the Bosphorus Straits, has 
been confronted with a considerable number of accidents. 
Implementation. The provisions of the Bucharest Convention require 
implementation by the six Contracting Parties: the Black Sea coastal 
states. They are bound to implement the provisions since the Convention 
is part of the legislation of all six countries. In practice, however, some 
countries were not immediately capable of implementing it, mostly 
because of economic constraints, and in some cases they were unwilling 
to take action to implement all of its provisions. The Convention does not 
                                                                 
21 See Brubaker [1993], p. 33. The classification is reflected in UNCLOS III, 
Part XII. Prior to UNCLOS III, it was common to ‘combine’ the pollution source 
‘from and through the atmosphere’ with ‘land-based pollution’. 
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provide for special enforcement techniques, such as a dispute settlement 
mechanism (the traditional enforcement technique, which is however not 
necessarily useful in case of environmental matters, where prevention 
rather than resolution or restoration is required). Furthermore it lacks a 
compliance reporting procedure, but, ‘in order to achieve the purposes of 
the Convention’, it does provide for the establishment of a Commission 
for the Protection of the Black Sea, which consists of at least one 
representative of each Contracting Party. The Commission shall, inter 
alia, ‘promote the implementation of the Convention, inform the 
Contracting Parties of its work, and assist them by making 
recommendations on measures necessary for achieving the aims of the 
convention, and on recommendations of possible amendments to the 
convention and protocols’ (Art. XVIII). The Convention further 
determines that the ‘Commission shall be assisted in its activities by a 
permanent Secretariat’ (Art. XVII). 
Unfortunately, despite the determination of the Parties to complete the 
ratification process, the full implementation of the Convention did not 
followed suit. The Commission was established, and had its first meeting 
in May 1995. The Commission provisionally decided to adopt the name 
Istanbul Commission as it was agreed to locate its Secretariat in Istanbul. 
The Commission however, did not initially prove to be the active, 
supervisory body as intended by the Convention. This was due to the 
failure to integrate the Secretariat. Experience in earlier Regional Seas 
programmes has shown that the existence of an organisational structure, 
providing for a coordinating body, increases the chances of success of a 
convention. In the case of the Bucharest Convention, the delay was 
mostly due to the failure of the Parties to secure the necessary funds for 
its integration. The economic circumstances of many of the Parties led to 
severe restrictions on overseas spending. This was coupled with a series 
of diplomatic problems regarding the agreement for establishing the 
Secretariat. A major logjam, for example, was a conflict between Russia 
and Turkey regarding the provision of immunities and privileges for the 
staff of the Secretariat. It was not until 15 October 2000 that the 
Secretariat started operations, with a core staff of two and a reduced 
budget based on the contributions of all countries except Georgia and 
Russia. In the six-year gap between ratification and opening the 
Secretariat, much momentum had been lost and the task faced by the first 
Executive Director, Mr. Plamen Djadjev (Bulgaria), is an onerous one. 
It is useful to examine the financial difficulties of the Commission more 
closely. The Convention had undergone scrutiny by all six legislative 
assemblies at the time of ratification and it is surprising that the financial 
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implications had not been taken into account. Certainly, in the case of the 
host country, Turkey, the Government had committed itself to covering 
40% of the total costs of the Secretariat, a provision conditional upon the 
compliance of other countries. This left 12% of the budget to be covered 
by each remaining country, an initial amount of about $43,000 each, 
seemingly trivial compared to the revenues from tourism and fishing in a 
healthy Black Sea. Until a critical mass of countries contributed 
simultaneously, however, nobody seemed prepared to make the first 
payment. The deadlock was finally broken in April 2000 at the fifth 
meeting22 of the Commission where Russia finally withdrew its 
reservations on the Headquarters Agreement for the Secretariat and the 
other countries agreed de facto to accept the default in payment of Russia 
and Georgia.  
The non-payment of Russia was symptomatic of a deeper problem with 
its environmental governance. Since the time of signature and ratification 
of the Convention, the ‘environment sector’ had gradually been 
downgraded in status from a Ministry to a State Committee and, in 2000, 
from a State Committee to a Department of the Ministry of Natural 
Resources (for which the former Ministry of Environment had been a 
regulator). Despite reassurances, this has given a strong signal that 
environmental protection does not occupy a high place on Russia’s 
political agenda. The continuous institutional turmoil, unwieldy 
procedures and budgetary uncertainty led to non-payment of 
contributions to Helcom (the Helsinki Commission for the Baltic) and to 
the Black Sea Commission. In an official statement to the seventh 
meeting23 of the Commission, the representative of Russia explained that 
support to the Black Sea would be within the Federal Programme for 
Ecology and Natural Resources but that a Federal legal act will be 
required to pay any contribution from the Federal budget. Since Russia 
has still not officially ratified the Commission Headquarters Agreement, 
its financial contribution is still blocked but the roadblock should be 
overcome by 2002. This tortuous process for releasing $43,000 contrasts 
sharply with the speedy approval of the international multi-billion dollar 
Blue Stream project to carry gas under the Black Sea from Russia to 
Turkey, as many local NGOs have been quick to point out. 
                                                                 
22 Minutes of the 5th Meeting of the Black Sea Commission, Istanbul, Turkey, 
27-28 April 2000. 
23 Minutes of the 7th Meeting of the Black Sea Commission, Istanbul, Turkey, 
29-31 May 2001. 
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The case of Georgia is one of setting priorities for spending in the 
environmental sector where the state budget is minuscule. Georgia has 
also not ratified the Headquarters Agreement for the Commission, 
possibly because of its financial implications. It is however a major 
beneficiary of international funding for environmental protection in the 
Black Sea region. 
Full and active functioning of both bodies is essential if the Convention is 
to succeed. It will also be necessary for the process of further elaborating 
a ‘Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Controlling Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Combating Illegal Traffic Thereof’, 
and a Biodiversity Protocol24. As mentioned earlier, the Bucharest 
Convention is closely modelled on the format and substance of the UNEP 
Regional Seas Conventions 25, most notably the Barcelona Convention for 
the Protection of the Mediterranean. However, in the 20-year lag time 
between the approval of these earlier Conventions and the Bucharest 
Convention, there have been many improvements in the available legal 
tools. The Barcelona Convention in particular has been completely 
revised, together with its respective Protocols.26 One of the earliest tasks 
of the Istanbul Commission will be to re-examine the provisions of the 
Protocols and whether or not these need to be readjusted to current 
international circumstances. It may be timely to revisit the entire 
Convention and restructure it as the Convention for the Protection of the 
Black Sea Environment, a much needed legal tool for the 21st century. 
3.3  The Odessa Ministerial Declaration: A statement of common 
policy 
The Bucharest Convention itself is a legal and diplomatic tool for joint 
action and does not set out to establish environmental policy goals (e.g. 
targets for reducing the loads of specific pollutants, etc.). It also does not 
establish any regulatory mechanism for exploitation or development of 
the natural environment (e.g. straddled marine resources or specially 
                                                                 
24 Elaboration and adoption of such Protocol was agreed by the Commission at 
its September 1996 session. It is referred to in the Black Sea Strategic Action 
Plan.  
25 For a recent review of the Regional Seas Conventions, see Mee [1998], p. 35.  
26 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against 
Pollution (1976, ratified 1978, amended 1995). Protocols on dumping (1976, 
1995), emergency response (1976), LBS (1980, 1996), specially protected areas 
and biodiversity (1995), seabed exploration and exploitation (1994), 
transboundary movement hazardous waste (1996). 
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protected areas). In order to develop a common policy framework, a clear 
Declaration of Environmental Quality Objectives was considered 
necessary. Following the initiative of the Government of Ukraine and 
employing the stewardship of UNEP, a Ministerial Declaration was 
formulated during nine months of negotiations and signed by all six 
countries in Odessa in April 1993 (the Odessa Declaration27). This 
Declaration is a pragmatic and innovative policy statement that sets 
environmental goals and a time frame to guide management regimes and 
associated investments. It was the first policy agreement on regional seas 
to reflect the philosophy of UNCED, Agenda 21, and features a heavy 
emphasis on accountability, periodic review and public awareness. These 
features represented a major conceptual shift in a public statement from 
countries of the region, particularly those emerging from totalitarianism.  
The Odessa Declaration is remarkable in two ways. The first is the spirit 
of consensus. While negotiations were going on, Ukraine and Russia 
were engaged in a dangerous conflict about ownership of the Black Sea 
naval fleet and Georgia was suffering civil war. ‘The environment has no 
political boundaries’ explained Professor Sherbak, then Minister for the 
Environment of Ukraine. The second remarkable feature was the 
commitment to a new approach to environmental policy-making in the 
region, including much greater public participation and accountability. 
The Declaration also represented the first public policy statement in the 
region to endorse the precautionary principle,28 an important departure 
from the earlier de facto acceptance of rivers and seas as waste 
receptacles.  
Structure and contents. The Odessa Declaration consists of a preamble, a 
general policy statement and 19 specific actions. These actions were 
designed to facilitate the rapid development of practical measures for 
controlling pollution from land-based and marine sources (including the 
harmonisation of environmental standards); to restore, conserve and 
manage natural resources; to respond to environmental emergencies; to 
                                                                 
27 See Hey and Mee [1993].  
28 Several different definitions have been given of this principle, which is also 
embodied in the Odessa Declaration. One definition is contained in Principle 15 
of the Rio Declaration: ‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely accepted by States according to their capabilities. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation’. For further information, see Hey and 
Freestone [1995]. 
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improve the assessment of contaminants and their sources; to introduce 
integrated coastal-zone management policies and compulsory 
environmental impact assessments; and to create a transparent and 
balanced mechanism for reviewing and updating the Declaration on a 
triennial basis. The Declaration was designed to provide a basis for a 
flexible but continuous process for taking decisions on coordinated 
national action towards common goals at present and in the future. Its 
clear objectives and specific time frames were to guide and stimulate 
implementation of the Bucharest Convention.  
Implementation. On 7 April 1996, the first triennium came to its end. A 
report commissioned by UNEP29 evaluated to what extent the Odessa 
Declaration has succeeded to serve as an ‘agenda’ for implementation of 
regional measures, in accordance with the Bucharest Convention. The 
results of this analysis were encouraging even despite the lack of formal 
implementation of the Bucharest Convention. The Odessa Declaration 
had given a strong signal to donors, particularly the newly created Global 
Environment Facility, that the Black Sea countries were willing and able 
to cooperate on restoring and protecting this severely damaged and 
unique shared environment. This paved the way for financial assistance to 
be granted for implementation of the Odessa Declaration. 
In June 1993, as a result of the Declaration, a three-year Black Sea 
Environmental Programme 30 (BSEP) was established with $9.3 million 
funding from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and over $5 million 
collateral funding from the EU, Austria, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands 
and Norway. The BSEP was designed to improve the capacity of the 
Black Sea countries to assess and manage the environment, to support the 
development and implementation of new environmental policy and laws 
for protecting the Black Sea, and to facilitate the preparation of sound 
environmental investments. A Programme Coordinating Unit (PCU) was 
established to coordinate the activities of BSEP. In order to share the task 
of programme implementation between countries, each Black Sea country 
agreed to host a BSEP ‘Activity Centre’, a specialist institution that 
addresses one aspect of the Black Sea environment, such as Emergency 
Response to oil spills (Varna, Bulgaria); Fisheries (Constanta, Romania); 
Pollution Assessment (Odessa, Ukraine); Coastal Zone Management 
(Krasnodar, Russia); Biodiversity (Batumi, Georgia); and Pollution 
                                                                 
29 See UNEP [1996].  
30 See GEF Black Sea Environmental Programme Annual Reports (1994, 1995, 
1996, 1997), BSEP Project Implementation Unit, Harekat Köskü II, Dolmabahce 
Sarayi, 80680 Besiktas, Istanbul, Turkey. 
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Control (Istanbul, Turkey). The BSEP also created a Black Sea Data 
System and a Black Sea Geographic Information System. The networks 
of institutions enabled specialists to ‘reconnect’ with each other, and 
external funding provided additional training and modern equipment. 
Non-governmental organisations began to play a key role in the BSEP, 
holding national and regional fora. The programme also included 
organisations such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, specialised 
UN agencies and international NGOs. Amongst many other things it 
generated an urgent investment portfolio, implemented by the World 
Bank and which was instrumental in leveraging almost $100 million in 
new investments with environmental benefits. 
The Odessa Declaration was seen from the outset as an interim policy 
arrangement. It signatories called upon the GEF partners to assist them 
with the development of a medium/long-term action plan for the 
protection of the Black Sea. It thus set the wheels in motion for a much 
more comprehensive strategy of which the Declaration itself was to be 
one of the building blocks. 
3.4  The Black Sea Strategic Action Plan 
The Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis. Development of the Black Sea 
Action Plan followed a carefully implemented technical process spanning 
two years. The first step was the integration of an effective institutional 
network, a process described in the previous section. The network was 
then asked to conduct an analysis of Black Sea problems within the field 
of specialisation of each ‘Working Party’ (Biodiversity, Emergency 
Response, Fisheries, Pollution levels and effects, Pollution Sources, 
Legislation, Integrated Coastal Zone Management, etc.) The thematic 
analyses were conducted at a national level and then integrated 
regionally. In the case of sources and levels of pollution, new reliable 
information had to be gathered and much of the data used to leverage new 
investments was obtained during this preparatory period. This was a 
remarkable accomplishment in such a short time and one that required the 
cooperation of many national and international actors. A similar situation 
occurred in the case of fisheries. The thematic analyses were then 
gathered together and studied intensively by a group of regional and 
international specialists in order to construct a ‘Transboundary 
Diagnostic Analysis’ (TDA) of the Black Sea.31 
 
                                                                 
31 See Mee [1997]. 
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Figure 2. Identification of the major underlying causes of environmental 
degradation in the Black Sea (from the Black Sea 
Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis) 
     Key 
Perceived 
major 
problems  
Transboundary 
elements 
Principle 
underlying 
causes* 
 
 1 Deficient 
management of 
living natural 
resources 
· Overfishing 
· Poorly 
regulated  
Decline in 
Black Sea 
fisheries  
Virtually all 
fisheries resources 
are shared and 
management 
requires the effort 
of more than one 
country 
1, 2, 4, 8  
 
3, 5, 6, 7  
  
 
 
 
2 
fisheries practices 
· Ill-defined 
resource 
allocation 
Eutrophication 
and chemical and 
microbiological 
pollution of 
coastal and 
marine areas 
· Discharges of 
industrial wastes  
· Domestic 
sewage 
Loss of 
habitats, 
notably 
wetlands and 
shelf areas, 
supporting 
important 
biotic 
resources  
Biotic resources 
are often mobile 
or migratory. 
Wetlands provide 
nursery grounds 
and may also 
reduce the inputs 
of transboundary 
pollutants 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 8 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
· Nutrients and 
pesticide residues 
from agriculture 
· Operational oil 
and ballast 
discharges  
· Solid waste 
dumping 
Inadequate 
planning at all 
levels 
· Poorly planned 
urban/industrial/ 
recreational/  
agricultural 
development 
 
 
PROTECTING THE BLACK SEA ENVIRONMENT 
107 
Limited 
protection of 
endangered 
species  
Endemic and/or 
rare species are of 
regional and 
global 
significance. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8  
  
 
 
 
 
 
4 
· Poor inter-
sectoral 
coordination 
· Coastal erosion 
and inappropriate 
erosion control 
Inadequate 
implementation of 
available 
regulatory 
instruments 
Replacement 
of indigenous 
Black Sea 
species with 
exotic ones  
Exotic species are 
a global 
transboundary 
problem. Entire 
Black Sea 
affected and may 
become vector for 
extra-regional 
contamination. 
1, 2, 4, 7, 8 
 
 
5 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
· Inadequate 
compliance and 
trend monitoring 
· Lack of 
international 
coordination 
· Ineffective 
pollution 
inspectorates  
Poor legal 
framework at the 
regional and 
national level 
· Poorly defined 
environmental 
laws and 
regulations 
· Regionally 
incompatible laws 
and regulations 
· Ineffective 
EIAs 
Poor 
protection of 
the Black Sea 
landscape 
Reduction of 
regional value of 
Black Sea 
tourism. 
2, 3, 5, 6, 8  
 
4 
  
 
6 
· Inefficient 
contingency plans 
Insufficient public 
involvement 
· General lack of 
awareness of 
environmental 
issues  
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Inadequate 
protection of 
coastal 
resources 
from 
maritime 
accidents 
Black Sea 
coastlines are 
short and 
transboundary 
pollution is highly 
likely following 
accidental spills.  
3, 4, 5, 8    
 
 
 
7 
· Deficient public 
participation 
· Apparent lack 
of transparency 
Major 
uncertainties to 
be resolved  
· Poor data 
exchange 
· Inadequate 
management 
oriented research 
Unsanitary 
conditions in 
many 
beaches, 
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The Black Sea TDA is a technical document that examined the root 
causes of Black Sea degradation and options for actions that could be 
taken to address them. It examined each major environmental problem, 
the ‘stakeholders’ involved in the problem (who is responsible? who has 
to act?) and the uncertainties in the information describing the problem 
(do we need more information and if so what kind?). It then proposed 
solutions, often giving various alternative options as well as a time frame 
and cost for the solutions. Some of the solutions required policy changes 
and other capital investments. They were all part of a holistic 
management approach that did not limit itself to end-of-pipe solutions but 
encouraged the development of more environmentally sustainable 
economic activities. 
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The relationship between perceived problems and their social and 
economic underlying causes is the starting point for the TDA. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2, abstracted from the TDA. The figure shows the 
major perceived problems, their transboundary consequences and the 
major causes within society (grouped into 8 major categories). Many of 
the environmental problems share common root causes and these cannot 
be addressed by a single sector. This diagram illustrates the conundrum 
facing environmental agencies.  
‘Environment’ has been defined as a sector of government rather than an 
issue that permeates all sectors. Environmental ministries are often too 
weak to resolve problems at the level of their underlying causes because 
the causes are within the authority of other, more powerful sectors. 
Environmental agencies in the Black Sea region are often blamed for 
inaction but are rarely empowered to intercede in the work of other 
ministries. Environment sector budgets are generally minuscule in 
comparison with those of other ministries and this has a cascade effect on 
the entire regulatory framework. The monitoring and regulatory 
institutions that depend upon the Ministry of Environment for support 
often receive too little funding too late to fulfil their functions. In some 
cases their staff is paid salaries well below the cost of living and have to 
seek employment elsewhere in order to feed their families. The state 
institution itself often becomes the part-time job. This situation often 
applies to those professionals who are supposed to be providing essential 
data for environmental protection or the inspectors who are supposed to 
implement state and local legislation.  
The Action Plan: Development, structure and contents. The BS-SAP32 
was developed from June to October 1996 as a direct consequence of the 
TDA. It is a negotiated document, prepared during a series of meetings 
between senior environmental officials of all six Black Sea coastal 
countries and adopted (following in-country cabinet consultations) at a 
Ministerial Conference, celebrated in Istanbul on 31 October 1996. The 
Plan, only 29 pages in length, contains 59 specific commitments on 
policy regarding measures to reduce pollution, improve living resources 
management, encourage human development in a manner that does not 
prejudice the environment, and to take steps towards improving financing 
for environmental projects. In adopting this plan, the Black Sea 
governments have committed themselves to a process of profound reform 
in the manner in which environmental issues are addressed in the Black 
Sea and its basin. 
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The structure of the Plan itself is simple. It starts with a set of ‘opening 
statements’ which link the BS-SAP to the on-going process in the region, 
the Bucharest Convention and the Odessa Declaration. It recognises that a 
considerable amount of effort has already been made to save and protect 
the Black Sea but that there is a ‘pressing need to take further actions 
both locally and regionally’.  
The first formal chapter of the BS-SAP is entitled ‘The challenge: The 
state of the Black Sea environment’. It describes the priority issues facing 
the Black Sea countries and identified in the Transboundary Diagnostic 
Analysis (TDA): eutrophication; insufficiently treated sewage; harmful 
substances, especially oil; the introduction of exotic species; poor 
resources management and the loss of habitat and landscape. The 
challenge is summarised by a single statement: The challenge which the 
region now faces is to secure a healthy Black Sea environment at a time 
when economic recovery and further development are also being 
pursued.  
The overall aim of the Plan is presented in a rather evocative manner: It is 
to enable the population of the Black Sea region to enjoy a healthy living 
environment in both urban and rural areas, and to attain a biologically 
diverse Black Sea ecosystem with viable natural populations of higher 
organisms, including marine mammals and sturgeons, and which will 
support livelihoods based on sustainable activities such as fishing, 
aquaculture and tourism in all Black Sea countries. Why marine 
mammals and sturgeons? Apart from humans (and perhaps monk seals), 
marine mammals and sturgeons are the largest life form sustained by the 
Black Sea. Their presence is more than symbolic. Both depend upon a 
healthy unpolluted and diverse Black Sea ecosystem. Dolphins depend on 
the healthy connection of the Black Sea with the world’s oceans, and 
sturgeon depend upon clean rivers for breeding as well as a clean Black 
Sea. The message is clear: the Black Sea offers opportunities for human 
development in co-existence with the most sensitive ecosystems. 
The second chapter of the BS-SAP sets down policies that form the basis 
for international cooperation. These consist of a set of principles 
regarding the concept of sustainable development, the precautionary 
principle, anticipatory actions, the use of clean technologies, the use of 
economic instruments, considerations on environment and health, close 
cooperation among Black Sea coastal states, Cooperation among all 17 
Black Sea basin states, better recognition of stakeholders, and last, but 
certainly not least, transparency and public particip ation. The chapter 
continues with a detailed analysis of the institutional arrangements for 
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implementing the Bucharest Convention and the BS-SAP. Here, the 
BSEP Working Parties were transformed into Advisory Groups to the 
Commission, many with new mandates. The concept of Activity Centres 
is retained and further strengthened. Finally measures are proposed to 
promote wider cooperation throughout the Black Sea basin and beyond. 
The third, and longest chapter of the BS-SAP, looks at specific policy 
actions. These actions are bold and innovative but were carefully 
tempered by the political realities perceived by each of the parties at the 
time of adoption. The agreed actions are summarised in Box 1 but the 
text of the Plan is well worth studying in detail.33 Each action is 
accompanied by a timeframe for implementation.  
Notable features of the BS-SAP include its emphasis on integration of 
pollution control efforts with those of the Danube River, the adoption of a 
system of economic instruments to regulate existing sources of pollution 
(and to avoid new ones), enhanced protection status for sensitive coastal 
and marine habitats, intersectoral planning and management of coastal 
regions and greatly improved transparency and public participation.  
 
Box 1. The Black Sea Strategic Action Plan: 20 major points 
· Adoption of a new institutional framework for the Black Sea, building 
on the achievements of BSEP and including the creation of a project 
implementation unit within the Secretariat of the Istanbul Commission. 
· Encouragement of a basin-wide approach to certain policy areas. 
· Implementation of profound fiscal reform – the implementation of the 
polluter-pays principle for pollution source control by 1999 – through 
the adoption of permit and licensing procedures that address common 
Water Quality Criteria for specific types of water use.  
· Abatement of priority hot spots by the year 2006 – public progress 
reports in 2000 and 2005. 
· Development of specific plans for waste water treatment plants for 
sewage in all coastal cities by 2000. 
· Adoption of measures to control pollution from vessels using the ‘Port 
State Control’ approach with meaningful incentives and penalties. 
                                                                 
33 See Mee [2000].  
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· Implementation of packages of measures for dumping, transboundary 
movement of hazardous waste, emergency response, etc. 
· Publication of five-yearly ‘State of the Black Sea’ reports based upon a 
joint monitoring system and regular surveys of land-based sources of 
pollution. 
· Introduction of a regime for the joint control of fisheries based upon a 
quota system for capture and the rehabilitation of key ecosystems that 
act as nursery grounds. 
· Development of a new Protocol on Black Sea Biological and Landscape 
Diversity. 
· Design of a comprehensive package of investments in conservation areas 
(wetlands and marine ecosystems). 
· Introduction of compulsory Environmental Impact Assessments, 
Environmental Audits and Strategic Environmental Impact Assessments 
with harmonised criteria. 
· Development of a regional strategy for Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management with associated legal instruments by 1999. 
· Economic development in the areas of sustainable aquaculture and 
environmentally-friendly tourism. 
· Increased attention to public participation, based upon a comprehensive 
package including local authorities, NGOs, private sector, Regional 
Environmental Centres, schools, etc. 
· Enhanced transparency through rights of access to information and 
improved public awareness. 
· Continuation of the BS -SAP process at the national level through the 
development of National Black Sea Strategic Action Plans. 
· Organisation of five-yearly donor meetings including the development of 
blended packages of investment based upon revisions of the NBS -SAPs. 
· Completion of a feasibility study of the Black Sea Environmental Fund 
which could be supported by regionally-applied economic instruments 
and would address incremental costs. 
· Regular and transparent revision of progress on implementation and the 
updating of the SAP objectives. 
The actions agreed to control pollution are a good example of the Plan’s 
pragmatism: In adopting the BS-SAP, countries agreed to a system of 
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harmonised water quality objectives which are reviewed every five years. 
Simply expressed, these objectives describe the desired quality of water 
for each use of the sea and rivers, including the use as a natural system. 
Each country, on the basis of its own legislation then introduces a 
discharge permitting system (and associated economic instruments) for 
polluters which enables it to meet the objectives and to obtain necessary 
revenues from permits, fees and penalties, levied on the polluters. Permit 
holders are clearly informed that the terms of the permits will be 
reviewed, and probably tightened, after five years. This provides the 
double benefit of achieving successive improvements in environmental 
health and in providing an incentive to install improved pollution control 
technology. The water quality objectives themselves will be set on the 
basis of common research and monitoring programmes coordinated 
through the institutional network of the Istanbul Commission. 
The BS-SAP is completed by three small chapters entitled: IV. National 
Black Sea Strategic Action Plans; V. Financing the Strategic Action Plan 
and, VI. Arrangements for Future Cooperation. These demonstrate the 
point that the BS-SAP is a dynamic  and flexible document, which is 
process-oriented. The National Black Sea Strategic Action Plans, in 
particular, were designed to provide a nationally-driven mechanism for 
ensuring that the BS-SAP is properly implemented at a local level. This is 
further supported through the Plan’s strong commitment to public 
participation, including greater public awareness and transparency.  
Implementation. Implementation of the BS-SAP is currently well behind 
schedule. A recent report of the Black Sea Commission34 clearly indicates 
that the governments are not meeting the deadlines they set for 
themselves. Progress had only been made in 29 of the 55 substantial 
articles of the Plan. Some 25 of these had been achieved with the help of 
donor support. The term ‘progress’ is used quite generously and does not 
imply that milestones have been fully met. There are many reasons for 
this situation including the delays in completing the institutional 
arrangements described earlier and the continuing economic difficulties 
confronted by many of the countries. The fact remains, however, that 
even basic requirements for pollution management such as a reliable 
monitoring system, are not being implemented, despite continued support 
from the international community. This is reason for considerable 
concern.  
                                                                 
34 Black Sea Commission [2001].  
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Fortunately, there are some areas where substantial progress has been 
made. All six countries completed some form of National Black Sea 
Strategic Action Plan for example. In the case of Ukraine, this resulted in 
the State Programme on Protection and Rehabilitation of the Black Sea 
and the Azov Sea, which has now been approved by the Parliament. The 
National Plans are an important step in the process of consolidating 
international agreements into the national policy framework. Some of the 
BSEP Activity Centres have also made important progress, resulting in a 
regional system for Port State Control (enabling the more effective 
implementation of MARPOL), a draft Protocol on Landscape and 
Biodiversity Conservation, a system for harmonised water quality 
objectives and a draft regional contingency plan for combating oil 
pollution. For their part, Black Sea NGOs have continued to organise 
celebrations of International Black Sea Day (on the 31st October each 
year), and there is evidence that this movement is growing in strength at 
the municipal level. In summary, it is reasonable to say that the BS-SAP 
has provided the impetus for a wide range of activities that would have 
otherwise not occurred. Leveraging political support for the integration of 
the Black Sea Commission Secretariat and persuading donors to back a 
basin-wide programme to limit eutrophication probably represent its most 
significant achievements to date. 
3.5  The Black Sea Commission takes over 
The Black Sea Commission Secretariat has only been in place for 18 
months at the time of writing this paper. During this short period, there 
has already been a remarkable acceleration in the implementation of the 
Bucharest Convention and the steps to complete or reform its Protocols. 
The Secretariat has assumed formal responsibility for implementing the 
BS-SAP and will incorporate the Black Sea Environmental Programme 
within its structure. A symptom of progress is that recent meetings of the 
Commission are reporting positive in-country developments for 
protecting the Black Sea rather than dwelling on procedural obstacles as 
was the case in the past. The Secretariat has inherited the difficult task of 
restoring and maintaining political momentum at a time of competing 
priorities and increasingly ambivalent attitudes towards environmental 
protection. The process is starting with a new Ministerial Conference in 
June 2002, coupled with a new substantial package of support from the 
international community. The Ministerial Conference will have the 
difficult task of reprogramming the agenda for implementing the BS-SAP 
without backsliding on its commitments.  
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4.  Emerging Challenges and Opportunities for Protecting the 
Black Sea Environment 
Joint institutional arrangements and the development of common polic ies 
between Black Sea countries are important tools for protecting the region 
but they will not work in isolation. The present section examines this 
situation from two perspectives, that of the Black Sea in a wider 
geographical context and that of the integration of stakeholders at a local 
level. 
4.1  A basin-wide approach 
The key problem of eutrophication cannot be resolved without integrating 
the nutrient reduction strategies of all 17 Black Sea basin countries, even 
though some of them are landlocked and may feel no responsibility 
towards the Black Sea nor enjoy the benefits of its restored health. To the 
best of our knowledge,35 some 14% of total nitrogen reaching the Black 
Sea is from Bulgaria, 27% from Romania, 12% from Ukraine, 10% from 
the Russia Federation, less than 1% from Georgia, 6% from Turkey and 
about 30% from the non-coastal countries (Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Slovakia and Slovenia). In the case of 
phosphorus, the figures are Bulgaria, 5%; Romania, 23%; Ukraine, 20%; 
Russia, 13%; Georgia, 1%; Turkey, 12% and 26% for the remaining 
countries; a similar story to that of nitrogen. The importance of showing 
these numbers is to illustrate that nobody is ‘innocent’, not even the 
Georgians whose low percentage input reflects the current collapse in the 
coastal economy, probably a temporary feature.  
As illustrated above, at the time of the 1995 study, the largest single 
contributor of nutrients was Romania. Romania’s entire territory drains 
into the Black Sea, mostly through the Danube. The industrial and 
agricultural practices adopted during the former political regime paid 
little regard to environmental protection, especially during the ‘green 
revolution’. Now that the economy of Romania is market-based, many 
subsidies on fertilisers have been removed and large animal production 
complexes are closing. The decrease in fertiliser use is beneficial to the 
environment but unless alternative and cost-effective agricultural 
practices are adopted, there will be enormous social problems of 
unemployed farm workers unable to compete with cheap food exports 
from places where cheaper production techniques are applied. A similar 
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situation prevails in neighbouring Moldova 36 where large animal 
complexes have also closed but where small land-holders now have 
excessive numbers of animals literally in their back gardens, in very 
unsanitary conditions. Human health is already declining in these places 
and shallow wells, the main local water supplies, are polluted. There are 
no simple solutions to these problems without fundamental changes in 
land tenure patterns and agricultural systems. And such changes require 
investments.  
Over 50% of the dissolved nutrients reaching the Black Sea arrive via the 
Danube River. The Danube river basin has its own management regime 
that includes a Convention, the International Convention for the 
Protection of the River Danube and an Action Plan.37 The Danube 
Pollution Reduction Programme (a GEF-funded project) has helped to 
define new strategies for reducing pollution, including nutrients, in the 
entire Danube Basin. Similarly, in the Dnieper River (shared by Ukraine, 
Belarus and Russia), a GEF-supported programme is developing a new 
Action Plan. If there are to be effective reductions in the flux of nutrients 
entering the Black Sea, it is important that a basin wide approach is 
developed in which the objectives of the different river basin projects 
with respect to protection of the Black Sea are matched with the needs of 
the coastal countries for implementing the Black Sea Action Plan. This 
does not imply the creation of a new 17-country programme, but rather 
the provision of a forum for the various programmes to agree on some 
common policies.  
A first move in this direction was the creation of an ad hoc working party 
in December 1997, between the Danube and Black Sea Commissions. 
The group freely exchanged scientific and policy information between 
experts from all parts of the Danube basin and the Black Sea coast. It 
agreed38 to recommend to the Parties of the two Conventions to take 
measures to maintain the discharge of nutrients to the Black Sea at or 
below the levels recorded in 1996. Empirical models39 have suggested 
that, if sustained, this level of inputs should reduce or eliminate hypoxia 
on the northwestern shelf of the Black Sea and provide a favourable 
environment for recovery of the benthic ecosystem. Furthermore, this 
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38 See International Commission for the Protection of the Black Sea and 
International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River 
(ICPBS/ICPDR) [1999].  
39 Mee [2001]. 
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group foresaw the need to monitor the recovery of the Black Sea very 
carefully to determine the effectiveness of this measure.  
Unlike the Istanbul Commission, the International Commission for the 
Protection of the Danube River became very active immediately 
following entry into force of the Convention in 1998. This was partly due 
to reliable funding from the upper riparian countries (Germany and 
Austria) and from the European Commission. The wider international 
community has already warmed to the proposal of the ad hoc group and a 
new phase of closely coordinated well financed Danube and Black Sea 
GEF projects for nutrient reduction was approved in April 2001.  
The new GEF project consists of two consecutive phases of two and three 
years respectively. Throughout this period there will be three parallel 
closely coordinated projects: 1) regional project to support nutrient 
reduction and ecosystem restoration activities in the Black Sea (total 
funding $9,555,000); 2) regional project of similar dimensions for the 
Danube; and 3) World Bank Strategic Partnership for the Black Sea basin 
with a total funding of $70 million. The regional projects will work with 
the two Commissions to support strategic research, continued process of 
legislative reform, a small grants programme to enhance stakeholder 
involvement and various initiatives to improve compliance, monitoring, 
evaluation and cross-sectoral participation. The strategic partnership will 
provide direct grants in the region of $5 million each to investment 
projects that directly or indirectly result in a substantial reduction in 
nutrient emissions. Provision of the grants is contingent on their leverage 
of additional funds and on the country in question paying its dues to the 
appropriate Commission. The grants will provide a unique opportunity to 
support projects such as agricultural policy reforms and wetland 
protection and restoration. The entire package represents the biggest 
single investment in international waters in the ten-year existence of the 
Global Environment Facility. Other donors have joined the programme 
and there will be parallel projects from the European Union’s TACIS 
programme, loans from the World Bank and EBRD and smaller projects 
from donors in the US, the Netherlands, and the UK to join existing 
efforts from Denmark and Canada. 
All of this represents a huge commitment from the international 
community, but will it work? Cutting nutrient emissions, particularly 
nitrogen, is a very costly enterprise. Costs tend to rise almost 
exponentially with successive reductions (i.e. each time the nutrients 
from the same source are reduced by another 50%, the costs double). 
Carefully chosen initial projects can make substantial reductions at 
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relatively low cost. However, even the large amount of money mobilised 
by the international community will almost certainly not resolve the 
Black Sea’s eutrophication problem. It will however create a number of 
demonstration projects with multiple benefits. For example, the 
agricultural reform projects will modernise and enhance agriculture in an 
environmentally sustainable manner, hopefully creating an incentive for 
replicate actions. Similarly, wetland restoration projects reduce flood 
risks, provide leisure areas and wildlife reserves as well as reducing 
nutrient fluxes. The underlying assumption in each case is that the 
countries are truly committed to sustainable development and have the 
vision of a healthy and productive Black Sea as one of the dividends of 
their efforts. If this assumption is wrong, the future of the Black Sea is 
very bleak indeed. 
4.2  Integrating the stakeholders into sustainable development in 
the Black Sea 
A valid criticism40 of all previous programmes is that they have not 
effectively engaged a wide range of stakeholders along the Black Sea 
coast. The primary focus of the Bucharest Convention and the various 
GEF and European Union interventions has been on central governments. 
There were a few token projects at the municipal level as well as support 
to some NGO activities but, apart from annual celebrations of Black Sea 
day, these paid little attention to civil society. In most cases, the 
governments themselves did not request financial assistance for civil 
society projects. They endorsed the provisions of the BS-SAP regarding 
public participation but subsequently most countries did not translate the 
Plan into national languages to give it wide distribution. 
Certainly, the entire region has a legacy of command-control 
environmental management. Stakeholder participation of the kind 
envisaged in the West is an alien concept. The reality however is that 
local administrations have considerable influence over important day-to-
day planning decisions with direct environmental consequences and often 
lack advice or pressure from concerned individuals or groups with an 
understanding of environmental problems and their solutions. The 
consequence may be progressive loss of ‘green’ areas or human conflicts 
when a particular development gets underway.  
This can be illustrated by some simple examples. In the Kizilirmak delta 
in Turkey, there are important wetland areas divided between several 
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municipalities. A project undertaken by the Turkish Society for the 
Protection of Nature (DHKD) with funds from a private donor helped to 
raise the awareness of local people in one of the municipalities of the 
value of the wetlands and the importance of managing them in a 
sustainable fashion. The project offered practical solutions and, through a 
continuous stakeholder dialogue, empowered local people to make the 
solutions a reality. The adjoining municipality, however, had a strong 
hunting lobby. Beach areas were sold illegally for summer houses to 
associations of middle class professionals and garbage was dumped in 
wetland areas. Conflicts emerged between the two municipalities. The 
human and financial resources of the NGO were insufficient to resolve 
the conflicts and facilitate sustainable development.  
A second example is from the Kinburn Spit in the Dnieper Delta region 
of Ukraine. A sharp decline in fishing yields from the Black Sea caused 
high unemployment among fishermen from former collectives. Following 
an investigation with older members of the local population, it was 
discovered that the lagoons on the spit had once been rich fishing areas. 
Using seed money from TACIS and the Black Sea Environmental 
Education Project, a Ukrainian NGO worked with students, teachers and 
parents from a local school to clear the clogged access channels to the 
lagoon. A healthy mullet population soon became established providing 
fish for the local people. Endangered Dalmatian pelicans also began to 
nest in the rehabilitated wetlands. Curiously, however, the local 
population showed no initiative or enthusiasm to maintain the channels 
clear for future years. 
These two examples from culturally distinct settings have important 
commonalties: 
· Local environmental action resulted from inspired leadership. 
· Important progress was achieved with small seed money. 
· The recognition that sustainable solutions require long-term 
campaigns for raising environmental consciousness. 
· Each initiative had to be conducted within realistic geographical or 
‘community’ boundaries. 
Though the above points are a matter of common sense, they have often 
been ignored when designing projects to stimulate stakeholder 
participation. Donors for example expect rapid returns on their money. 
They often request proof of tangible environmental benefits in project 
cycles that may be as short as 18 months. The ‘quick fix’ culture does not 
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limit itself to capital investments. The reality however is that the process 
of empowering local people to seek sustainable solutions is one that takes 
many years to complete. To some extent, the gulf between donor 
expectations and reality may be bridged by ‘training trainers’ or 
providing support to those people who are identified as inspired leaders. 
Such an approach carries the risk of being seen as ‘political interference’ 
however. 
The task of encouraging greater civil society participation in 
environmental protection is analogous to those campaigns that seek to 
improve public health by improved dental hygiene, condom use, etc. 
Since the benefits are not immediately obvious, several cycles of 
campaigning are required and younger people are more receptive than 
older ones. In the case of environmental protection, the benefits are 
probably even less tangible than the risk of caries or AIDS, and the 
campaigning needs to be for a longer duration and more creative in 
design, emphasising positive messages, rather than those that might 
contribute to existing fatalism. Very little has been achieved in this 
direction in the Black Sea region and the evidence can be clearly seen, for 
example by the immense amount of trash on beaches, beauty spots and 
many streets. Indeed, an aggressive campaign against littering would be a 
good starting point to creating a new public consciousness regarding 
behaviour and environmental ethics.  
Several of the governments of the region have signed the Aarhus 
Convention, guaranteeing public access to environmental information. 
There is little evidence of proactive information campaigns however. 
Greater public awareness is a key to promoting action for protecting the 
environment, but it would be naïve to regard awareness campaigns as 
being sufficient. To be successful they must demonstrate viable options 
for sustaining the natural environment and human welfare. Campaigns 
that focus on changing the behaviour of individuals in society should also 
focus on positive examples and rewards, not just on scaling down 
command-control thinking to a local level. Expecting a personal and 
collective commitment by all individuals in society, however, may be 
unreasonable in the short term. This is particularly true in societies in 
which people are barely able to cover the material needs of their families, 
spend inordinate amounts of time confronting dehumanising bureaucratic 
obstacles, and often feel that individual action will be ignored or 
repressed. 
Is the concept of action by empowered stakeholders entirely alien to the 
region? There are some remarkable examples of recent community-based 
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action, which suggest that the seeds of change are being planted. In the 
city of Zonguldak in Turkey, for example, a local community-based 
NGO, predominantly organised by local women, successfully took the 
Government to court over the direct discharge of fly ash to the Black Sea 
from the local thermoelectric power station. The station has now been 
equipped with the necessary treatment facilities. Near the Black Sea port 
of Novorrossiysk, the construction of an oil terminal is planned on a site 
considered to be of great natural beauty. Partly as a result of efforts by the 
local NGO Aquatoria, the local public was mobilised and, in a public 
hearing, rejected the results of an official environmental impact 
assessment that supported the construction. Aquatoria was careful in its 
arguments: it sided with the local harbourmaster in suggesting that the 
development would be better sited in the existing port of Novorrissiysk, 
rather than taking a harder line that would have exposed them to divisive 
arguments about interfering with national economic priorities or 
damaging local employment opportunities. In the event, however, the 
results of the public hearing were overruled and construction is 
proceeding. The stakes are high, as the terminal is a key element in 
Russia’s oil export plans. 
Despite these examples, the general reality is that few citizens or even 
local officials are aware of any international efforts to protect the Black 
Sea and in many cases have poor knowledge of the issues affecting the 
sea and its coastal zone. The public is not backing national or 
international efforts in most cases because they are not even aware of 
them or of the implications for their own quality of life. Until recently, in 
countries with a Communist regime, individual or collective action on 
environmental issues was insignificant unless conducted within the limits 
defined by the government or through the channels of the Communist 
Party itself. The situation was different in Turkey of course, but it should 
be remembered that Turkey had significant periods of military rule in the  
last two decades and these periods were not conducive to the 
development of a strong civil society. In the entire region, therefore, the 
‘environmental movement’ is new. In a rather short period of time, non-
governmental organisations have emerged, grown and gathered strength, 
though in many cases, they fragmented and faded. One of their problems 
is that many NGOs were, and remain, small groups of specialists or 
enthusiasts, trying to raise funds for their projects and seeing the world 
through their own technical perspective. This function sometimes fills a 
vacuum left by weak government agencies. There are very few genuine 
community-based NGOs, however. Many people are so preoccupied with 
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the demands of survival in a transition economy that they have little spare 
time to seek other avenues to assert their rights.  
The current BSEP NGO Directory41 identifies less than 100 such 
organisations in the region. A Black Sea NGO forum was created in 1992 
using GEF funds. The forum met on several occasions and served as a 
mechanism to disseminate information on donor-supported projects and 
materials. When external support diminished in 1997, the forum soon 
collapsed as it lacked a sense of common purpose and coherence and was 
unable to seek its own funding. At about the same time, a new 
organisation emerged, the Black Sea NGO network, again supported by 
external funding, mostly from the Netherlands. It remains to be seen 
whether the new organisation is more sustainable than the old one. To 
date, they have enjoyed consistent support from their members but not 
from the few NGOs that still cling to the hope of resuscitating the 
original forum.  
The deficient sense of regional purpose of Black Sea NGOs is partly a 
consequence of the appalling communications infrastructure between 
many Black Sea countries. The recent workshop in Yalta, Crimea, 
Ukraine of the Black Sea Environmental Education Project42 serves to 
illustrate the point. The meeting brought together teachers from all Black 
Sea countries, except Georgia. For the Romanian teachers to travel the 
short distance between Constanta, just over 100 km from the Ukrainian 
border to Crimea, it was necessary to travel to Bucharest, fly to Chisinau 
(the capital of Moldova), then onwards to Odessa and then travel 11 
hours by road to Yalta. There is no reliable border crossing between 
Romania and Ukraine. The journey cost over $400 each and total travel 
time was over 24 hours, almost double the time taken by a participant 
from Boston, Massachusetts. Two teachers travelled from Sochi in 
neighbouring Russia by different means, rail and road. The rail journey 
took 27 hours. The road journey, some 900 km, took even longer as there 
was a delay of 10 hours waiting to pass the draconian border formalities 
and short ferry journey across the Kerch Straits from Crimea to Russia. 
Incidentally, the Georgian participant opted not to attend, as she felt 
insecure and unable to face the tedious and complicated journey alone. 
This example serves to illustrate the real challenges of bringing interest 
groups together. Given that teacher’s monthly salaries are below $100 in 
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Marine Conservation, that works with a group of Black Sea teachers to 
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many countries, the likelihood of establishing a self-funded sustainable 
environmental education network is minimal. Raising funds for 
environmental education in the Black Sea region, however, is very 
difficult; it neither appears to be a priority for governments nor donors, 
despite much talk of intergenerational equity. 
One of the problems facing the NGO movement in the region is that 
organisations tend to become dependent upon external funding since 
fund-raising opportunities from their own ‘grass roots’ are limited. This 
had the risk of distracting them from a community-centred function to a 
technical one. 
The need for stakeholder involvement is not just a matter for NGOs 
however. A truly participatory approach must engage a wide range of 
community interests. There are a number of stakeholder groups emerging 
in the region that have proven to be receptive to a dialogue on 
environmental issues. Examples are chambers of commerce in those 
countries with a respected business community. In Turkey for example, 
the Black Sea Foundation is a powerful group representing business 
interests in coastal cities such as Trabzon and Samsun. Black Sea 
Harbourmasters have formed their own association including 
representatives from all six countries. The tourist industry has national 
associations in many Black Sea countries and some of these have 
willingly entered the dialogue surrounding BSEP. One of the most 
interesting and successful examples of an independent initiative was that 
of the Ecumenical Patriarch of the Orthodox Church, HAH Bartholomew 
II, who organised an action-oriented floating symposium on the Black 
Sea in 1997 between more than 300 religious leaders, scientists and 
politicians.43 The Patriarch has expressed his concern for the environment 
and the Black Sea in particular on many occasions and has urged 
religious leaders of all faiths to take up the challenge. This ‘greening of 
the priesthood’ was followed by a residential training course for priests 
on environmental issues. 
One of the keys to improving stakeholder participation at a local level is 
to facilitate an open and positive dialogue between a wide range of 
interest groups including municipal authorities, not just getting the 
converted environmentalists together in self-righteous isolation. But who 
is to facilitate this activity? The lack of committed leaders and facilitators 
are frequently the stumbling blocks to converting ideals into practical 
initiatives. In some cases local TV stations have assisted in this role. In 
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Sevastopol, Ukraine, for example, the local inspector of pollution (of the 
Ministry of Environment) has chaired a regular live TV discussion about 
environmental issues, an enormous advance in a city plagued with 
problems of faulty sewage systems, poor water supply and polluting civil 
and military vessels. To some extent, the institution of ‘International 
Black Sea Day’, referred to earlier and which is annually celebrated 
throughout the Black Sea on 31 October, has also been important in 
catalysing the involvement of local authorities, donors, NGOs, business 
groups, schools and the media. The initiative focuses the often dispersed 
efforts of these groups on a single common objective. The fact that 
practical activities are being undertaken in many towns in six countries 
on the same day excites the imagination and gives a sense of international 
solidarity, which the media is quick to grasp and publicise. 
There is no easy answer or clever formula for overcoming the apathy and 
lack of public participation that currently tend to make efforts for Black 
Sea protection ineffectual at a local level. There is a need to foster new 
environmental values in the region; valuing nature for its own sake and 
not just as a free commodity of limitless magnitude. It will take many 
years to make such a change. When a critical mass of people feel moved 
to action to defend environmental matters that they personally value, 
there may be a real change towards sustainability.  
4.3  An economic reality check 
The precarious economic situation in most Black Sea countries makes it 
very difficult for governments to invest in environmental projects. It is 
often possible nevertheless to achieve substantial environmental benefits 
as by-products of activities focused on other priority issues, such as 
promoting economic growth or improving human health. There are bitter 
realities to be faced when searching for such ‘win-win’ opportunities. The 
Black Sea Strategic Action Plan, for example, focuses attention on two 
such activities, tourism and aquaculture, which have a potential to 
promote economic growth but can be managed in a sustainable manner. 
Many people in the Black Sea region talk wistfully of tourism offering a 
major untapped source of foreign revenue.44 It is often hard to explain the 
reality in a way that does not offend. Particularly in the former Soviet 
countries, however, much of the current tourism infrastructure is 
dilapidated and ugly. Staff is poorly trained and officious, travel is 
uncomfortable, airport procedures are archaic and confusing and food 
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standards are a lottery. With the notable exception of a few resorts in 
Bulgaria that have overcome these problems, there is little to attract most 
foreign tourists. The best short-term strategy for resorts is probably to 
compete for national tourists in the hope that they will spend money that 
might otherwise have travelled abroad. Those that do travel abroad will 
probably expect a higher standard back home. For the environment, the 
short-term scenario is not encouraging as it leaves little prospect of 
income for tackling such problems as sewage control or landscape 
protection. Currently, however, the warm summer waters of the Black 
Sea are its biggest tourist asset and long-term economic prosperity in the 
tourism sector is unlikely unless that asset is protected.  
Many of the problems of the Black Sea can be ascribed by economists to 
‘free riding’ or to a lack of ‘internalisation’ of environmental 
externalities.45 The most significant ‘free’ use of the Black Sea and its 
tributaries is for the disposal of waste from human activities. Some of the 
pollution problems of the Black Sea result from a lack of investment in 
adequate treatment of effluents. Others such as the diffuse discharge of 
nitrogen and phosphorus compounds, are the result of more complex 
issues related to agricultural practices and poor pricing of fertilisers in a 
heavily subsidised and distorted national and international market.  
The Black Sea Environmental Programme placed an initial emphasis on 
tackling point sources of pollution by trying to stimulate the necessary 
investments. At the early stages of the programme, shortly after approval 
of GEF funding in 1993, the World Bank took charge of developing a 
Priority Investment Portfolio that consisted of one project of undisputed 
urgency from an environmental perspective per country. Of these 
projects, only those in Georgia, Romania and Bulgaria were fully 
implemented and the remaining projects are still at various stages of 
approval, though pre-investment studies have been finalised. The reasons 
are many but one of the main lessons learned is that investments with an 
environmental benefit take a very long time to negotiate and the 
acceptance by governments of a portfolio is only one of the earliest steps.  
The case of the landfill for municipal waste in Trabzon is a useful 
example to illustrate the practical constraints. The city of Trabzon in 
Turkey is squeezed between the mountainous hinterland and the Black 
Sea. Solid waste disposal has been a problem for many years and garbage 
collected from homes was simply placed on a conveyor belt and 
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discharged into the sea. Turkish legislation was passed to prohibit this 
practice but did not offer practical alternatives; so the practice continued. 
As part of the Urgent Investment Portfolio, solutions to the problem were 
investigated. The only suitable landfill sites were behind the hills 
surrounding the city but transport costs of garbage to the new sites were 
quite high. The ability (and willingness to pay) these costs was tested 
through economic studies and public hearings. The reluctant change from 
relatively free disposal to the environmentally acceptable (and legal) 
option clearly required consensus-building and substantial capital costs. 
The local authorit ies eventually agreed to the proposals, but the national 
government was unwilling to include the project on the National Lending 
Portfolio. The reason for this appears to be a combination of competing 
demands for investment (with more immediate tangible benefits) and the 
political differences between the central and regional governments. The 
exercise, however, has served to convince local authorities to seek 
alternative funding sources. 
This example demonstrates some of the practical constraints. Banks are 
not charitable foundations and are obliged to demonstrate the willingness 
of clients to borrow as well as their ability to repay the costs of loans. At 
the same time, the technical feasibility of projects can be evaluated from 
several perspectives, only one of which is its environmental benefit and 
relative cost-effectiveness.  
The World Bank requires sovereign guarantees from finance ministries 
and these ministries may often have very different priorities than 
ministries of environment of municipalities. Central government 
treasuries have many customers to satisfy and are limited in the debt they 
can accumulate. This is where other IFIs (International Financing 
Institutions) with different conditionalities, or bilateral donors may be 
willing to become involved; sometimes acting together in ‘packaged’ 
loans. Such an approach was used to secure a package of some $40 
million for a new wastewater treatment plant for Constanta, Romania. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which 
does not require state guarantees but has its own exacting criteria, 
provided the main loan. The government of Denmark however decided to 
support a broader financing programme for wastewater treatment plants 
in smaller towns along the coast. As a result, Romania will largely solve 
its coastal sewage pollution problem. The concept of packaged loans is 
becoming increasingly popular, partly due to the PPC (Project 
Preparation Committee), a multi-donor group coordinated from the 
EBRD. The packages often include blends of commercial loans and 
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grants (for example for improving the enforcement of regulations), 
making the loans more attractive to the borrower. 
In the past, IFIs have tended to favour ‘end-of-pipe’ projects that are 
perceived to have a lower risk. Wastewater treatment plants offer 
relatively rapid ‘fixes’ of problems but may not be the most cost-effective 
or holistic solution to many environmental problems. The Black Sea 
region is littered with defunct Soviet-era wastewater treatment plants. 
They ceased to operate because of inappropriate technology, poor 
maintenance or a lack of financial instruments (water and waste tariffs, 
licensing fees, etc.) to pay the cost of operation. Through hidden 
subsidies, treatment plants may have actually encouraged wasteful 
production processes. By supporting technological quick fixes, the IFIs 
could be perceived as encouraging a ‘business as usual’ philosophy to 
environmental protection. The overcapacity of Black Sea fishing fleets 
and its social, environmental and economic consequences provide another 
sad example of ill-conceived sectoral investment policies seeking quick 
returns. 
Fortunately, the approach used in the ‘World Bank Strategic Partnership’ 
discussed earlier reflects a more sensitive approach towards Black Sea 
environmental protection. By supporting investments in such things as 
wetland protection initiatives and agricultural reform packages, it is 
possible to tackle the problem of eutrophication closer to its root causes 
and to achieve multiple benefits. There is undeniably a place for 
wastewater treatment plants but these can sometimes be financed through 
commercial loans from the private sector. Unfortunately, it is still quite 
difficult to attract small-scale donor support for relatively small sums of 
$500,000-$1 million needed to restore and upgrade many wastewater 
treatment plants that have not functioned for some years owing to the 
need for a major overhaul or missing pumps.  
In most Black Sea countries there are major problems to finance 
measures to protect the environment, particularly the operation and 
maintenance cost of municipal utilities, such as waste collection and 
disposal. In some cases, local economies are so depressed that the users 
cannot afford to pay the full costs of utilities. Inspectorates of pollution 
may not be adequately empowered to enforce revenue-gathering charges 
and collect fines from industry, despite the importance given to the 
‘polluter-pays’ principle in the Black Sea Strategic Action Plan. It is 
necessary to regard environmental protection as an indispensable part of a 
wider process of economic reform. As a separate agenda item, it will 
inevitably find its way to the bottom of the list. 
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5.  European Integration and the Black Sea Environment 
5.1  Prerogatives for change 
The prospect of integration of at least three Black Sea countries as 
members of the European Union represents a huge geopolitical change in 
the Black Sea region. This change will have profound consequences for 
the Black Sea environment and the measures developed to protect it. 
Though clearly one of Europe’s major regional seas, the Black Sea is 
ignored in existing European Community Directives. The Water 
Framework Directive46 (WFD), flagship of the Community water policy, 
does not even mention the Black Sea nor classify it amongst its 
ecoregions. Though this reflects the status quo (i.e. that no coastal states 
are members of the Community), it overlooks the fact that two member 
states (Germany and Austria) occupy a significant area of the Black Sea 
basin (the entirety of Austria drains into the Black Sea). The WFD adopts 
a catchment area approach and this implies that the Community already 
shares some responsibility for protecting the Black Sea. To quote article 
35 of the Directive:  
Within a river basin where use of water may have 
transboundary effects, the requirements for the achievement 
of the environmental objectives established under this 
Directive, and in particular all programmes of measures, 
should be co-ordinated for the whole of the river basin 
district. For river basins extending beyond the boundaries of 
the Community, Member States should endeavour to ensure 
the appropriate co-ordination with the relevant non-member 
States.  
Certainly, the Commission has been very active in its support of the 
International Commission for the Protection of the River Danube and has 
consistently provided technical assistance to the Black Sea 
Environmental Programme through TACIS. Until very recently, however, 
it has been careful to avoid any statement that may be construed as a legal 
obligation to protect the Black Sea ecosystem.  
With the future accession of Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, this situation 
is changing radically. The European Commission, already accepted as an 
observer in the Black Sea Commission, will inevitably become a 
signatory. It will have direct influence on the policy-making process in 
the region. Experience from the neighbouring Mediterranean Action Plan 
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(the body responsible for the Barcelona Convention for the 
Mediterranean) suggests that this influence can be both positive and 
negative. The positive side is that it brings the considerable experience of 
all member states to the table, new opportunities for financing and the 
legislative and policy framework of the Commission’s Directives. The 
negative side is the reticence of Commission representatives to sanction 
any new initiatives that they feel may contradict Community policy. The 
Commission, for example, has yet to sign the new Protocols of the 
Barcelona Convention described earlier. Reference to them is omitted in 
the WFD. 
5.2  Case studies of EC legal and policy instruments 
A brief consideration of three key items of Community legislation will 
illustrate the potential effects of the accession process: 
The Water Framework Directive. This key directive serves as a new 
framework for the implementation of a number of EC directives of direct 
relevance to the Black Sea. The framework is designed to give coherence 
to these directives and also to provide direct linkages to regional and sub-
regional conventions and other agreements. It adopts an integrated 
catchment area management approach, setting geographical boundaries at 
watersheds defined as ‘river basin districts’ rather than following political 
borders. It moves away from previous notions of harmonised water 
quality objectives covering the entire Community, to a more pragmatic 
and scientifically sound approach. 
The WFD expects member states to complete their plans for compliance 
by 2003. For those countries seeking accession, Bulgaria and Romania 
have already been modifying their environmental laws to comply with 
some of the directives covered by the WFD. Turkey is now following 
suit. Interestingly, Ukraine, on its own account has decided to follow the 
provisions of the WFD when reforming its own laws and regulations. For 
the Black Sea, there are some key elements in the overall strategy that, 
though difficult to implement, will make a huge contribution to solving 
environmental issues. 
The reorganisation of water management into river basin districts (and 
receiving waters) will require root and branch reforms of the present 
institutional structure for compliance. It will also require new cooperative 
arrangements and the strengthening of existing ones. 
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The requirement to implement the Community Nitrates47 and Phosphorus 
Directives should lead to reduced nutrient loads and hence facilitate the 
countries to attain the targets for nutrient control negotiated between the 
Danube and Black Sea Commissions. Having said this, it should be 
pointed out that in practice most member states have failed to comply 
with the directive, a matter of great concern within the Commission. 
Implementation of the directive should start with the designation of the 
Black Sea as a vulnerable receiving water. This will trigger a cascade of 
obligations, both to member states and those in the process of accession 
throughout the Black Sea catchment. Most of the obligations are 
concerned with agricultural reforms of the type envisaged in the new 
phase of GEF intervention.  
The requirement to apply the new Community Bathing Water Directive48 
will change the currently ambiguous way of informing (or emphatically 
not informing) the public about conditions of Black Sea bathing waters 
and beaches. This will undoubtedly change the agenda of many coastal 
municipalities that hope to maintain and develop a tourist industry.  
The implementation of the WFD will require a huge effort by the four 
countries that intend to follow its use as the basis of national legislation. 
The reform of legislation is relatively easy compared with the task of 
implementation and compliance, and a major sustained programme of 
assistance is needed to build the necessary capacity. Community support 
through the PHARE programme and subsequently the accession 
programme has focused on country-by-country support, often to the 
exclusion of cross-border assistance. Though a logical prioritisation, the 
approach taken strictly follows political boundaries and since 1996 has 
not supported the participation of accession countries in their 
implementation of the Bucharest Convention.  
The above situation begs the question of what will happen to those 
countries (Russia and Georgia) that are developing their legislation along 
different lines to those of the WFD. In the case of Russia, the river basin 
approach has already been followed in projects such as the Lower Don, 
supported through a World Bank loan. It is true however that the old 
Soviet system of water quality standards is completely incompatible with 
that used in the West. There are moves to change this system but the 
recent ambiguous situation of Russian regulatory institutions has left 
much uncertainty on the way the process will develop. The situation of 
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Georgia is different in that the main constraint is the virtual absence of 
national funding for the environmental sector and legislation is 
somewhere in between the old Soviet system and a more Western 
approach. In the medium term, the situation of Russia and Georgia should 
not hamper the successful implementation of the WFD in the Black Sea. 
The main rivers draining these countries to the Black Sea are entirely 
national and contribute a relatively minor share of pollutants. In the short 
term, the Bucharest Convention can be implemented quite successfully 
with the two different regulatory regimes; the difference between success 
and failure will be much more a matter of compliance than of the 
regulations themselves. To illustrate this point, it is worth recalling that 
there has been no comprehensive monitoring exercise in the Black Sea 
since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
The Habitats Directive. The 1992 EC Habitats and Birds Directive is the 
main element of legislation protecting biological diversity in the 
European Commission. It requires member states to propose areas for 
designation as Special Areas for Conservation (SACs, often termed 
Natura 2000 sites). Particular endangered species can also be granted a 
protected status. The process of implementation of the directive is well 
behind schedule but several countries have already listed their ‘candidate 
SACs’. In addition to many categories of terrestrial habitats, the 
legislation recognises two submerged habitat classes for the marine 
environment, reefs and sandbanks. These loosely defined habitats cover 
the majority of potential protected areas. The main problem with the 
designation of SACs is that it is a national process and there are no 
special provisions for transborder situations. It is for this reason that the 
OSPAR Commission (the regional seas commission for the northeastern 
Atlantic region) has developed its own system of ‘Marine Protected 
Areas’. This is formalised in Annex V to the OSPAR Convention and has 
been the subject of much debate and consensus-building. Marine 
Protected Areas may allow certain human activity (including some kinds 
of fishing) and may be transborder in nature. Most of the OSPAR 
countries are EU member states and are therefore subject to both OSPAR 
and Natura 2000 regulations. For the two non-member countries, Norway 
and Iceland, only national and OSPAR regulations apply. This is a 
situation that parallels the Black Sea. All six Black Sea countries will be 
subject to the new Landscape and Biological Diversity Protocol, currently 
in its final stages of preparation, and this will provide a vehicle for 
countries to declare national and transborder protected areas. 
Following accession (or perhaps during the accession process), Bulgaria, 
Romania and Turkey will have to propose their own SACs to the 
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Commission. By this time, the ongoing OSPAR debate49 should have set 
a precedent that will be directly transferable to the Black Sea. In 
principle, the existence of these two conservation instruments should be 
complementary and offer the basis for proper protection of habitats, such 
as the remaining Phyllophora beds in Ukraine or the bivalve reefs off the 
coast of Bulgaria. 
The current situation of protected areas in the region is very poor and 
legislation is incompatible and often ineffective. The strictest protection 
is afforded by the Soviet concept of a Zapovednik  or fully protected area. 
This rigorously excludes all human economic activity but is increasingly 
difficult to apply in the face of demand for access from the local 
population and, more to the point, financial interests from the emergent 
private sector. A recent case in the author’s experience was the Ropotamo 
Nature Reserve in Bulgaria, a small and beautiful reserve on the Black 
Sea coast. The reserve includes a fully protected area surrounded by 
‘buffer zones’ where human development is strictly regulated. The 
Ropotamo buffer zone includes the highest area of dunes in the Balkan 
peninsula, a habitat for at least seven species of plants cited in the Black 
Sea Red Data book. As the result of a ‘legal loophole’ of a previous 
government, one part of the buffer zone was sold to a property developer 
and the other side conceded to a hunting association. The entire reserve 
has only two wardens and the hunters place food close to the edge of the 
reserve in order to attract animals and shoot them. Currently, the mayor 
of the administrative district, together with a number of conservationists, 
is fighting in the high court to restore the buffer zones. 
The above case would have been entirely different had the reserve been 
protected under the Habitats Directive. The directive would have given 
much greater power to sustain the reserve as part of a wider network. The 
current problem is that protected areas are being lost very quickly and 
there will be very few sites that can be declared as SACs by the time 
accession is completed. This, together with the fact that only half the 
countries are candidate members, is a good reason for the Black Sea to 
adopt its own Landscape and Biological Diversity Protocol. 
In the former Soviet countries, the situation is similar. The system of 
protected areas is under great pressure from developers. Recently, for 
example, a unique stand of ancient forest was clear-cut for the Blue 
Stream gas pipeline that is being laid from Russia, under the Black Sea to 
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Turkey. Alternative routes avoiding the forest were dismissed in order to 
cut costs. Measures to protect near-shore sea grass beds are being 
rendered ineffective by unregulated trawling. Little by little, opportunities 
to protect fragile habitats are being lost, mostly as a result of ambiguous 
regulations, weak compliance and short-term thinking. The reality is that 
the Soviet concept of Zapovednik  may also be inappropriate to areas with 
a high population density and competing demand for space. The 
alternative, integration of the human population in a participatory 
approach to nature protection, requires careful planning, understanding of 
cultural values and rigorous compliance. Accession of western Black Sea 
countries to the European Union will do little to foster this approach in 
the east. However, participation of EC technical specialists, co-financing 
and support of the new Black Sea Protocol would help to establish a 
stronger network that may make a genuine commitment to the protection 
and restoration of Black Sea habitats. 
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The CFP is an example of a policy 
instrument that has failed to achieve its objective to regulate European 
fishing in a sustainable manner. The recent Green Paper50 on the CFP 
provides a frank description of the weaknesses of the current policy, 
particularly that the scientific advice on total allowable catches given by 
the Commission was not respected in the negotiated settlement with 
governments. This implies that governments were knowingly permitting 
catches beyond the safe biological limits for some species. The industry 
is riddled with hidden subsidies resulting in overcapacity – too many 
boats chasing too few fish. The paper also recognises the ecological 
damage caused by overfishing.  
As a result of this policy failure, the Commission has initiated a process 
of urgent reform of the CFP. It states that ‘apart from these internal 
systemic weaknesses, there are also challenges that make reform 
necessary: the forthcoming enlargement of the European Union’. 
The shape of the new CFP will not be determined until the end of 2002. 
Negotiations with stakeholders are difficult and often acrimonious. It is 
clear however that it will follow the FAO Code of Conduct for Fisheries, 
seek to reduce overcapacity and hidden subsidies and have a more 
ecological dimension. In the case of transborder water bodies including 
members and non-members, it will have to work closely with regional 
fisheries conventions. 
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In the case of the Black Sea, there is no fisheries agreement covering all 
countries. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) recently 
established a fisheries sub-group to try to complete the negotiations on a 
new Convention. The sub-group, composed of senior representatives of 
Ministries of Agriculture, together with BSEC officials, decided that 
BSEC was not a suitable host organisation for any permanent inter-state 
fisheries body. This was because BSEC has a wider geographical 
mandate than the coastal Black Sea countries. For this reason, BSEC 
asked the Secretariat for the Bucharest Convention to take up the fisheries 
challenge. Potentially, this offers the advantage of a fisheries commission 
cohabiting with an environmental commission, but without additional 
resources it would stretch the existing secretariat beyond reasonable 
limits. At its 8th meeting (February 2002), the Black Sea Commission 
appears to have taken up the challenge and it will be interesting to see 
how this aspect of its work develops in the near future. It is just possible 
that, by including a broad range of stakeholders, it can avoid the same 
pitfalls as the original CFP. However, there is currently no scientific basis 
for setting quotas in the Black Sea – a full stock assessment has never 
been conducted. 
There is also a debate on the ecological aspects of the potential new 
Black Sea Fisheries Convention. There is a need to make a clear 
distinction between measures that the industry should take to sustain 
itself and limit its environmental impact and those that should be taken to 
protect key habitats and species from all human pressures including 
fishing. The Biological and Landscape Diversity Protocol of the 
Bucharest Convention should be complementary to the new Fisheries 
Convention and an early dialogue should be established in order to avoid 
overlaps of responsibilities between the two instruments. In order to 
avoid regulatory failures, the new Fisheries Convention should 
contemplate a wide range of instruments including fisheries recovery 
zones (‘no-take zones’). 
How will this development relate to the new CFP? The CFP will only 
affect those countries that have entered the accession process. In the case 
of Romania and Bulgaria, their share of the Black Sea fisheries is 
currently quite small. The real impact of the new CFP would not be felt 
until Turkey enters the group since it currently accounts for 90% of the 
Black Sea fisheries (in terms of monetary value) and has a large excess of 
fleet capacity. The Black Sea countries would be well advised to request 
observer status for the EC during the Fisheries Convention negotiations, 
as this will avoid future incompatibility of policy between the CFP and 
the Regional Convention. Similarly, Black Sea countries should be 
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formally invited to express their opinion on the EC Green Paper. Perhaps 
EC assistance should also be requested to support a full stock assessment 
in the Black Sea and to improve the understanding of the relationship 
between fish stocks and habitat. 
A success story for MARPOL. With respect to the MARPOL Convention, 
whose special provisions remain unimplemented in the region 25 years 
after ratification, the pre-accession of Bulgaria and Romania has led to an 
unexpected recent development in the region. The new EC port waste 
Directive will impose even stricter controls than MARPOL. Harbour 
masters are concerned that the new provisions will increase some port 
charges and influence the trade to their ports. They have recently formed 
a Black Sea Ports Association, involving all six countries, and are calling 
for the new regulations to be applied in a uniform manner and for grants 
and credits to be given in order to equip their ports to appropriate 
standards. This is a good example of the positive regional impact that can 
result from the accession process. 
5.3  Longer-term perspectives 
The vision of a new Europe implies vast changes in the nature of 
production and the distribution of goods and services. It is difficult to 
foresee the eventual impact of an unreformed Common Agricultural 
Policy for example. The fertile plains of the lower Danube could become 
Europe’s breadbasket. In such circumstances, there would be an 
enormous new pressure on the Black Sea from the kind of high-
technology agriculture already employed in other parts of the 
Community. In devising new environmental policies for the region, it is 
important to consider these scenarios and take appropriate measures. 
Until now, most policy work has examined scenarios based on ‘business 
as usual’ or ‘application of the EC Directives to existing production’. The 
real scenario may be ‘entirely new business’! Such a tantalising economic 
perspective could give new opportunities for sustainable development if it 
is planned in a holistic manner. Entirely opportunistic development, 
however, could completely wipe out any advances achieved in 
environmental protection through the processes described in the present 
paper. 
5.4  EC involvement in the Black Sea Commission 
Until recently, the EC has been cautious not to become too heavily 
involved in the formal aspects of implementation of the Bucharest 
Convention. Its support was initially channelled through the PHARE 
multi-country programme for Romania and Bulgaria and the TACIS 
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programme for the countries of the former Soviet Union. It has not 
provided funding for work in Turkey. Total funding of the order of €12 
million has been provided through these mechanisms for a number of 
projects to support the development and implementation of the Black Sea 
Strategic Action Plan. In addition, a smaller sum was provided by the 
Commission (DG-XI now DG-Environment) for the work of the BSEP 
Programme Coordination Unit. This funding was critically important for 
the survival of the programme at a time when other sources had become 
exhausted. 
The Commission’s support was much more effective for the TACIS 
countries than the PHARE countries. The Accession programme replaced 
PHARE and the multi-country programme was closed, effectively closing 
the door from 1995 to all EC support to Bulgaria and Romania to work 
with the other Black Sea countries. It is also unfortunate that the 
Commission had no mechanism to support the participation of Turkey, 
fuelling this country’s sense of isolation. This difficulty to fund 
multilateral cross-border collaborative mechanisms is a serious flaw in 
the EC foreign aid programme and represents a serious lack of strategic 
thinking on longer-term cooperation in the expanded Community.  
The Black Sea Commission itself has encouraged the European 
Commission to take a more active role in implementing the Bucharest 
Convention. From its signature in 1992, the Black Sea countries opened 
the Convention for signature by its neighbours, particularly those 
countries within the Danube. Signature by non-coastal countries was 
foreseen as an act of solidarity and bore neither financial obligations nor 
voting rights. No other country opted to enter into such arrangement and 
there is no evidence that the Black Sea countries promoted signature by 
non-coastal states. At the 7th Meeting of the Black Sea Commission (29-
31 May 2001), a resolution was passed containing rules to establish 
permanent observer status and the EC was accepted as the first permanent 
observer.  
An important recent development that partially responds to growing 
pressure for greater EU involvement has been the publication of the 
‘Communication from the Commission on Environmental Cooperation in 
the Danube-Black Sea Region. 51 This document provides a technical 
overview of the issues facing the basin and the evolving instruments for 
addressing them. It concludes that:  
                                                                 
51 European Commission [2001b]. 
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The environmental degradation of the Danube and Black Sea 
region requires urgent attention and can only be tackled 
through a joint effort of environmental rehabilitation, 
conducted at regional level. This much-required effort will 
become a prime tool to promote and then secure the 
sustainable development of the region. 
Amongst the specific  actions proposed by this welcome document are 1) 
an operational framework for cooperation in the entire region; 2) 
improved integration of Danube and Black Sea priorities into the EU 
cooperation policy, including sectoral integration and 3) more efficient 
financial assistance. 
Regarding the first action (the operational framework), the vision of the 
EC is to take a ‘more pro-active role’ and become the ‘driving force’ of 
‘co-ordinated assistance’. Though broadly welcomed, there is concern 
that too aggressive a role from the EC might block important advances in 
cross-border cooperation. This has already occurred in the Mediterranean 
where the EC is a Contracting Party to the Barcelona Convention and has 
been unable to sign, ratify or promote measures that do not exactly 
correspond to its own Directives or future Directives.52 This can cause 
resentment in non-member countries. For the Black Sea Basin, the 
process of seeking a common platform has already begun with the 
formation of a Danube-Black Sea Task Force (DANBLAS), which was 
one of the outcomes of the EC-sponsored Ministerial Meeting held on 26 
November 2001. DANBLAS met for the first time on 1 March 2002. 
Unfortunately, the mandate of the Task Force is restricted to the 
application of the WFD, thus excluding much of the broad-based 
intersectoral approach fostered in the Black Sea Strategic Action Plan. Its 
title also suggests that the other key transboundary basins (Dnieper, 
Dniester, Don) are excluded even though the riparian countries 
themselves are part of the Task Force. This raises the question of whether 
the objective of the Commission is to facilitate integrated basin-wide 
management or merely to ease the implementation of the WFD for 
accession countries. To its credit, however, the process may help to 
                                                                 
52 One of the main problems is that in matters regulated by existing EC 
Directives, the EC Representative is entitled to vote on behalf of all the member 
states in the region. For non-member states this gives the impression of 
powerlessness against a ‘cartel’ from the north. If the EC were to become a 
Contracting Party to the Bucharest Convention following accession of, say, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, there would be a danger of an East-West 
division between an EC ‘bloc’ and a NIS (newly industrialised state) ‘bloc’. 
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achieve a consensus on solving the problem of eutrophication, a problem 
that can only be solved by concerted action within the enlarged EU. 
Hopefully, the European Commission will take this opportunity to 
become involved in a mechanism that will inevitably help them to reduce 
the image of creating a fortress Europe with a border that divides the 
Black Sea from East to West. The Commission may now regard 
accession of any of the Black Sea countries as an appropriate moment to 
sign the Bucharest Convention and its Protocols. They should already 
develop a strategy for incorporation of Black Sea issues in key policies 
such as the revised Common Fisheries Policy and the Water Framework 
Directive and not simply employ the new framework as a mechanism for 
‘shoehorning’ existing policies into the new geopolitical reality. 
The second and third actions (enhancing technical and financial 
assistance) should improve the standing of the Black Sea Basin within a 
broad range of EU technical assistance instruments and programmes (e.g. 
LIFE, PHARE, TACIS, and ISPA). It should also serve to ‘mainstream’ 
Black Sea issues in new co-operative agreements (such as those aimed at 
managing tributaries within the Basin). Most importantly, in the next 
review of the Common Agricultural Policy, the Commission will 
endeavour to include the prerogative to control Black Sea eutrophication 
by reducing nutrient discharges from agriculture.  
6.  Conclusion: Towards a Common Purpose 
In many senses, the Black Sea is Europe’s forgotten sea, swept aside 
from collective and individual consciences because there is always 
someone else to blame for its predicament. Situated at the end of one-
third of Europe’s drains, its health, or rather sickness, is a symptom of 
unsustainable development and social and political division.  
A large number amongst the 16 million people dwelling on the Black 
Sea’s shores care about this situation, although only a few feel 
empowered to take action. This situation is not hopeless however and a 
number of actions, mostly but not all supported by governments, have 
made a real difference to the prospects for the protection and recovery of 
this valuable system. 
The present paper has examined the hypothesis that the gradual accession 
of at least half of the six Black Sea countries to the European Community 
will facilitate this sea’s recovery. It has demonstrated that the accession 
process will accelerate the reform of regulatory instruments and 
encourage greater investment. If the European Commission takes a more 
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proactive stance, it will also help the Black Sea Commission to fulfil its 
responsibilities. 
Having said this, there is also cause for concern. The EC has failed to 
regulate its own fishing industry in a sustainable manner. It has not 
managed to fully implement many of the Directives that are part of the 
accession process. Extension of the Common Agricultural Policy to the 
lower Danube countries may also introduce new stresses to the Black Sea 
ecosystem. The Commission has paid very little attention to improving 
public awareness of environmental issues and their solutions. 
Furthermore, an overly aggressive presence of the EC in regional bodies 
such as the Black Sea (environmental) Commission could create tensions 
between the new member states and non-member states that will sit 
around the table as equals. 
For the Black Sea, it is timely for the European Commission to fully 
embrace the challenge ahead and to formalise a commitment to protecting 
this unique European water body. This will be an investment towards a 
sustainable future for the Community. The absence of any mention of the 
Black Sea in key instruments such as the Water Framework Directive or 
in policy papers on the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy is 
particularly short-sighted and regrettable. The important initiatives 
announced in the recent Commission Communication 615 on 
environmental cooperation in the Black Sea Basin [European 
Commission, 2001b] should redress the situation regarding the WFD but 
does not yet tackle the fisheries and biodiversity issues in the Black Sea 
itself. It is seen as an awakening of the EU consciousness that we 
hopefully lead to a new spirit of cooperation. 
For the Contracting Parties to the Bucharest Convention, the time is ripe 
to re-examine this rather archaic instrument. Though uniquely important, 
the Convention follows sectoral thinking of the early 1970s and should be 
reformed to pursue a more holistic approach: ‘joined-up thinking for 
joined-up issues’. For those who worked hard to foster and implement the 
existing Convention, there is a temptation to regard it as sacrosanct. This 
attitude would eventually guarantee its death warrant.  
It is important to place the development of policy and legislation in a 
pragmatic perspective and to take care that all the energy of the very 
small number of regional technical experts is not spent on procedural 
arrangements and rhetoric. For every expert engaged in policy and law, at 
least another ten need to focus their energies on compliance, monitoring 
and public participation. New capacity has to be built, but a properly 
funded environmental authority with attractive professional salaries and 
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infrastructure must be included in the economies of all six Black Sea 
countries if the benefits of environmental protection are to be realised. 
Achievement of such a change will be one of the most difficult 
challenges of the coming decades. 
The author remains optimistic about the future of the Black Sea. The 
flywheel of change is moving. It is our duty to oil it and help it on its 
way. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AIOC Azerbaijan International Oil Company 
AMBO Albanian, Macedonian, Bulgarian Oil Corporation 
API American Petroleum Institute 
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 
bcm Billion cubic metres (of natural gas) 
bcmy bcm per year 
BEAC Barents Euro-Arctic Council 
bl barrels 
BlackSeaFor Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group 
bnbls  billion barrels 
BP British Petroleum 
BSCA Association of Black Sea Capitals 
BSEC  (Organisation for) Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
BSEC BC BSEC Business Council 
BSEEP Black Sea Environment Education Project 
BSEP Black Sea Environmental Programme 
BS-SAP Strategic Action Plan for the Rehabilitation and 
Protection of the Black Sea 
BSTDB Black Sea Trade and Development Bank  
BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (pipeline) 
CARDS Community Assistance for Association, Democratisation 
and Stabilisation 
CASP Cambridge Arctic Shelf Programme 
CBSS Council of Baltic Sea States 
CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies 
CERA Cambridge Energy Research Associates 
CFP Common Fisheries Policy 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
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CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
CPC Caspian Pipeline Consortium 
DANBLAS Danube-Black Sea Task Force 
DHKD Turkish Society for the Protection of Nature 
EAEC EurAsian Economic Community 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EC  European Community 
ECOSOC UN Economic and Social Council 
EIB  European Investment Bank 
EP European Parliament 
EPDRB Environmental Programme for the Danube River Basin 
EU European Union 
FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation (of the UN) 
FSU Former Soviet Union 
GEF  United Nation’s Global Environment Facility 
GESAMP Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine 
Environmental Protection 
GIOC  State Oil Company of Georgia  
GEF  Global Environmental facility 
GUUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova 
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
(World Bank) 
IBSC International Black Sea Club 
ICBSS International Center for Black Sea Studies 
ICPBS International Commission for the Protection of the Black 
Sea 
ICPDR International Commission for the Protection of the 
Danube River 
IFC International Financial Corporation 
ABBREVIATIONS  
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IFI International Financial Institution 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IMO International Maritime Organisation 
INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe 
INTAS International Association for the promotion of 
cooperation with scientists from the New Independent 
States of the former Soviet Union 
ISPA Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession 
LIFE EC Financial Instrument for the Environment 
LNG Liquefied natural gas 
LPG Liquefied petroleum gas 
MEDA Mediterranean Assistance Programme 
MLA Multinational Lending Agency 
mmbd Million barrels 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
mty Million tonnes (of oil) per year 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
NIOC State Oil Company of Iran 
OAS Organisation of American States 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic  
PABSEC Parliamentary Assembly of BSEC 
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
PERMIS Permanent International Secretariat of BSEC 
PETrA Pan-European Transport Area 
ABBREVIATIONS  
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PHARE Poland/Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring 
Economies 
PPC Project Preparation Committee (multi-donor group 
coordinated from the EBRD) 
PSA Production Sharing Agreement 
SAC Special Areas for Conservation 
SAPARD Special Accession Programme for Agricultural and 
Rural Development 
SECI Southeast European Cooperative Initiative 
SME  Small and medium-size enterprise 
SPA  Supply and Purchase Agreement 
TACIS Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
TCGP  Trans-national gas pipeline (Central Asia -Caspian) 
TDA  Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis 
TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia 
ULCC Ultra-Large Crude Carrier 
UN United Nations 
UNCED UN Conference on Environment and Development 
UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and Development 
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme 
VLCC Very Large Crude Carrier 
VTS Vessel Traffic Services 
WFD  Water Framework Directive (of the EC) 
WHO World Health Organisation 
WTO   World Trade Organisation 
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Figure 1. Exploration in the Caspian 
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Source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA). 
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Figure 2. Oil Pipelines in the Caspian 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA). 
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Figure 3. Black Sea Oil Flows, 2000 (crude and products) 
 
Notes: All figures in millions of tonnes annually. The figures for Romania and 
Bulgaria represent crude oil imports. Except for the volume of crude oil 
imported into the Black Sea, these imports are roughly the equivalent of 
Russian and Caspian crude; this drawing thus reduces total flow through 
the straits. 
Source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA). 
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Figure 4. Bypassing the Bosphorus: Proposed options 
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Figure 5. The Turkish market: Pivot for new gas geography? 
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 Figure 6. Central Asian gas pipelines 
 
Source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA). 
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Figure 7. South Caspian disputed areas 
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Figure 1. The Black Sea basin  
 
 
 
 
  
 
